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This monograph attempts a study of the history and
problems of Japan's postwar naval forces drawing largely on
the living participants in the activities and events making
up that history, a subject area largely neglected to date.
The study concludes that despite the ideals and di-
rectives of the Occupation, Japan was never fully stripped
of naval forces following the Second World War. More impor-
tant, some people were not fully convinced of the possibil-
ity and desirability of perpetual disarmament. Plans for
eventual rearmament began to be formulated even before the
almost complete disarmament was achieved. In fact, specific
rearmament studies and plans were being made by the very
persons who were exempt from Occupation purge directives in
order to work in the government on disarmement. Rather
than trying to effect any type of conspiracy, these persons
were, instead, acting sincerely for what they thought best
for their country and were at least sympathetically encour-
aged throughout much of the Occupation by important
1

Japanese political figures and influential U.S. naval offi-
cers
.
Although Article 9 of the Japanese postwar Consti-
tution called for a ban on war as a sovereign right of the
nation and on maintaining land, sea, and air forces, an idea
that may have been originated by Japanese Prime Minister
Shidehara, it was an idea that did not appear in other
drafts of the new Constitution and it was opposed from the
outset by some conservative politicians and former military
leaders who thought it dangerous for Japan's security.
General Douglas MacArthur who was responsible for the inclu-
sion of the article in the Constitution, if not its author-
ship, maintained that he never meant for the provision to
ban armed self-defense measures; and it appears that the
man immediately responsible for the drafting, General
Courtney Whitney, understood the amendments to Article 9 as
proposed by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi, who was advised that the
Americans might interpret the changes to allow rearmament
for self-defense in the future, to mean exactly that. In
any event, such allowance for future armed self-defense was
not explained to the Japanese Diet reviewing the Constitu-
tion in 1946; and the government's official explanation,

which has always maintained that regular armed forces, war
potential, and the right of belligerency, a term found to
have no meaning in international law, were forbidden, has
led to efforts to live within the confines of Article 9
and still have armed forces only for self-defense, to main-
tain special civilians in military uniforms conducting
military activities, and by ever-changing, increasing
estimates of what constitutes self-defense and what is not
war potential to give opposition parties the opportunity
to argue credibly that the entire idea of armed self-
defense has from the beginning been unconstitutional.
Less than one year after the new Constitution went
into effect, a new organization conducting naval activities
under the advice and actual participation of former naval
personnel was formed with little opposition other than from
a few American Occupation officials and Soviet representa-
tives on various Allied postwar commissions; although the
Maritime Safety Agency was called a non-military force, its
activities were from the outset, though limited, military
in nature. In October, 1950, when the world thought Japan
had no naval forces, 46 of its ships deployed into combat,
the only such action in the nation's postwar history to date

Since recovering independence, the Japanese formed
a National Safety Agency in 1952, incorporating a police
reserve force founded after the outbreak of the Korean War
because of the removal of American ground units and a naval
guard unit formed within the Maritime Safety Agency. In
1954 the name of the Safety Agency was changed to the Defense
Agency; the explicit mission of defending the country against
external aggression was added. Also, a third unit with an
air defense role was added so that the three forces re-
sembled the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, which provided
their Japanese counterparts with equipment and training. The
National Defense Council, to be the Prime Minister's top ad-
visory body on national security matters was constituted in
1956; and a year later a basic national defense policy,
unchanged to the present, was adopted after Council and
Cabinet approval. A very small percentage of the gross
national product and a usually declining portion of the
national budget, although gradually increasing in absolute
amount, has been annually allotted to defense since 1952,
but little more than a training capability has ever been
achieved. Especially taking into account advancements made
by other countries and because of the greatly increasing

tempo of its commercial maritime activities, Japan may be
relatively less able at present to provide for its naval
defense than before. Never given the power to conscript
and with postwar military activity constitutionally doubt-
ful and unpopular, the ability to attract and hold young
recruits has dwindled under conditions of advanced economic
prosperity, including nearly full employment with attendant
categorial shortages, in the postwar era. A small portion
of the modest defense budget has been annually earmarked
for research and development with the result that Japan's
forces have so far been dependent on sometimes outmoded
foreign technology or ideas of interest and benefit to
domestic industry for weaponry. Adequate stockpiles of
fuel and ammunition or logistic support for any type of
sustained defense capability have never been accumulated
or maintained so that claims of autonomous or even consid-
erable defense capability seem quite weak from a military
point of view.
This monograph challenges many of the basic popular
assumptions concerning the disarmament of Japan, the timing
and causes of its rearmament, and the character of its
actual postwar forces. Specific assumptions challenged

include those maintaining: that sea forces were never
maintained from 1945-1952; that no military organization
was allowed to exist during the pre-Korean War period of
demilitarization; that Japanese and American planning for
rearmament came only after the outbreak of the Korean War;
that rearmament was forced on the Japanese by the United
States government, particularly in the person of special
envoy John Foster Dulles; that Japan has really wanted to
provide itself only internal security, the U.S. guaranteeing
external security, an unchanged Japanese policy which has
finally won out over American changing attitudes; that the
Self-Defense Forces in general and the Maritime Self-
Defense Force in particular do not rely on the traditions
of the Imperial Forces and are in fact basically new al-
though hybrid organizations; that the Self-Defense Forces
are now more powerful than the prewar forces and are capable
of providing for the autonomous defense of Japan; and that
militarism might be returning to Japan as partially mani-
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The greatest portion of my research and writing was
accomplished in a ten-month period in Tokyo during the aca-
demic year 1970-71. A letter of introduction from Admiral
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy,
to Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, Chief of Maritime Staff, Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force, established the contacts which
made this project possible. The personal and continuing in-
terest of both admirals was of unquestionable assistance in
arranging interviews and in learning and experiencing so
many different aspects of Japan. Because of their personal
prestige, I was treated as a distinguished guest at all times
during my stay; to both leaders I am sincerely grateful.
Other people who assisted cannot all be individually
listed, but some who provided special help cannot go unmen-
tioned.
Seven people of extraordinary talent were of constant
service and offered the kindness of friendship along with
their professionalism: Mr. Taoka Shunji of the Asahi Shimbun
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was an invaluable source of information; his encyclopedic
knowledge of military history was exceeded only by the
hospitality shown me by his family; Mr. Raymond Y. Aka of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo,
the American most knowledgeable on the subject of the
Japan Self-Defense Forces, arranged interviews with numer-
ous political leaders, bureaucrats, and defense officials
I would have been otherwise unable to meet; Captain Robert J.
Harlow, U.S. Navy, of the U.S. Military Okinawa Negotiating
Team, strongly influenced my orientation to and understand-
ing of military affairs; his superb professionalism and
moral leadership were of utmost help; Mr. Shimada Shigeo of
The Daily Yomiuri was an ideal interpreter/translator and
warm friend; his knowledge of military terminology in both
Japanese and English made his services invaluable; Mr. Masuoka
Ichiro, secretary to Speaker of the House of Representatives
Funada Naka was an enthusiastic source of friendship and
assistance; his well-earned title of "Japan's Mr. Navy" is
indicative of his interests and accomplishments; Dr. Tsunoda
Jun, research expert of the National Diet Library, taught me
naval history and served as an advisor on many facets of
Japanese affairs; similarly, Professor Iwashima Hisao of
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the National Defense College taught me so much about Japan
and the Self-Defense Forces.
Retired officers including Admirals Arleigh Burke,
USN, and Nakayama Sadayoshi, UN and JMSDF, Vice Admirals
Hoshina Zenshiro, UN, Yoshida Eizo, Tamura Kyuzo, and Terai
Yoshimori, UN and JMSDF, Rear Admirals Yamamoto Yoshio,
Akishige Jitsue, UN, and Redfield Mason, USN, and Captains
Noble W. Abrahams, USN, and Frank M. Meals, USCG, as well
as former Maritime Safety officials Okubo Takeo and Mita
Kazuya, former Defense Agency officials Aso Shigeru and
Kaihara Osamu, and former U.S. naval officer and civilian
official Scribner McCoy took active interest and provided
first-hand knowledge and documents of their pioneering ef-
forts in the development of Japan's postwar naval forces.
Professor Allan B. Cole of the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy directed my work throughout and offered
constructive criticism and generous time in matters of sub-
stance and style. Captain William J. Crowe Jr., U.S. Navy,
former head of the Pacific and Far East Branch of the
Politico-Military Section of the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, rendered much useful help and advice.
Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer and Dr. Roger Dingman of
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Harvard University directed my master's thesis on naval
activities during the Occupation the previous academic year
and continued to show interest and offer assistance.
Dr. Dean C. Allard, archivist of the U.S. Naval History
Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
and Professors Royama Michio of Sophia University and
Geoffrey Kemp of the Fletcher School and Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, the second reader of this monograph,
also provided kind assistance.
Admiral Itaya Takaichi, UN and JMSDF, Captains Abe
Yuzo, Tamagawa Yasuhiro, UN and JMSDF, and Wilton L.
Atkinson, USN, Commanders Yamato Kunitami, UN and JMSDF,
Chihaya Masataka, Sekino Hideo, UN, Sato Kenzo and Seno
Sadao, UN and JMSDF, Lieutenant Commander Imaizumi Yasuaki,
JMSDF, Lieutenants Tamai Akira and Nagasawa Kazunami, JMSDF,
and Leading Seaman Yamakawa Etsuo, as well as Defense Agency
Councillor Yasuda Hiroshi and research fellow Kimura Kazuo
and Maritime Safety Agency official Ohno Yasuchika provided
substantial research assistance.
Other people who deserve more thanks than can be
indicated here include: General Hayashi Keizo, JGSDF (Ret.),
Vice Admirals Ishida Suteo, Ishikuma Tatsuhiko, and Nakamura

Teiji, UN and JMSDF, Rear Admirals Kunishima Kiynori,
Inoue Tatsuaki, Sudo Yoshitatsu, and Kadowaki Soichi, UN
and JMSDF, Captains Ralph F. Merrill, USN, Oi Atsushi, UN,
Komatsuzaki Masamichi, and Sahashi Morio, UN and JMSDF,
Commanders Fukushima Tsutomo, UN (Ret.), Kubokawa Motoo,
Sato Hyakutaro, UN and JMSDF, John A. McTammany, and
Alan H. Bath, USN, Lieutenant Commanders Roy N. Wallace,
USN, and Yatsazuka Hidenori, JMSDF, Air Force Candidates
Kawamura Yasuyoshi, Nishikawa Kinichiro, Tamogami Toshio,
and Watanabe Masao, JASDF, and Leading Seaman Sato Hiroshi,
JMSDF, as well as Mr. Sato Tatsuo of the National Personnel
Authority, Mr. Tsuchiya Teizo, editor of the Japan Press
Exchange , Mr. Goto Eiho, artist, Messrs. Stephen P. Dawkins,
Roy A. Mlynarchik, Nishiyama Sen, Roy M. Payne, and Yamaoka
Ryohei of the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Mr. Yamamoto Takehiko of
the National Diet Library, Mr. Asai Reiji of the Japan
Defense Agency and Messrs. James H. Blessin and Sam Kuramoto
and their staff of the Sanno Transent Billeting Facility.
Last but not least ten lovely ladies, Mesdames
Frances Bodkin, Claudia Harlow, Kumagai Akira, Masuoka Yoko,
Bertha Mintz, Susan Payne, Taoka Noriko, and Susan Wallace
and Misses Hagiwara Michiko and Inoue Harumi provided
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admiral; also VADM - vice admiral,
RADM - rear admiral
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naval rank of captain
commander
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Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
Local Liaison Office of the Defense Agency
(Japan)
large support landing ship
Military Assistance and Advisory Group-
Japan (USA)
Military Assistance Program (USA)
Mutual Defense Assistance Office (USA)
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(Japan)
Maritime Safety Board (Agency) of the Ministry
of Transportation (Japan)
Maritime Safety Force (Keibitai) of the Safety
Agency (Japan)
Maritime Staff Office of the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force
National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai )
(Japan)
Officer Candidate School
Offshore Procurement Program (USA)
patrol frigate
Naval Shipping Control Authority for the
Japanese Merchant Marine (USA)
Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
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On September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered to the
United States on board a U.S. Navy battleship in Tokyo Bay
beginning a new era in Japanese history. For almost seven
years, until April 28, 1952, Japan lived under an Occupa-
tion largely directed by the United States although under
circumstances considered to be rather mild for a defeated
nation; on the date of independence, however, another era
in Japanese history, one still marked by manifold depend-
ence on and friendship with the United States, was ini-
tiated. On November 21, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister
Sato Eisaku and United States President Richard Nixon
signed a communique declaring that the Ryukyu Islands
would be returned to Japan in 1972 pending the conclusion
of negotiations between the two countries; observers have
pointed out that the reversion signifies the beginning of
still another era in the history of postwar Japan, all
major problems remaining from the war finally settled and
truly complete sovereignty with territorial, economic, and
1

psychological recovery finally achieved.
Japan was disarmed by the occupying powers at the
end of World War II and was rearmed only as the Korean War
escalated, and even then in a way mainly to preserve in-
ternal security. Because of the complete failure of mili-
tary policies which had become dominant in the 1930 's and
which had resulted in national defeat, the Japanese people
gladly cooperated with the physical disarmament of the
Occupation and at the urging of their conquerors were,
further, psychologically disarmed as well. The most obvi-
ous expression of total disarmament was Article 9 of the
postwar Constitution which renounced war as a policy option
and stated that land, sea, and air forces would never be
maintained.
Denied in their request for a centralized police
force to maintain internal security with a U.S. guarantee
of external protection in 1947, only following the outbreak
of the Korean conflict were the Japanese allowed a
Following currently accepted patterns of style,
Japanese names used in this monograph are listed with
family names first. Long vowels, formerly marked by a
macron in romanized Japanese words, are not so designated
here, following the recent practices of Japanese scholars
writing in English.

centralized security force, considerably greater in fire-
power than under their earlier plan. A small marine guard
force was decided upon in late 1951 and founded in April,
1952. In 1954 the police reserve force and marine guard
were renamed the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces
j
respectively; and an Air Self-Defense Force was initiated,
creating for Japan, in effect, nuclei of army, navy, and
air forces. Despite constitutional problems, such develop-
ment was necessary to win a peace treaty from the United
States and to gain military aid from the U.S. once a limited
capability was decided upon.
Since the formal founding of these forces in 1954,
greater absolute amounts of money have been appropriated
annually for defense; three buildup programs have been
planned and almost completely executed; a fourth and more
ambitious program is presently on the drawing board. As a
result, capability has been built up and United States
military presence has been reduced. In the 1970 's as the
reversion of Okinawa, the de-escalation of the Vietnam War,
and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine approach and
become facts, Japan will assume responsibility for its con-
ventional, autonomous defense.

While the above three paragraphs represent a typical
appraisal of military events in postwar Japan, they do not,
it is believed, accurately express the true situation. This
monograph, in tracing the historical background, development,
and problems of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
,
will challenge many of the basic popular assumptions concern-
ing the disarmament of Japan, the timing and causes of its
rearmament, and the character of its actual postwar forces.
Furthermore, it will be held that any truth to these chal-
lenges does not result from any military or political con-
spiracy on the part of the Japanese or American government
or military establishment heretofore unknown. On the con-
trary, it will hopefully be demonstrated that the pattern
of disarmament described above was simply not compatible
with the maritime nature of an island nation in a less than
stable international environment, and that the lack of any
firm naval policy of rearmament in an economically viable
Japan since the recovery of sovereignty has not made the
Maritime Self-Defense Force nearly capable of performing an
autonomous defense mission.
Specific popular assumptions to be challenged and
respective findings of this study include:

a. concerning disarmament:
1. the assumption that sea forces were never main-
tained from 1945-1952; it will be argued, instead, that
uniformed, armed forces paid for by the Japanese government
conducting limited naval operations with Imperial Navy per-
sonnel, exempt from purge directives and continued in
service on Imperial Navy ships, existed throughout the
period under centralized authority;
2. the assumption that no military organization
was allowed to exist during the pre-Korean War period of
demilitarization; the origin and development of the Mari-
time Safety Agency will be examined with respect to its
similarity to a military organization, and with respect to
its operations which included the deployment of a small
naval unit into combat, the only overseas dispatch of
Japanese armed forces since the war;
b. concerning rearmament:
1. the assumption that Japanese and American plan-
ning for rearmament came only after the outbreak of the
Korean War; this study will point out in contrast: the
almost immediate beginning of naval rearmament planning
by former Japanese naval officers exempt from purge

restrictions, the sentiment shown toward eventual rearma-
ment by important U.S. Navy and Japanese political leaders,
particularly to the person of former Admiral/Ambassador
Nomura Kichisaburo, and the quiet pre-Korean War activities
of some United States officials following the National
Security Council decision of 1948 to encourage paramilitary
activity in Japan;
2. the assumption that rearmament was forced on the
Japanese by the United States government, particularly by
special envoy John Foster Dulles; this monograph will argue
that the request for protection which led to the Maritime
Safety Agency was specifically a Japanese idea and that, in
addition to people such as Admiral Nomura and Dr. Ashida
Hitoshi who opposed total disarmament, even Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru, despite primary economic priorities, de-
sired naval rearmament although he desired it be paid for
by the United States;
3. the assumption that Japan has really wanted
only internal security by its own means and a U.S. guar-
antee of external security, an unchanged Japanese policy
which has finally won out over changing American attitudes;
this study will try to show that the first military

organization, the Maritime Safety Agency, was specifically
directed against external threats; that the Self-Defense
Forces, while uncapable of providing considerable security
against either internal or external threats to the nation,
are outwardly as well as if not more than inwardly oriented;
and that neither the United States nor Japan has been known
to have a consistent policy concerning the latter 's defense
in the postwar period;
c. concerning the Self-Defense Forces in general and
the Maritime Self-Defense Force in particular:
1. the assumption that they do not rely on the
traditions of the Imperial forces and are in fact basically
new although hybrid organizations; this monograph will
point out the direct linkages of the Maritime Self-Defense
Force to the Imperial Navy through activities, organiza-
tional continuity, present customs and symbols, personnel,
and engineering techniques;
2. the assumption that the Self-Defense Forces do
not deploy overseas; this study will detail the peaceful,
regular overseas training activities, the potential for
participation in United Nations' peacekeeping activities
overseas based on a relatively unknown postwar precedent in

8Japan, the annual deployment of an Antarctic service expe-
dition, and other training activities abroad;
3. the assumption that they are now more powerful
than prewar forces and are capable of providing for the
autonomous defense of Japan; this monograph will attempt
to show the lack of a clear role with resultant inability
to implement a definitive maritime strategy or to achieve
any kind of real capability outside of training and mine-
sweeping; the inherent limitations of personnel shortages,
small research and development spending, and poor logistics
will be shown to make the Maritime Self-Defense Force a
midget when compared with modern sea forces or even with
the World War II Imperial Navy;
4. the assumption that militarism might be return-
ing to Japan as partially manifested in bigger defense
spending and an emergent military-industrial complex;
factors to be pointed out as arguing against such a rebirth
include: the very small rate of defense spending, severe
limitations in capability, almost total anonymity and lack
of influence of postwar military leaders, and overwhelming
subordination of military considerations to political and
industrial concerns.

Research for this monograph has emphasized inter-
views with Japanese civilian and military persons knowl-
edgeable of and involved in postwar naval activities. Al-
though these led to the challenges that are listed above
and are later explained, no still-classified information
has been utilized. Basically, because of the small nature
of and incorrect assumptions concerning postwar military
activities, there has been little detailed, historical
study of their content and nature. Declassified U.S.
Occupation military documents have been surveyed and
several of the key U.S. naval personnel with important
roles in postwar Japanese naval rearmament have been inter-
viewed. Documents provided by the Japan Defense Agency,
other civilian agencies, and both American and Japanese
press sources were also utilized. In almost every case
details of historical incidents were cross-checked with
direct participants, other knowledgeable sources, and di-
rect documentation. The testimony of no one person is
believed key to any fact reported in the monograph; most
informants were most cooperative in directing the writer to
other sources, even though those interviewed frequently
knew that in some cases the other persons might not be in

10
complete agreement as to opinions and interpretations. No
one interviewed made a recognizable attempt to present only
favorable information toward his role or interest.
The need and possible value of this study is be-
lieved to be especially great if indeed another era in
Japan's history is drawing to a close. Japanese military
activities are almost routinely and carelessly excluded
from studies of the pre-Korean War Occupation era and are
frequently inaccurate and overstated for the first twenty
years of existence of the Self-Defense Forces. If real
military forces in the sense of other nations' services are
to appear in Japan in the next era or one that then ensues,
their influence from the unique type of forces that have
been maintained since the war, as well as any carryover of
influence from the Imperial forces, which have been studied
elsewhere in more detail, will be informative. Even if no
substantial change in the nature of the present Self-Defense
Forces is forthcoming, their immediate background and
history through the first quarter century following the war,
during which military events have been unpopular in Japan,
are believed worthy of deeper study. Finally, problems
such as an unpopular military, an all volunteer force, and
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the problem of defense spending among pressing public needs-
questions many modern nations are beginning to face in the
1970's--have been characteristic of Japan's postwar forces
during the last two decades. Japanese experience, therefore,
may have some relevance to what other nations might exper-






PREWAR MARITIME JAPAN AND ITS NAVAL FORCES
Never was so much false arithmetic employed on
any subject, as that which has been employed to per-
suade nations that it is in their interest to go to
war. . . . And perhaps, to remove as much as possible
the occasions of making war, it might be better for
us to abandon the ocean altogether, that being the
element whereon we shall be principally exposed to
jostle with other nations: to leave to others to
bring what we shall want, and to carry what we can
spare. ... It might be time enough to seek employ-
ment for them at sea, when the land no longer offers
it.
Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable
citizens. ... As long, therefore, as they can find
employment in this line, I would not convert them
into mariners, artisans, or anything else. . . . Our
people are decided in the opinion that it is neces-
sary for us to take a share in the occupation of the
ocean, and their established habits induce them to
require that the sea be kept open to them. ... I
think it a duty in those entrusted with the admin-
istration of their affairs to conform themselves to
the decided choice of their constituents; and that,
therefore, we should in every instance preserve an
equality of right to them in the transportation of
commodities, in the right of fishing, and in the
other uses of the sea.
But what will be the consequence? Frequent wars
without a doubt. Their property will be violated on
the sea, and in foreign ports, their persons will be
insulted, imprisoned, etc. for pretended debts, con-




leads to the necessity of some naval force. . . .
If war with England should take place, it seems to
me that the first thing necessary would be a reso-
lution to abandon the carrying trade because we
cannot protect it. Foreign nations must in that
case be invited to bring us what we want and to
take our productions in their own bottoms. . . .
Indeed I look forward with horror to the very pos-
sible case of war with an European power, and
think there is no protection against them but from
the possession of some force on the sea.
The great American statesman and President, Thomas
Jefferson, saw the possibility of his potentially maritime
nation remaining clear of international conflicts by employ-
ing its citizens as cultivators of the earth and leaving to
others to bring necessities from outside.
In slightly more than 25 years since World War II,
the archipelago of Japan has engaged in all the activities
warned about by Jefferson, built a strong and vibrant
economy based on its maritime activities, and yet has
avoided completely the wars he cautioned would be frequent.
Furthermore Japan has existed with only a very small naval
force, an organization which, in 1971, is lesser in
aggregate tonnage than one of the nation's many large mer-
chant vessels. Japanese politicians, scholars, and
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia (1782); "Letter
to John Jay," August 23, 1785.
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businessmen have made statements to the effect that good
relations must be maintained with all nations of the world,
while every day the maritime activities of the country are
expanded in territories including some where the greatest
tensions of the international community are focused.
Have the postwar Japanese proved the statements of
Jefferson to be incorrect? Or has Japan experienced success
only because of the protection of the powerful United States
Seventh Fleet which has operated out of its ports the entire
period? Or has the horror of the nuclear age made war obso-
lete, Japan providing an example of the fact that a nation
may economically prosper despite engaging in international
financial ventures without a powerful military establishment?
Only the future may reveal the answers to these questions,
but the pre-World War II history of maritime Japan does not
seriously challenge the assertions offered by Jefferson.
Although Japanese maritime activities and naval
forces date back more than 1000 years, this preliminary
discussion will cover briefly only the most recent half of
this prewar period. This treatment is in no way intended
to portray a detailed history or analysis of the period in
question but will discuss the commercial maritime
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activities, pre-formal-establishment naval activities, the
development of the Imperial Navy, its personnel problems,
relation to defense industry, and logistic support situa-
tion in order to parallel the postwar discussion to be
treated in detail in the remainder of the monograph.
A. MARITIME ACTIVITIES
In 1636 the Tokugawa Shogunate declared that hence-
forth no Japanese citizen would be allowed to travel abroad
and no such person already abroad could return to Japan.
This was followed by a decree in 1638 banning the construc-
tion of large merchant vessels thereby limiting the country
to a coastal merchant marine. For over 200 years Japan was
cut off from the outside world except for very limited
contacts allowed to continue in Nagasaki with the Dutch and
Chinese. During this period, following the precepts to be
uttered by Jefferson during its course, Japan experienced
extended political stability and no war by employing its
citizens as cultivators of the earth.
The citizens of United States did not follow this
recommended role as completely as did the Tokugawa Japanese,
and in the 1850 's American maritime activities provided the
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occasion for the end of Japanese isolation. U.S. merchant
and fishing vessels using sea lanes and operating areas prox-
imate to Japan were desirous of entry to Japanese ports to
take on water and fuel. Shipwrecked seamen who happened on-
to Japanese territory were either executed or tortured, treat'
ment that was not considered civilized by the new American
republic. In 1853 a U.S. naval steamer with Commodore
Matthew C. Perry embarked entered Japanese waters and in the
name of the President of the United States demanded commer-
cial relations. A year later, when Perry returned for an
answer, the Japanese consented to a treaty; and a maritime
status, soon-to-be increased in strength with the introduc-
tion of Western industrialized technology, was resumed.
New technology demanded increasing percentages of
outside resources, domestic supplies of most minerals other
than coal being rather minimal. Abundant water for irri-
gation provided rich agricultural yields; but other than
water's eventual use for hydroelectric power, industrial
modernization meant a need for outside mineral and energy
sources. By the mid 1930 's Japan imported the following
2percentages of raw materials:
2Statistics furnished by Research Division, Japan


















To transport these commodities an ocean-going mer-
chant marine was again developed. Starting with virtually
nothing, by the mid 1930 's Japan possessed the third largest
merchant fleet in the world, smaller only than those of
Great Britain and the United States. Japanese-owned vessels
carried a greater percentage of exports and imports than did
foreign bottoms, transporting almost twice the relative
amount they did in 1970 when the Japanese merchant marine
was in actuality the largest in the world. Some indication
of the size of prewar merchant ship strength can be gained
3from the following figures:
3 Statistics furnished by Japan Ministry of Trans-





Cargo cargo Passenger Merchant Total Tonnage
Year Ships Ships Ships Tankers Fleet (1,000 G/T)
1935 924 319 73 39 2146 4086
Prewar Japan's diet included a great amount of fish
and its fleet of fishing vessels was overwhelmingly the
largest in the world, surpassing its closest rival, the
United States, by over 49 per cent in the mid-1930' s. Al-
though coastal fishing provided a greater percentage of the
catches than it does at the present time, ocean going fish-
ing vessels and whaling ships ventured far from local waters
Japanese whalers accounted for over ten per cent of the
world's catch of whales in the mid- 1930 's, allowing the na-
tion to produce a similar percentage of the global supply
of whale oil.
In its swift drive to modernization, however, prob-
lems arose for the new maritime power. Industrialization
resulted in the production of more finished goods than
could be consumed domestically and also drew more people
from the rural countryside into the cities, people who had
4




to be fed with imported foodstuffs. The nation became more
and more dependent on regular and uninterrupted overseas
trade. World War I's demands on shipping and resultant
sharp rise in freight rates swiftly caused severe rice riots
in Japan. Rapid population increase was also problematic.
Continental Asia was already densely populated, and its
living standard was lower than Japan's. As a result,
Japanese laborers could not compete with Chinese or Korean
coolies; on the other hand, Americans, Canadians, and
Australians could not compete with the Japanese and thus
excluded them. Increasingly the Japanese could not earn
a living where they were free to go and were excluded from
countries where they could hope to better themselves.
Since Japan's "new rich" in Kansai made much money during
World War I, and the country was guided through part of
the 1920 's by moderate statesmen such as the first commoner
Prime Minister, Hara Kei, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, real
resentment of the increasing dual problems did not express
itself in international dissatisfaction until the London
Arthur Bullard, The ABC's of Disarmament and the




Naval Conference in 1930. Increasingly after that, however,
Japan turned from its role as an ocean nation to one as a
continental power. Hoping to conquer areas capable of sup-
plying the needed resources and of providing space for its
people to live, the continental-oriented nation experienced
conflict and defeat. Only after surrender and occupation
would Japan again become a maritime nation.
B. TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMPERIAL NAVY
Just imagine it! A three-masted schooner cor-
vette, of only 400 tons, with a sun flag atop the
stern pole. Nearly 100 officers and men, all clad
in Happi -like coats and cotton trousers, all with
quaint hairdos and wearing straw sandals. Also on
board a team of 11 American naval officers and men,
headed by a young, full-bearded captain. All but
one of the Japanese can't speak English, and orders
are given in Dutch! To add to this, on deck are
two hogs , 60 chickens and 20 ducks
.
This is not the filming of another movie about
Townsend Harris.
^
Interview with Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives Funada Naka, January 23, 1971. Speaker Funada was
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary in 1924, a private secretary
to Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo, and a member of the
Diet as early as 1930. His insights into Japan's past and
present policy actions were invaluable to my understanding.
Chihaya Masataka, "The 'Kanrin Maru' Goes Across
the Pacific," US Japan Centennial Special Edition, Shipping
and Trade News
, 1960, p. 4. I am indebted to former UN
Commander Chihaya, now managing editor of Shipping and Trade

22
What it was, instead, was the first overseas cruise
of the young Japanese Navy just established by the Tokugawa
Shogunate. This cruise of 1860 accompanied the first
Japanese Embassy to the United States coming to ratify the
commercial treaty signed by the two countries in 1858.
The ban on building of non-coastal shipping had been
lifted in 1853 in order to allow Japan to acquire a naval
force to prevent more humiliations such as Perry's visit
of that year. A powerful navy was felt necessary to pre-
serve peace and isolation, but in fact Jefferson's feeling
proved to be more accurate. The Dutch were rather reluc-
tant at first, to give up their exclusive Western access
to Japan; but in 1855 they yielded and presented the
Shogunate with a paddlewheel steamer and agreed to build
two corvettes for Japan, one of which was the KANRIN MARU
.
The gift of a steamer necessitated maritime train-
ing for the prospective members of the new Navy since two
centuries of isolation had weakened maritime skills. The
first officer candidates came from Tokugawa samurai, and
News
,
for providing this article, another manuscript men-




the first sailors were recruited from the boatmen of
Shiakujima in the Inland Sea. Dutch naval officers served
as faculty for primitive training held in Nagasaki just as
American officers would do almost 100 years later when the
United States government's gift of ships would occasion
elementary training for the beginning of a new naval
e 8force.
In addition to a trans-Pacific crossing, Japanese
naval forces participated in a modern sea battle before the
establishment of its Imperial Navy. The Satsuma daimyo,
whose samurai were to found and dominate the national sea
force of the future, had founded their own autonomous
naval force with advice and help from the British. In 1866
this relatively modern force defeated the two ship Tokugawa
fleet; and a young impatient Satsuma officer named Togo
Heihachiro, later to command the victorious Japanese fleet
in one of the greatest naval battles of all time in 1905 at
Tsushima, fired the first shot. Again almost a century
later, an autonomous maritime force would go into battle





navy, and its officers would go on to position of high
responsibility in the later Maritime Self-Defense Force.
C. THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
The Emperor Meiji reviewed the fleet near Osaka in
the first year of his reign and the Imperial Navy was born.
From humble beginnings of less than 2000 men and four ships
aggregating 3416 tons, it was to grow during the Second
World War to a nearly two-million-man force with 538 ships
of 899,000 tons and 1480 aircraft.
1. Organization
The fleet belonged to the Emperor who was its
Supreme Commander. The Navy Minister was a member of the
Cabinet; however, because of a 1900 ordinance giving the
Army and the Navy the option of providing ministers, without
which a Cabinet could not be formed, the military's control
by the Prime Minister was never firm. In addition to the
Navy Ministry, responsible for administration of naval af-
fairs and maritime safety, the Navy General Staff (Gun Rei
Bu ) also belonged directly to the Emperor. The General
Staff issued operating orders to the Emperor's Combined
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Fleet in wartime. The new force's tradition soon developed
as "Silent Navy," i.e . , involved in politics only in the
Cabinet as proper in the person of the minister. As a re-
sult, initially the General Staff was not an overly impor-
tant body in contrast to the case of the Imperial Army. In
1933, however, the rules of the General Staff were revised
more in line with the Army pattern. The new rules estab-
lished the supremacy of the General Staff over the ministry
and greatly reduced the power of the minister over the Navy,
The Chief of the General Staff obtained control over the
fleet, even in peacetime, and gained the power to determine
the size of the Navy in manpower and ships. In 1937 the
powers of the Navy Minister were again severely reduced
when the minister and his staff were placed together in the
Navy Department of the Imperial General Headquarters (Dai
Hon Ei ) as subordinates to the Chief of the General Staff.
A simplified representation of this eventual command organ-
9ization might be depicted as follows:
9 Information on the history and organization of the
Imperial Japanese Navy was obtained through long hours of
patient instruction kindly provided by Professor Tsunoda Jun
of the National Diet Library, general editor of Road to the
Pacific War and Taoka Shunji, military affairs correspondent









The mission of the Imperial Navy soon became the
control of the seas of the Western Pacific; and after con-
vincing victories over the Chinese fleet in the Sino-Japanese
War and Russian Asiatic and Baltic fleets in the Russo-
Japanese War, control was nearly absolute. Friendly rela-
tions with Britain, France, and the United States meant no
threats from those countries. The German Navy was bottled
up by the British, and the only formidable Asian navies had
been annihilated. A fleet of moderate size might have now
been sufficient, but the Japanese Navy desired otherwise.
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Coordination between the Army and Navy had been
poor in the Russo-Japanese War, and in L906 the Army pro-
posed that Japan adopt an integrated defense policy based
on a common list of hypothetical enemies with a general
agreement between the two services on a common strategy.
Navy Minister Yamamoto Gombei and the now famous Togo op-
posed this policy, the latter even refusing to consult with
the Army on the conduct of land-sea operations. Instead
of the single hypothetical enemy of Russia, the Navy wanted
a listing of three: Russia, the United States, and France.
It was not important that these last two were not unfriendly
to Japan; the Navy wanted to use their strength as a minimum
standard for the Japanese Navy by regarding those countries
as hypothetical enemies. This meaning of the term "hypo-
thetical enemy" which had been popularized in the writings
of Alfred Thayer Mahan, translated and widely read in Japan,
triumphed when the Emperor Meiji ruled that the dual defense
policy structure would remain. The Japanese Navy thus
justified a larger budget than it otherwise might have had;
it was often at parity with the Army which was much larger
in personnel. Shortly after this early Imperial ruling,
the Navy War College was established in Tokyo. From 1907
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both that body and its U.S. Navy counterpart in Newport,
Rhode Island, conducted war games with each other desig-
nated as foe. In 1918 the revised Japanese defense policy
designated the United States as number two on the list of
hypothetical enemies; and in 1923 a further revision desig-
nated U.S. as number one for at least theoretical purposes.
Recently some scholars have reasoned that the causes of the
Pacific War have been too casually attributed to the diffi-
culties of international politics between Japan and the
United States; the effect of the writings of Mahan on some
Japanese and American naval planners might have also played
an important role.
Initially stimulated to build up the fleet which
triumphed in the wars with China and Russia by the visit of
Perry in 1853 and reinforced in this intention by the sight
of Chinese men-of-war in the port of Nagasaki in 1881, the
Japanese government, by an Imperial ruling of 1907, granted
For example Professor Tsunoda's Taiheiyo Senso
e no Michi (Road to the Pacific War), Tokyo: Asahi
Shinbunsha, 1963. This seven volume work is so far avail-
able only in Japanese but is in the process of translation
into English at this time by a group ot American scholars
specialized in modern Japanese foreign policy and is to be
published by Columbia University Press.
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the Navy authority to build eight modern battleships, eight
new cruisers, and necessary auxiliary vessels to support the
combatants. The Navy planned to reorganize eight older
battleships into a third fleet, and the entire program be-
came known as the 8-8-8 Plan. Budget considerations, how-
ever, delayed the start of even one battleship until 1910;
three battle-cruisers were authorized in 1913. The Navy
pressured the government by refusing to provide a minister
to the Cabinet and incurred the wrath of the elder states-
men who dominated the political scene in Meiji Japan.
Even a decree from the Emperor in the government's behalf
did not succeed, however, until the Navy was promised three
new battleships. Before the end of the 8-8-8 program was
in sight, naval expenditures had reached 30 per cent of the
national budget and Japan's far-sighted naval statesman,
Kato Tomosaburo, then Navy Minister and formerly Togo's
chief of staff at Tsushima, astonished the Washington Con-
ference in 1921 by accepting the establishment of a five to
three American-Japanese ratio in capital ships. Kato
reasoned that such a ratio was more limiting to the United
States than it was to Japan, arguing that if Japan would
carry out the 8-8-8 plan despite the economic difficulties
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involved, the U.S. would only build more ships and Japan
would not be able to match this further increase in American
superiority. Admiral Kato's policy of no war with America,
although fully supported by future moderate leaders of the
Imperial Navy such as Ministers Yonai Mitsumasa and Yoshida
Zengo and other well known admirals such as Yamanashi
Katsunoshin, Yamamoto Isoroku, Nomura Kichisaburo, and
Inoue Shigemi, was sabotaged by more shortsighted officers
led by another Kato, Admiral Kato Kanji, and his followers
who insisted that Japan must maintain 70 per cent of Ameri-
ca's naval strength. This latter group succeeded by weaken-
ing the Navy Ministry where many of the foreign- educated
moderates were powerful, by assuming that someday there
would be an inevitable Pacific clash, and by abandoning
the up-to-that-time rational and scientific approach to
naval planning for a ideological approach that believed
Japanese moral superiority could triumph over America's
physical superiority. Many middle and low rankings offi-
cers were indoctrinated step-by-step in an even more
fanatical version of such a policy; the disarmament agree-
ments of Washington and London were allowed to expire;
Japan began again building warships in earnest; the final
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result was the Pacific War. The ideas of Kato Tomosaburo
did not completely die out in Japanese naval thinking, how-
ever. When it came time to establish a postwar navy, re-
tired admirals Nomura and Yamanashi would play major roles
and a handpicked appointee of the moderate and influential
Yonai would be delegated by the government to plan the new
force.
D. THE PERSONNEL SITUATION OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
To serve in the Imperial Navy was directly to serve
the Emperor and despite discipline which at times became
rigid and severe, morale remained extremely high. "The
spirit of the Imperial Navy," one of its former officers
explained, "can be stated in one word: Shintoism."
Although this explanation might seem too simple, naval
service was a religious exercise, although religious in
the sense of the Shinto concept. The Emperor and his sub-
jects who died in naval battle were deified but in the
Interview with Lieutenant Commander Hino Torao,
UN (Ret.), September 17, 1970. Good pay and numerous
fringe benefits including high social prestige were, of
course, among other factors influencing morale.
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Western sense perhaps in a way more akin to veneration than
adoration. Bushido or the way of the warrior was the ethi-
cal code; service to the master was service to the Imperial
Navy. The greater the personal sacrifice the more fully
honor was attained. Retired Captain Fuchida Mitsuo who as
a commander led the attack on Pearl Harbor states that he
sincerely believed in the Imperial Way (kodo ) , the ideolog-
ical movement which in the 1920 ! s and 1930' s intensified
Navy spirit, particularly that of middle level officers,
and challenged the more scientific orientation of the past.
He believed that conquering Hawaii and perhaps part of the
west coast of the United States was in the best interests
not only of Japan but of all men of that region. Although
his forces destroyed the fourteen American aircraft which
came up to challenge the attack, the bravery of those out-
numbered pilots was greatly admired; and the Japanese fliers
tried to confirm among themselves how many parachutes were
sighted with the hope that those noble fighting brothers
12
were spared. Although this more passionate mood resulted
12
Interview with Captain Fuchida, December 5, 1970.
Fuchida reconsidered his belief in kodo after seeing the
Southeast Asian hatred of the Japanese following the war.
He presently is still working for the brotherhood of all
men as a Christian lay missionary.
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in some severe treatment, e.g . , junior officers and seamen
were sometimes struck by their immediate seniors, the
better-known gentlemanly moderation of the Navy was still
13
the rule in public.
Social status was high for an Imperial Navy man and
financial compensations were also very adequate. Although
a midshipman graduating from the Naval Academy may have had
an initial salary slightly below that of a university gradu-
ate, he soon caught up with his contemporaries from the
national universities. All officers of flag rank had
salaries at least equivalent to college professors, vice
admirals and above exceeding the pay of the top professor
of a national university. Enlisted men were also adequately
compensated, a chief petty officer drawing a salary equiva-
14
lent to that of a university graduate. Senior officers
13
Navy men were always known for their courtesy in
public, particularly as compared with the Army's military
police, often mistaken as infantrymen and known to strike
civilians. In the early days of the Imperial Navy very
friendly relations between officers and enlisted men were
reported, even in the heat of battle. See for example
Nihon Kai Kaisen (Battle of Tsushima) Tokyo: Asahi
Shimbunsha, 1936, pp. 84-85, 142, 169-170.
14
Interview with retired Professor Emeritus Taoka
Ryoichi, Kyoto University, November 13, 1970. Salary data
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had liberal expense accounts for entertainment, and retire-
ments were comfortable for all career men. A chief petty-
officer could retire in his 50' s with adequate money to
purchase a home and live comfortably as an honorable and
respected member of his community.
Regular line officers were usually graduates of the
Naval Academy at Etaj ima near Kure. Engineering specialists
were trained at Maizuru and paymasters in Tokyo. Reserve
officers were obtained from graduates of the best universi-
ties. Competition was always keen for naval schools, and
education at Eta j ima was considered a good way for an in-
telligent son of a low- income family to increase his social
status. Particularly in World War II, even some wealthy
boys sought education at the Naval Academy in order to com-
plete university education without being conscripted for
military service. Universal conscription had been intro-
duced in Japan in 1873; but, except for World War II, even
most enlisted men in the Navy were volunteers.
Etajima's education was considered equivalent to
that of the best national university; and because of the
for Imperial Navy personnel provided by Personnel Section,
Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office, Tokyo.
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insistence of its moderate President, Vice Admiral Inoue
Shigemi, it was the only university in Japan to continue
teaching English during the war. Etajima sought to impart
knowledge rather than skills, which were thought to be the
jobs of petty officers; future officers studied there four
years, cut off from the rest of society on an island, to
be spiritually trained above all, with intensive schooling
in military subjects, technology, and the liberal arts.
Although regimented training and memory work is reputed to
have been increasingly typical after 1917, Admiral Inoue
described the lowest aim of the academy as producing a
military man capable of serving as an ensign with a poten-
tial to grow like a young tree. He rejected the training
15
of an apprentice with skills in only one field. Maizuru's
engineers and the graduates of Tokyo University and other
prestige graduate schools gave the Navy the most advanced
technology in Japan. Selected officers were dispatched
Ikura Takeaki, "Boeidaigakko to Kaigunheigakko"
(The Defense Academy and the Naval Academy), Gunji Kenkyu
(The Military Review), December, 1970, pp. 70-80; memoran-
dum for the record (unpublished) of Admiral Inoue Shigemi,
UN (Ret.). Mr. Shinohara Hiroshi of Asahi Shimbun kindly




abroad to the best graduate schools, e.g . , Yamamoto Isoroku
to Harvard, Hoshina Zenshiro to Yale, and Nakayama Sadayoshi
to Princeton. Enlisted men were also well trained, and it
is often said that the Imperial Navy survived on its petty
officers. These men often handled the ships at the breath-
takingly close intervals at which Japanese men-of-war often
operated in conditions of darkness without modern electronic
aids such as radar and sonar. It was the petty officers
who were skilled as masters of their specialties in con-
trast to the more generally- educated officers.
Although officially denied as non-existent, the
Imperial Navy did seemingly contain an informal, noninsti-
tutionalized elite consisting of the top graduates of the
Navy Academy. Many of this group, particularly those
1 fa
In the postwar literature there has been criticism
of Imperial Navy officers as "too generally uniform" and as
conforming to the Japanese seniority system and to the
gentlemanly style of officer life they learned from the Royal
Navy without realizing that beneath the veneer the British
officers were specialized combat leaders. One former naval
officer candidly states that on the most senior level in
the Navy were "many bright and likable flag officers but
few real leaders and fighting commanders." Okumia Masatake,
Commander UN, in Okumia and Fuchida Mitsuo, Midway, The
Battle that Doomed Japan , Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
1955. Interview with now retired Lieutenant General Okumia,
JASDF, December 8, 1970.
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educated abroad and/or specialized in political-military
affairs, tended to dominate the Navy Ministry up until the
1930' s. In contrast to this administrative elite was a com-
mand group which dominated the General Staff. Although
interchange of the two groups was not unheard of, it was
not common; and it was the staff group which arose in
discontent to reduce the power of the ministry so as to
resume full-scale naval rearmament.
Graduates of the Navy War College in Tokyo were
less of an elite although most ambitious young officers
aspired to go there. The establishment of this Navy school
in 1907 had been preceded by the founding of the Army
equivalent which had become strongly influenced by
machtpolitik through the advice of a German Army major en-
gaged as an advisor. Then Commander Kato Kanj i was warned
by an Army officer to avoid this tendency in the foundation
of the school. Kato and the Navy followed this advice,
An example of the denial of an elitism can be found
in Rear Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi, Kaisen to Shusen: Hito to
Kiko to Keikaku (The Starting and Ending of the War: Men
Organization and Planning), Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha,
1968, p. 152. A more critical view can be found in Admiral
Toyoda Soemu, Saigo no Taikoku Kaigun (The Last of the
Imperial Navy), Tokyo: Sekai no Nihonsha , 1950, pp. 55-56.
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kept away from politics, and studied only naval affairs.
Unfortunately, however, the Navy War College made a differ-
ent mistake and, drawing from the spectacular victories
against the Chinese and Russians, rigidly studied all future
wars, including the one with America, as consisting of one
grand fleet encounter. Routine and less spectacular opera-
tions such as convoy and scouting were not emphasized, and
optimistic assumptions about Japanese superiority and
American inferiority became routinely accepted. Innovation
from and criticism of this strategy were not tolerated, and
belief that the U.S. could be defeated in this manner was
a strong factor in the desire of many Japanese naval offi-
cers to go to war.
E. DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPERIAL NAVY
The industrial capability of the Japanese Navy can
be seen throughout its history and even after its existence.
18
A brilliant and moving detailed analysis of the
downfall of the Japanese Navy and the role of the Navy War
College in that happening is contained in an unpublished
English manuscript written six months after the war by
Commander Chihaya; see above, note 7.
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After sending representatives to study abroad and the early
purchase of warships from European naval powers, Japan began
its own military industry, and developed a base of industrial
talent in the Navy alone which postwar shipbuilding, optical,
electronic and chemical industries were able to call upon to
help build the economic miracle of the 1960's and beyond.
Naval research centers were to develop the biggest
battleships, the fastest torpedoes, the most sophisticated
optical equipment, and plans for the most advanced fighter
aircraft of their times in the world. The Navy's largest
budget and highly schooled officer personnel helped to
stimulate a successful research and development program.
Great shipyards at Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo built the
first two ships of every new class, after which time
civilian shipyards might mass produce succeeding units.
Navy repair facilities could drydock the largest vessels
and perform overhauls and voyage repairs to all classes of
ships. The "Zero" fighter which was felt so good that it
equalled ten American fighters was built with almost no
self-defense capability, i.e . armor plating, etc., so
confident were its planners of its success. The U.S. Navy
took possession of the latest models of Japanese flying
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boat and midget submarine at the end of the war in order to
study their construction and design. A recent study has
pointed out the previously little-known Japanese atomic
weapons research of 1941 in which naval planners partici-
*- A 19pated.
F. LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE IMPERIAL NAVY
The same technological prowess which built and de-
signed advanced ships and aircraft for the Japanese Navy
provided it with superior ammunition. So advanced were the
Japanese oxygen torpedoes that official claims that they
were ten knots slower than was actually the case were be-
lieved since the resultant speed still appeared respectable
in comparison with the rest of the world's torpedoes.
The Navy's big shortcoming in the field of logistics
was in the supply of ammunition and fuel which was avail-
able; the aforementioned belief in the quick victory of a
decisive fleet encounter contributed to the lack of prepa-
ration for adequate, sustained support. At the time of
19
Thomas M. Coffey, Imperial Tragedy , Cleveland
World Publishing Company, 1970.
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Japan's entry into World War II, the Navy had six million
tons of fuel, theoretically enough to last for two years
if it could retain all stockpiles for itself; calculations
that other users would draw on Navy sources were not con-
sidered seriously. One modest estimate of the initial
shortage of oil at the beginning of the war put the figure
at eight million tons. Japanese planners similarly did not
worry too much about cruising radius when planning opera-
tions. Lack of confidence in fuel supply plagued all ships
involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. Shortly after the
war began, naval ordnance depots at Yokosuka, Kure, and
Sasebo ran out of 25-millimeter machine gun bullets and
experienced continuing shortages throughout the war. By
1943 the average naval anti-aircraft battery could muster
only 100 rounds of ammunition, and a machine gun battery
could similarly rely on only about 1000 rounds, giving
units about ten minutes average operating time, after which
20
they were easily overpowered by U.S. air attacks. Yale-
educated Hoshina, a rear admiral and head of the Naval
Ordnance Bureau, frankly warned at a prewar conference
20
Chihaya, unpublished manuscript, pp. 20-22.
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that adequate logistics for a war with the United States
were impossible; but several middle level officers finally
21
pressured him into reversing his statement. Adequate
convoy ships were never initially planned or provided, with
the result that American submarines virtually destroyed
the entire Japanese merchant fleet, perhaps the greatest
single factor in American victory. Finally, desperate
Japanese tactics even reduced the supply of a human resource,
regular officers. Over half of all Etajima graduates of
classes graduating from 1933 to 1943, 1913 out of 3453, were
killed in combat, many as members of the "Special Attack
Corps." Regular commissions were even given to non-Naval
Academy graduates and Etaj ima ' s enrollment expanded from
less than 1000 in 1937 to over 15,000 in 1945.
22
A 12,000-
man Japanese naval force on a south sea island in 1944
mustered only fifteen Naval Academy graduates and only
two of these were below the rank of lieutenant, so low
had the suicide missions reduced the strength of junior
21
Interview with Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro, UN
(Ret.), November 30, 1970. Hoshina 's warnings are documented
in war history archives.
22Statistics provided by War History Office, Japan





Its officers and men dead or demobilized, its ships
and aircraft destroyed or destined to be given away, the
Imperial Navy went out of existence on December 1, 1945
with the abolition of the Navy Ministry. No naval force
was to be intentionally formed in Japan again until April
26, 1952.
23




Defeated as a continental imperialist power, Japan
lay in ruins in 1945. Allied Occupation forces under the
command of United States Army General Douglas MacArthur
arrived to supervise a supposed reformation of the national
character. Military and civilian members of the occupying
forces, some with very liberal views on how any government
should be structured, had an apparent opportunity to exer-
cise wide-ranging authority that could substantially deter-
mine the future destiny of the entire nation. But right
from the start they decided that Japan would not abandon
the ocean, even though they tried to prevent any armed
Japanese sea force.
The great economic combines, the zaibatsu , were
ordered to be broken up by the Occupation, and initially
even the large companies which were resultant were ordered




conditions in the Late 1940 's, however, and stagnation in
the Japanese economy changed the orientation of the Occupa-
tion considerably. Only a fraction of the more than 300
companies scheduled to be broken up were actually reduced
further in size. Rampant inflation was attacked; a special
economic mission to Japan was dispatched from the United
States; and leftist elements, particularly in labor, were
no longer given the wide latitudes they had been provided
earlier in the reformist experience. Progress was slow;
but started back on a sound economic track in accordance
with proposals of the Dodge Mission of 1949 and stimulated
by the American demand for goods and services following
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Japanese
economy started rolling again. Friendly relations with the
United States and failure to sign a peace treaty with con-
tinental China were significant events influencing economic
development. The former resulted in a massive input of
modern Western technology to which Japan had not been ex-
posed since the late 1930' s. In addition the U.S. provided
large-scale credits to Japanese banks which were short of
capital to loan and purchased considerable amounts of
Japanese securities. Having no relations with continental
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Asia meant Japan's return to international markets to ob-
tain the resources with which to fuel and otherwise supply
the industrial sector. With the powerful Seventh Fleet
operating from bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan exper-
ienced a peaceful Pacific over which to bring uninterrupted
supplies of raw materials. Later, the building of large
tankers to carry oil from the Middle East greatly increased
the energy producing capability which had been largely
limited to what could be obtained from hydroelectric plants
and from not overabundant supplies of coal.
In 1970 Japan was importing resources in greater
percentages from more countries than ever before in its
history. Comparing the figures on page 18 with a recent
postwar summary shows the increase of the usage of outside
resources. (See page 47.) Already the largest importer
of natural resources in the world, Japan's need for raw
materials is predicted to increase even allowing for only
conservative gains in the economy through 1975. If Japan's
needs and the level of world trade continue along the lines
of moderate estimates, by 1975 the ratio of Japan's imports
to world trade will rise from the present seven per cent to
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Source: Research Division, Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force Staff College, Tokyo.
businessmen to wonder if secure stable overseas supply
sources commensurate with the Japanese demand can be found
and to designate the possibly great impact on global trade
patterns as the biggest problem of the 1970' s. The only
solution some of these men see as possible to overcome the
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increasing need is for Japan "to undertake the development
of overseas resources vigorously without fearing risks."
But just what kind of risks will Japan take to seek
out new resources? A glance at almost any recent Japanese
daily newspaper brings information on current projects.
When a Socialist Diet member objected that a joint U.S.-
Japanese oil development project off the coast of South
Vietnam was unwise due to American involvement in the
Vietnam War, Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi replied that,
in view of the recent moves of the petroleum-exporting
countries to raise prices, Japan should engage in the de-
velopment of oil resources in active cooperation with
2
other countries. Joint resource-development projects with
Taiwan and South Korea were planned at meetings of repre-
sentatives of the three countries held in Tokyo in December,
3
1970. Plans for a 300-million-dollar port at Wrangel and
Echigo Masakazu, President, C. Itoh & Co., Ltd.,
"Japan has International Responsibility to Carry Out








Mainichi Daily News , December 22, 1970.
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a 177-million-dollar natural gas pipeline from Sakhalin to
Hokkaido have already been discussed by the Soviet Union
and Japan; it is reported that Moscow hopes to obtain
further Japanese support in four large projects costing
4.5 billion dollars. Japan is eager to exploit Siberian
resources, but the area of interest has been the subject
4
to sizeable Chinese territorial claims.
Exploitation of the seabed for resources will give
the sea a third major use that may well challenge the two
previously economically important uses as an economical
method of transport and as an abundant source of fish.
Japan Science and Technology Agency officials warn of the
nation's lag in successful experiments with seabed habitats;
a nearly one-million-dollar submarine habitat with operating
capital of nearly ten million dollars for fiscal 1971 was
scheduled to be completed in February. The Japan Maritime
Safety Agency recently announced plans to speed up charting
of the seabed around Japan "to meet the demands of maritime
researchers"; the agency expects significant resource
Selig S. Harrison, "Japanese to Help Siberia
Develop," The Washington Post , February 28, 1971.
The Japan Times , January 2, 1971.
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discoveries in 1971 in the seas of Abashiri and Wakkanai,
both in Hokkaido.
Exploitation of underseas resources could con-
siderably rearrange trading patterns, increase the power
of certain fortunate states, and similarly provide ready
grounds for future international conflicts. A glance at
the map on the following page shows areas of the continen-
tal shelf which are of obvious interest to Japan; it is not
hard to imagine that there will be jealousy about the
possession of resources found in these areas and it is not
hard to notice that the areas: are unevenly distributed,
include under-developed countries increasingly dominated
economically by Japan, and are not infrequently bounded
by a number of contiguous states.
The merchant marine has been one of the most obvi-
ous examples of the economic miracle of postwar Japan.
At the end of the war prospects were dim, for Japan in
particular, but also for worldwide maritime commerce in
general. Japan's situation was particularly critical be-
cause, unlike some countries where shipping was just one
Ibid
.











independent business, or where adequate supplies from the
outside could be obtained by rail or foreign delivery, a
native merchant marine was important to the entire nation
as a means of obtaining resources and carrying on foreign
trade.
World War II cost Japan 8,897,000 gross tons of
merchant shipping; a total of only 1,300,000 tons of
standard wartime and superannuated vessels remained. Rem-
nant ships were placed under the jurisdiction of the United
States Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese
Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) which was required by Occupation
directives to make maximum use of these vessels for re-
patriating the six million Japanese forces still overseas;
however, 317 steel hulled vessels of 338,600 tons and 455
wooden vessels of 77,000 tons were allowed to resume
coastal and nearby cargo and passenger operations. Trade
was limited to the coasts of Japan and Korea, China, and
Taiwan. Construction of new vessels was also severely
restricted, ocean-going ships not becoming authorized until
1949. In April of 1950, management of merchant ships was
G-3 Division, GHQ SCAP, Report on Mass Repatriation
in the Western Pacific, April, 1947, p. 4.
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returned to Japanese civilian companies, and in August of
the same year trade areas were expanded so that maritime
commercial relations were permitted with 28 countries. The
Far Eastern Commission's informal ruling that no new ship
could be constructed in excess of 50 00 tons in weight and
with speed capability in excess of fifteen knots was also
removed in 1950 to allow full-scale ship construction.
Even removal of these restrictions did not, however, mean
immediate recovery for Japanese shipping companies. Only
with the recovery of global maritime trade in 1954 did the
Japanese trade picture become bright again. By 1956 the
merchant marine's number of ships, aggregate tonnage, and
amount of cargo moved exceeded the respective totals of
prewar Japan's third-ranked fleet. In 1968 Japan ranked
second in the world in merchant strength, trailing only
Liberia, many of whose vessels are so-called "flags of
convenience" and actually belong to shipowners in the
United States and Greece. Table II-2 charts the growth
of Japan's maritime commerce. As spectacular as is the
rise of the industry to the present time, estimates of
immediate future growth are even more impressive. Cargo




JAPAN'S MERCHANT MARINE (1935-1968)
Trade
Ocean Going Volume Percentage of









1935 1698 4,030 27,735 65.0 55.0
1939 2337 5,,630 34,146 72.0* 65.0*
1945 796 1
:
344 • • •
1946 813 1.,385 1,464 93.6 20.2
1947 869 1
:
,468 1,962 81.7 8.1
1948 1204 1.,024 2,773 69.2 8.4
1949 1121 1.,564 2,690 33.8 11.4
1950 1499 1.,871 4,292 17.3 26.8
1951 1529 2.,182 10,075 26.6 32.6
1952 1587 2.,787 15,224 31.6 45.5
1953 1669 3.,250 19,013 37.8 43.0
1954 1727 3.,578 22,539 43.3 46.5
1955 1770 3.,735 28,281 43.6 52.1
1956 1891 4.,076 34,396 44.8 47.5
1957 2032 4
:
,415 38,267 49.2 41.2
1958 2413 5.,465 43,261 56.6 57.4
1959 2775 6,,277 51,353 54.8 53.8
1960 3124 6
:
,931 61,120 52.4 47.5
1961 3733 7
.
,954 71,277 53.7 41.3
1962 4372 8.,870 81,195 52.4 45.6
1963 4819 9.,997 96,476 44.6 45.7
1964 5401 10.,813 110,944 47.4 46.5
1965 5836 11. 971 103,806 42.0 45.3
1966 6105 14.,723 128,717 42.7 48.1
1967 6409 16.,883 154,409 45.1 49.9
1968 6877 19.,587 183,401 40.7 51.3
1969 7665 23.,987 212,185 44.7 52.4
1970 8402 27, 004
*1940
Sources: The Japan Shipowner's Association; 1945-47 ship
figures from Ministry of Transportation, 1948-1970
from Lloyd's Register of Shipping; Japan Statisti -
cal Yearbook , Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, Office
of the Prime Minister; Economic Statistics, Economic
Planning Agency, Japan government.
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approximately seventeen per cent of the world total are anti
cipated to rise to about 30 per cent under the new socio-
economic development program; to accommodate this forecast
a plan has recently been adopted to increase Japan's mer-
chant marine by approximately twenty million gross tons in
o
the 1971-1974 period. This anticipated increase is larger
than the entire merchant fleet of 1968 and larger than the
combined fleets of the British Commonwealth countries in
World War II.
Along with the volume of trade, the countries who
are Japan's trading partners have expanded on a continuing
and interesting basis. Initially restricted to local areas,
permission to send ships to the United States was granted
in 1950. Britain and Australia refused trade privileges
into the 1950 's; but not only were these restrictions sub-
sequently lifted, Japan also secured commercial relations
o
Fukuda Hisao, President, Japan Shipowners Asso-
ciation, "Freight Conference Setup Needs Restudy," The
Japan Times
, January 18, 1971. That Mr. Fukuda 's estimate
is, as he states, a conservative one, is indicated by
statements of Japanese government leaders and Liberal
Democratic Party members that the projected increase
should be changed from twenty to 28 million tons of
shipping, ibid
.
, November 19, 1970.

56
with the Soviet Union as a result of a separate government
to government understanding in 1956 and with Mainland China
through a so-called "private agreement" in 1961 which is
renewed every year and which allows Japan to collect imme-
diate cash payment in exchange for goods, a sum which in
1970 reached 825 million dollars.
The deep engagement of Japan in Asia is not often
appreciated. Japan ranks as the first or second trading
partner of all but one non-communist nation in the area
(it is third with Cambodia) as of 1968. The author of a
recent study from which Table II-3 is reproduced makes
interesting observations. Japan has surpassed the United
States as largest supplier to the area and overwhelms the
third largest supplier, West Germany, 28.9 per cent to
4.9 per cent. Since there is very little trade among the
under -developed nations of the area themselves, Japan is
the primary beneficiary of further trade expansion and
increased capital investments in the region. Since it is
not economically necessary for Japan to trade in Asia,
however, Hellman argues that any special priority given
this area by Japan must be essentially for political





TRADE OF EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH JAPAN
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTAL TRADE (1967)
Exports Imports Total
Per Per Per
Country Amount Cent Amount Cent Amount Cent Rank
Burma 12.4 6.5 36.6 23.9 49.0 14.3 2*
Cambodia 4.9 7.3 15.2 13.7 20.1 11.3 3*
Mainland China 269.5 26.7 288.3 21.7 557.8 23.9 1
Nationalist China 112.1 17.3 326.9 40.8 439.0 30.6 1
Indonesia 195.0 35.3 155.2 19.7 350.2 26.1 1
South Korea 84.7 26.1 443.0 45.5 527.7 40.1 1
North Korea 29.6 86.6 8.2 26.0 37.8 57.5 1**
Malaysia 270.6 27.7 104.0 14.2 374.6 21.9 1*
Philippines 274.0 33.9 329.4 28.0 603.4 31.4 2
Singapore 44.2 19.4 151.6 21.0 195.8 20.7 1
Thailand 160.0 38.4 341.0 38.5 501.0 38.9 1
South Vietnam 2.3 14.3 139.5 25.9 141.8 25.2 2
North Vietnam 1.8 22.5 6.7 77.0 8.5 50.9 J**
As printed in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East
Asian International Subsystem," International Studies
Quarterly , Volume 13, Number 4, December, 1969, pp. 430.
*
1966 figures;
Trading partners mainly communist countries but
reliable figures not available and not included.
Sources: International Bank of Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Monetary Fund, Direction of




area's trade conducted with Japan is the sizeable and grow-
ing dependence of individual countries on their source; any
severe alteration in these trade relationships could result
in considerable economic dislocations. Such trade dominance,
particularly because Japan itself has no economic necessity
to trade with these countries, provides the opportunity for
9international influence extending beyond the economic realm.
The world-wide scope of Japan's trade and lesser relative
dependence of East Asia for survival can be gauged by com-
paring Table II -3 with Table II-4 on the next page. Of the
ten products heading Japan's import list, five are purchased
in East Asian countries but in each case only on partial
u 10bases
.
Like its merchant marine, Japan's fishing industry
also advanced from very modest wartime levels back to and
in excess of its former strength. Placed under the author-
ity of the United States Fifth Fleet, initially only small-
size wooden fishing boats were allowed to resume operations,
9
Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East Asian Inter-
national Subsystem," pp. 430-31.
Anzen Hosho Kenkyu Kai, Kaiyokoku Nihon no Shorai
(The Future of Japan as a Maritime Nation), Tokyo: Hara
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and then only to a distance of twelve miles from the coast-
line. The geographic limitation was extended somewhat in
late September, 1945; and on January 26 of the following
year, the so-called MacArthur Line was drawn marking a
boundary for fishing operations. Some whaling off the
Bonin Islands had been authorized in late 1945, and in 1946
limited operations were authorized in the Antarctic region.
Because of the restriction in space, local fishing grounds
were severely exploited and the 1948 catch still only
matched 60 per cent of the average prewar level. A
scarcity of ropes and nets following the war resulted in
special government aid in 1948; extension of the MacArthur
Line to the International Date Line in 1949 also helped to
ease the problems somewhat. The specific lineal restriction
was lifted three days before the Peace Treaty went into ef-
fect, but Article 9 of the treaty stated that Japan would
enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers
for bilateral and multilateral agreements on fishing.
These agreements and others were successfully negotiated,
in some cases even before diplomatic and/or commercial trade
relations were established, with the Allied nations and with
the two large communist countries that did not sign the
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Peace Treaty: with Mainland China in 1955 and with the
Soviet Union in 1956. Japan quickly regained its position
as the world's largest catcher of fish but lost first rank
to Peru in 1963. Peru's total, however, is inflated by its
catch of anchovies which are obtained in great quantities
off its coastal waters; Japan's catch, on the other hand,
consists of many varieties, and its growth has been aided
by the development of 4000 -ton trawlers capable of catching
fish living in waters several hundred meters deep and by
the discovery of new fishing grounds in northern seas.
Table II-5 indicates the growth of the industry and the
emergence of larger ships with greater capacities. The
supply of whales has already become critical; and, in addi-
tion to a treaty alloting strict quotas to participating
countries in Antarctic waters, a similar arrangement from
the northern Pacific is now being sought.
Decreasing supplies of other species promise prob-
lems for the future. Mainland China in late 1970 gave
indications it might claim a 200-mile territorial limit
for purposes of excluding other nations from fishing off
its shores. Controversies over fishing rights have always





JAPAN'S FISHING INDUSTRY (1935-1968)
Non-
Total Powered powered Catch Whales
Year Vessels Vessels Tonnage Vessels Tonnage (1000T) (Number)
1935 366,019 57,478 309,461 4,038
1941 326,959 71,975 254,984 4,108 2,349
1945 279,292 60,613 228,679 1,825 531
1950 446,652 127,556 909,470 319,086 300,113 3,374 5,332
1955 415,588 4,908 11,866
1958 398,911 164,717 1,397,123 234,194 218,383 4,951
1960 380,728 6,193 19,649
1965 403,250 6,908 26,986
1966 399,561 7,103 22,784
1967 398,002 7,851 21,088
1968 397,279 253,544 2,315,130 143,735 100,290 8,670 21,586
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook; The Japan Yearbook 1946 -
1948 , Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of
Japan.
Soviet Union. Negotiations with the latter are still tense
in this regard. Since Moscow's unilateral declaration of
February 26, 1946 that the Japanese islands of Kunashiri,
Etorofu, Habomai, and Shikotan are a part of Soviet terri-
tory, 1336 Japanese fishing boats and 11,316 fishermen
have been arrested in the area; of those: 22 boats have
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11been sunk and 32 fisherman have been killed.
What then does the future hold for Japan as a
modern maritime nation? It has actively engaged in all the
activities that Thomas Jefferson warned would bring fre-
quent wars to the United States, and past history contains
evidence that the statements apply to Japan in the time
prior to 1945. Jefferson said protection of sea-going ac-
tivities would require a naval force, but postwar Japan's
military activities have lagged well behind its economic
ventures. One question of significant importance seems to
be: will economic interests and the changing international
environment post 1972 cause Japan to put more emphasis on a
naval force as Jefferson suggested an involved maritime na-
tion might do?
The remainder of this monograph will trace what
has been done about building a postwar naval force up to
the present time using the traditions of the past, the
technology, and the wealth that have once again made Japan
a maritime nation.
The Japan Times , January 16, 1971. Personal let-
ter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Vice Admiral C.
Turner Joy, March 13, 1951, contained in Commander Naval
Forces Far East, chronological file, 1950-1951.

PART II
THE INTERIM: NAVAL ACTIVITIES 1945-1952
Japan's surrender and occupation did not mean the
end of its commercial activities on the sea; but, as has
been discussed in the previous chapter, use of the ocean
for economic purposes was allowed from the earliest days of
the Occupation. If, however, a typical historical account
of the period were to be consulted concerning military
forces, it is likely that statements similar to the follow-
ing would appear: after the war Japan's military forces
were demobilized and all munitions industries were closed
down; in May, 1947, a new Constitution went into effect con-
taining a provision that war is "forever" renounced and that
"land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained"; because of the pullout of American
military forces following the outbreak of the Korean War, a
National Police Reserve was authorized and not too long




embryonic, quasi-military organizations were the forerunners
of limited rearmament which Japan pursued after regaining
independence.
To limit discussion of military activities during
the Occupation to a treatment such as that just presented
could easily lead to the assumption that, despite increas-
ing commercial maritime activities, no Japanese, organized
sea force existed prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.
Further it would not be too unreasonable to believe: first,
that not even naval activities took place on the part of
the Japanese after demobilization was completed; second,
that no navy was ever planned or even desired prior to the
change of political climate in Asia and/or the unexpected
and sudden conflict in Korea; and third, that possibly, if
it had not been for Korea, the Constitution would have been
rigidly adhered to and no military, and thus no naval force,
would have been inaugurated, at least as quickly as it was.
Part II will discuss events during the period, try-
ing to demonstrate that naval activities by Japanese took
place throughout the Occupation; that a uniformed, organ-
ized naval force, first a remnant body but later an entirely
new organization, which testified to its character by
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deploying into combat, existed prior to the Korean War; and
that the events of Korea, rather than triggering the first
steps of rearmament, at least as far as a navy is concerned,
merely demonstrated to the Occupation and to Japanese
authorities that a strengthened, more professional naval
organization was necessary. Hopefully it will be made
clear that the arguments put forth are not merely techni-
calities to appear controversial or revisionist; nor do
they suggest that a conspiratorial plot on the part of
Japanese or American civilian or military authorities is
here being exposed for purposes of spectacle. Instead,
hopefully, it will be made clear that many Occupation and
Japanese government leaders saw a need for at least some
naval forces for a commercially-engaged maritime nation.
The maritime-naval events of this period have been
poorly reported, at least partially because of the great
unpopularity of anything military following the psychologi-
cal disarmament of many Japanese people following the
physical demobilization of the country's armed forces.
Most of the principal characters involved in the activities
to be described are still living in advanced age and are
now willing to talk about what happened on the Japanese
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side, with or without the Occupation's knowledge or approval
This presentation will be made by dividing the events under
the three headings of demobilization and continuation, mari-
time safety, and rearmament rather than by attempting to




A. DEMOBILIZATION, PART I
As was mentioned in Chapter I, two moderate Imperial
Navy admirals who were direct descendants of the no war with
America policy of Admiral and Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo
were Yonai Mitsumasa and Nomura Kichisaburo. As Navy
Minister from 1937-1939, Yonai unsuccessfully opposed the
more aggressive and powerful voices of the General Staff
arguing for war; Nomura, who was close to many U.S. Navy
admirals from the time of his active duty and was Ambassador
to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, had senti-
ments similar to Yonai' s. Yonai served as Prime Minister
briefly in 1940, but his Cabinet soon failed. With the
accession of General Tojo as Prime Minister in October,
1941, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro became Navy Minister; and




"determined" for war. By 1943 Japan was obviously losing
the war, and there was a feeling among moderates in the Navy
that Shimada should be replaced in order to help bring peace
At that time the personnel situation in the Navy Ministry
and its most influential division, the Military Affairs
Bureau, was partially as follows:
CHART III-l
NAVY MINISTRY IN 1944
Bureau Level







Leal | Military (RADM YAMAMOTO)
Asst. Naval
Attache London
Diet and Army (CDR NAKAYAMA)
Princeton
*
Former duty assignments listed below individual
names
.
Commander Nakayama Sadayoshi approached Admiral Nomura to
discuss possible courses of action. A plan developed to try
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to separate Admiral Shimada, who was also Chief of the
General Staff, from his job as minister and to replace him
in that position with Admiral Yonai; that would require a
special act by the Emperor since Yonai had been retired.
Nakayama's position gave him access to people and informa-
tion at the working level, and Nomura with his prestige as
a retired admiral, foreign minister, ambassador, and Presi-
dent of the Peers College could directly approach Shimada
as well as other high officials of the government and the
Imperial Household. With the Koiso Cabinet of July, 1944,
Yonai was called out of retirement and was once again made
Navy Minister.
1
Interview with Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, MSDF
(Ret.), January 27, 1971. Then Commander Nakayama on his
way to Princeton was the only other Navy officer on the ship
carrying Ambassador Nomura to Washington in 1941. They had
many discussions during their two week trip from Yokohama
to San Francisco and during school vacations which Nakayama
spent in Washington. A close association continued after
their departure from the United States. Whether or not any
efforts by Admiral Nomura had any effect on the Imperial
court or on the elder statesmen who induced the Cabinet
change is not a point of issue here (Admiral Shimada tried
in vain to remain as minister) ; but the facts are mentioned




Yonai strongly supported efforts for peace. Before
the end of the war Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, head of
the Military Affairs Section, prepared and submitted to the
minister a memorandum concerning disarmament. Yamamoto
argued that Japan's Army must be abolished but that the Navy
must also cease. He argued that the military was like a
four-wheeled cart, and thus all four wheels rather than just
two would have to be removed in order to stop the movement.
After ten years or so a new military organization might be
needed in Japan; but whenever that time arrived, the new
military should be modeled to conform with Japan at that
time rather than on the old Imperial Army or Navy models
as they existed at the time of dissolution. Vice Admiral
Hoshina Zenshiro, Chief of the Bureau and Yamamoto 's senior,
argued for the good traditions of the Imperial Navy. He
proposed that a small naval force, perhaps similar in size
to that following the Russo-Japanese War, should be main-
tained, both because the Navy was essentially good and be-
cause without any military force in Japan and with the situ-
ation in China still chaotic, there would likely be a power
vacuum in Asia dangerous to Japan's security. Admiral
Yonai came out for Yamamoto 's position and put him in charge
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of the Military Affairs Bureau when surrender came.
Hoshina moved out of the Navy Ministry to another position;
and Yonai remained as Navy Minister, constantly on guard
for any resistance to peace and disarmament within the
Navy, until replaced by Prime Minister Shidehara, who as-
sumed the position as a collateral duty on November 13,
1945.
2
Regardless of any Japanese feeling, disarmament was
not a subject for debate. The Potsdam Proclamation of
July 26, 1945 stated in part that:
There must be eliminated for all time the author-
ity and influence of those who have deceived and mis-
led the people of Japan into embarking on world con-
quest, for we insist that a new order of peace,
security, and justice will be impossible until irre-
sponsible militarism is driven from the world. . . .
The Japanese military forces, after being completely
disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes
2
Interviews with Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro,
UN (Ret.), November 4, 1970; Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio,
UN (Ret.), December 28, 1970; Rear Admiral Akishige Jitsue,
UN (Ret.), January 24, 1971; Captain Sanematsu Jyo, UN
(Ret.), January 28, 1971. The discussions in the Navy
Ministry concerning disarmament were very secret and in-
formal. Neither Admiral Yamamoto nor the War History
Office of the Japan Defense Agency has a copy of the
Yamamoto memorandum. Captain Sanematsu, a leading author-
ity on and biographer of Yonai also did not have a copy but
confirmed the sentiments of Yonai for peace and disarmament.
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with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive
lives.
This was followed on August 29, by the United States Initial
Post Surrender Policy in which President Truman directed
General MacArthur specifically that:
Japan will be completely disarmed and demili-
tarized. The authority of the militarists and the
influence of militarism will be totally eliminated
from her political economic, and social life. In-
stitutions expressive of the spirit of militarism
and aggression will be vigorously suppressed. . . .
Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary
tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried
out promptly and with determination. . . .
Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force,
secret police organization, or any civil aviation.
Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be
disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters, the General Staff and all
secret police organizations shall be dissolved.
Military and naval material, military and navy
vessels and military and naval installations, and
military and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered
and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme
Commander .4
The discussions preliminary to the Occupation, which were
held in Manila in August, 1945, left no doubt in the minds
of the Japanese participants that disarmament was to be
3
Articles 6 and 9, as quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett,
The Record of American Diplomacy , New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1960, pp. 671-72.
4Subparagraph (b) part I and paragraph 1 part III,
ibid
. , pp. 755-56.
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complete. Although some members of the delegation had
ideas for possible suggestion to American authorities, the
discussions regarding military forces were strictly tech-
nical. SCAP Directive Number One concerning military and
naval disarmament had already been prepared; the Japanese
were ordered to remove obstacles to a speedy demobiliza-
tion and not to worry about anything such as a power
vacuum in Asia. SCAP Directive Numbers One and Two were
formally issued on September 2, 1945, providing explicit
instructions for carrying out disarmament and demobiliza-
tion. From a strength of 1,693,223 men as of August 15,
1945, by October 15, 1946, naval forces were reduced to
57,523, mostly overseas awaiting repatriation.
A final plea for naval personnel was made by Vice
Admiral Hoshina in September, 1945. He was then Navy rep-
resentative on a Cabinet committee overseeing demobilization
Interview with Vice Admiral Terai Yoshimori, JMSDF
(Ret.), November 26, 1970. Then Commander Terai, UN, was
a member of the Japanese delegation to Manila.
Ibid
. , pp. 79-80. Detailed description of person-
nel demobilization can be found in GHQ SCAP, Final Report,
Progress of Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, 31
December 1946 (unpublished) and in James E. Auer, "The Con-
tinuation: A Study of Naval Activities in Behalf of Japan
from 1945-1952" (unpublished master's thesis) Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, 1970), pp. 3-7.
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and expressed a fear that the quick unemployment of over
five million Japanese military forces could create a prob-
lem and produce rioting if jobs were not made available.
He favored the formation of a civilian construction corps,
cooperatively organized and managed but financed by the
central government. Yoshida Shigeru, who was also a member
of the committee, preferred not to discuss such an idea
with the American military authorities but agreed to allow
Hoshina to make an initiative. The latter contacted
Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's
Chief of Staff, who politely received the idea. Finally,
however, as at Manila, the Japanese were told not to worry
about any security problems; no action was taken on the
^ 7
request.
Japanese naval vessels were scrapped or sunk, given
to Allied navies, or put under the control of SCAJAP. A
total of seven carriers/escort carriers, three battleships,
twelve cruisers, and three auxiliaries were reduced by
scrapping; almost all submarines and aircraft were sunk
or destroyed.
Interview with Hoshina, November 30, 1970.
8Commander Naval Activities Japan, Command Narra-
tive, 21 January 1946 to 1 October 1946, p. 17; GHQ SCAP,
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More than six million Japanese forces remained
separated from their homeland on the islands throughout the
western Pacific and on the mainland of Asia at the time
of surrender. The Navy/Second Demobilization Ministry
supervised repatriation. Because of the paucity of
Japanese naval and merchant shipping capable of being de-
militarized and made fit for repatriation, Allied vessels
were authorized to participate in the program beginning in
October, 1945. By January 1, 1947, 5,103,323 persons had
been returned to Japan and 1,340,232 had been evacuated to
their native countries. There still remained 1,600,000 to
be brought home, but almost all of these were in Soviet-
influenced areas. Repatriation then became more of a po-
litical problem than a transportation matter, the Soviets
commencing and terminating repatriation from time to
Final Report, Progress of Demobilization of Japanese Armed
Forces, p. 88. Details of the destruction and disposal of
naval units can be found in U.S. Department of the Army,
General Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied
Operations in Southwest Pacific Area , Volume I (Supplement)
"MacArthur in Japan, The Occupation," September, 1945 to
December, 1948, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1961; allocation of 135 ships among Allied









Munitions industries were closed down or converted
to other purposes. Naval research centers and base facil-
ities were similarly closed or converted unless they were
to be used by U.S. forces. The principal locations taken
over by the U.S. Navy were the bases and shipyards at
Yokosuka and Sasebo and the naval air station at Atsugi.
As the histories continue to report, Japan was disarmed.
B. DEMOBILIZATION, PART 2: RENUNCIATION OF ARMED FORCE
"FOREVER"
And there was movement even before demobilization
was complete to insure that Japan would never arm again.
This action supposedly would finalize disarmament and
hopefully provide an example for the rest of the world
that nations could live without arms. The action, a more
Q
G-3 GHQ SCAP and Far East Command, Status of
Repatriation Report, March 4, 1949. Additional details
of this period concerning repatriation can be found in
Commander Naval Activities Japan Command Narratives, Com-
mander Naval Forces Far East Summaries and Command Narra-
tives, and Auer, "The Continuation: A Study of Naval
Activities in Behalf of Japan from 1945-1952," pp. 11-23.
The most complete work on the repatriation effort is
Kikiage-Engo-no Kiroku (The Record of Demobilization)
Tokyo: Hikiage Engo-cho, 1950.
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determined effort to accomplish in one country what the
Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 had tried unsuccessfully to
accomplish in many, took the form of a constitutional pro-
... . 10
vision forever renouncing war.
The most complete work on the Constitution is
the report of a governmental investigation commission which
met from 1957-1964 and which returned a report of over
40,000 pages in almost 500 volumes plus an additional 100
volumes of reference material, Commission on the Constitu-
tion, Kempo Chosakai Hokokusho Fugoku Bunisho (Report of
the Commission on the Constitution), Tokyo: 1958-1964.
SCAP's official account is contained in Government Section,
GHQ, SCAP, The Political Reorientation of Japan, September
1945 to September 1948 , Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1949. Other English sources are: Sato
Tatsuo, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitu-
tion of Japan," Contemporary Japan , Volume 34, Numbers 4-6
and 7-9. Sato was a member of the Cabinet Legislative
Bureau during the drafting of the Constitution; Robert E.
Ward, "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects
for Constitutional Change in Japan," and John M. Maki,
"The Documents of Japan's Commission on the Constitution,"
both in Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 34, Number 3,
May, 1965; Ward and Maki were American scholars working
with the commission. Also valuable is Dan Fenno Henderson,
editor, The Constitution of Japan Its First Twenty Years
,
1947-1967
, Seattle and London: University of Washington
Press, 1968. An excellent English language work on
Article 9 is Theodore S. McNelly, "The Renunciation of War
in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Quarterly
,
Volume 78, Number 3, September, 1962.
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The Japanese government had been led to believe that
revision of the Meiji Constitution was a matter under its
own cognizance, coordinated, of course, with SCAP authori-
ties if accomplished during the Occupation. General
MacArthur himself initially took little active interest
other than pointing out the need of reform to Prince Konoye
on October 4, 1945, when he was Minister without Portfolio
in the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet, and to Prime Minister Shidehara
on October 11, 1945, two days after his new Cabinet had been
inaugurated. The new Cabinet resolved to make a study of
the Constitution and organized a committee under Dr. Matsu-
moto Joji, also Minister without Portfolio, to investigate
the necessity of revision. The committee consisted of
scholarly advisors, leading professors of Tokyo University
and other universities, a group of officials from the
Cabinet Legislative Bureau, and other concerned government
officials. Outside groups also prepared drafts; but the
committee itself came up with two plans, a relatively con-
servative draft by Matsumoto himself, known as Draft "A,"
and a more liberal draft of the committee, known as Draft
"B." Both were based on the basic principles of the
Meiji Constitution and were designed to prevent future
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misuse by amending some articles. With regard to armed
forces, Draft "A" stated, "The system of armed forces is
retained. The supreme command of the armed forces may not
be exercised independently, except with the advice of the
Ministers of State." Draft "B" deleted the articles con-
cerning military forces although it did not appear that
this deletion prohibited the use of such forces.
By Cabinet agreement Draft "A" was submitted to
SCAP's General Headquarters (GHQ) in early February, 1946,
and was criticized as being "far behind even the most con-
12
servative of the unofficial drafts." MacArthur decided
to reject the Matsumoto draft entirely; and in order to
instruct the Japanese government on the nature of those
principles he considered basic to a revised Constitution,
he ordered Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of
the Government Section, to prepare a draft to serve as a
13guide. Although Whitney's section was to have direction
Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft
Constitution of Japan, pp. 3-8.
12Government Section, GHQ SCAP, The Political Re -
orientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948
,
p. 99.
13MacArthur 's reason for taking over the drafting
at the particular time he did is controversial. Some claim
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in its drafting, three major points were to be incorporated
The second of these points read:
War as a sovereign night of the nation is abol-
ished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality
for settling its disputes and even for preserving
its own security . It relies upon the higher ideals
which are now stirring the world for its defense
and its protection.
he became aware of a statement in the Potsdam Proclamation
of December, 1945, which stated that a Far Eastern Com-
mission would be set up "to oversee the Occupational ad-
ministration" and that any directives dealing with the
fundamental structure of the Japanese government including
the Constitution were to be "issued only following consul-
tation and the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern
Commission." Knowing that the commission would be meeting
soon (it met first in Washington on February 24, 1946),
MacArthur hurried to beat its chance to restrict him,
particularly since he feared the commission might not allow
retention of the Emperor. Interview with retired Career
Minister John K. Emmerson, October 14, 1970. Minister
Emerson was a member of the Diplomatic Section and worked
with the early Japanese constitutional study efforts.
MacArthur in his memoirs stated that he was forced to act
because of the upcoming election in April which had been
decided as a plebescite on the new Constitution before
the Matsumoto draft was submitted. Since the draft was
not much different from the old Constitution, there would
have been little choice. Since the first unsatisfactory
effort had taken so long, MacArthur decided to provide
guidelines. He later stated, however, that the Far Eastern
Commission would have most likely blocked free choice by
the Japanese people due to Soviet veto power. "The choice
was alien military government or autonomous civil govern-
ment." General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences
,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964, pp. 299-302.
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No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be
authorized and no rights of belligerence will ever be
conferred upon any Japanese force. 14
The authorship of this idea which became Article 9
of the revised Constitution is disputed. General MacArthur
claimed that it was suggested to him by Prime Minister
Shidehara while Yoshida Shigeru, then Foreign Minister and
later Prime Minister, claimed the idea was most likely sug-
gested by MacArthur to Baron Shidehara who readily agreed.
Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, chairman of the committee which in-
vestigated the Constitution from 1957-1964 and a believer
in MacArthur 's authorship and "imposition" of Article 9
before his research began, eventually came to support the
general:
Article 9 had its origin in Tokyo, not in
Washington. The idea was first suggested by Prime
Minister Shidehara, not by General MacArthur. . . .
No one else was present at the interview which
continued for some three hours. Shidehara aston-
ished the General with a proposal for the insertion
of a renunciation-of-war and disarmament clause into
the new Constitution. Apparently the General
hesitated at first because of the possible deleter-
ious effects on United States foreign policy in
Eastern Asia, if the proposal were approved. The
14
Ibid., p. 102, italics mine.
Ibid., p. 299; Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida





Prime Minister, however, succeeded in persuading the
General that in the atomic age the survival of man-
kind should precede all national strategies, that if
an atomic war should break out, America herself might
be destroyed; that other nations must follow the same
principle of renouncing war if they themselves were to
survive. MacArthur was deeply impressed by this part
of Shidehara's argument. Before the SCAP draft and
the Japanese Government Bill were drawn, the General
and the Prime Minister agreed to insert such a clause
in the new Constitution. 16
In less than a week Whitney's section turned out a draft
which was submitted to a shocked Japanese government on
February 13. MacArthur 's statement on the renunciation of
war had been modified slightly. Originally-numbered
Article 8 of the draft read:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is
abolished. The threat or use of force is forever
renounced as a means for settling disputes with
any other nation.
No army, navy, air force, or other war poten-
tial will ever be authorized and no rights of ,
7
belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.
The specific prohibition against wars of self-preservation
had been deleted.
1 6
Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, "Some Reminiscences of
Japan's Commission on the Constitution," in Henderson,
The Constitution of Japan Its First Twenty Years, 1947 -
1967
, pp. 79, 86.
Quoted in Sato, "The Origin and Development of
the Draft Constitution of Japan," p. 32.

85
Regardless, the Japanese were shocked by the draft
in general and by the renunciation of war among particulars
Giving further credibility to MacArthur's statement that
the idea was Shidehara's, Dr. Takayanagi later stated:
Before Shidehara talked with MacArthur on January
24, 1946, he had not consulted with anyone, including
his Foreign Minister, Shigeru Yoshida. At a Cabinet
meeting on February 22, reporting the results of his
interview with MacArthur on the previous day,
Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were proposed by
MacArthur, although he never clearly said so. If he
had said that the proposal was his and not MacArthur's,
it might have been rejected by the Cabinet. Shidehara
was diplomatic enough to know this. So Cabinet members
who attended the meeting, including Yoshida and Ashida,
thought the proposal was made by MacArthur and not by
Shidehara. After the meeting Shidehara told a number
of his close friends that "Article 9 did not come from
abroad" and that it was his own proposal. Neither
Yoshida nor Ashida was aware that the original pro-
posal was made by Shidehara. They thought, as I did
at the time, that it was "imposed" by the Allied Powers
These events account for the difference between
Ashida' s public statement at the plenary session and
his private opinion in his pamphlet, and Yoshida 's
written memorandum sent to the Commission on the
Constitution which denied that the Article's was
Shidehara's. 18
MacArthur stated that he held from the outset that the re-
nunciation of war did not prevent "any and all necessary
steps for the preservation of the nation," and that if
18
Takayanagi, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's




attacked Japan would defend herself . Takayanagi surmised
that Dr. Kanamori Tokuj iro who replaced Matsumoto as
Minister of State in charge of revision did not correctly
explain the intended interpretation when he brought the
draft before the Diet:
. . .
SCAP's failure to inform the Japanese Govern-
ment that the article did not preclude armed forces
for defensive purposes led Dr. Kanamori, deputed by
the Cabinet to explain the draft Constitution to both
Houses of the Diet, to misinterpret the article and
thus to arouse opposition from conservative members
and provide plausible ground for later Socialist
intransigence toward evasion, amendment or repeal
of the article. 20
Although Yoshida claimed in his memoirs to have
agreed with the provision from the outset in order to dis-
pel fears of Japanese militarism, other conservatives did
21
not feel such a statement belonged in the Constitution.
The draft was first submitted to the Privy Council
where then designated Article 9 was attacked by Nomura




Takayanagi, quoted in Howard S. Quigley, "Revis-
ing the Japanese Constitution," Foreign Affairs , Volume 38,
Number 1, October, 1959, p. 14.
21





expressed his doubts about the renunciation of war as a
limit to self-defense at a meeting held in the presence
of the Emperor:
Nomura: I insist on deleting the second section
of Article 9. What do we do if China, Korea or the
Philippines invades?
Yoshida: Article 9 is the outcome of American
apprehension about Japanese rearmament. Consequently
it is difficult to revise it. Maintenance of security
has to be through the Occupation Army even when at-
tacked since we are not allowed armament, e.g
.
, even
against the Soviet Union we have to rely on the United
States and Britain.
Nomura: Absolute submission to the Potsdam
Declaration requires the disarmament of the Japanese
military but does not require renunciation of armament
forever. Even absolutely neutral countries like
Switzerland have military forces and against Korea we
will need armament of some sort. At the present time
we are weaker than Korea. Do you intend to revise
this later or will Japanese be forced to wear American
uniforms? I do not insist you answer this, but this
is my apprehension. 22
The appeal was to no avail as the Emperor had already con-
sented to the principles of the draft.
The draft Constitution was submitted to the House
of Representatives when it convened on June 20, 1946. A
Constitutional Amendment Committee of 72 members chaired
22
Commission on the Constitution, Reference
Document Number 46, July, 1960. I am indebted to Mr. Sato
Tatsuo, now President of the National Personnel Authority,
for providing me with this document.
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by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi was organized to examine the draft
article by article. With regard to Article 9, two amend-
ments were introduced upon suggestions by Dr. Ashida and
several other members. The phrase "Aspiring sincerely to
an international peace based on justice and order" was
added to the beginning of the first clause; and the phrase
"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph"
was placed before the second clause. The explanation
offered was that these phrases would indicate in a more
emphatic way Japan's sincere wish for peace by using inde-
pendent judgment in the expression of the provision.
GHQ raised no objection to the amendments, and only a few
years later did Ashida announce that these provisions were
23designed with rearmament for self-defense in mind.
Mr. Sato Tatsuo, who was division chief of the
Cabinet Legislative Bureau, helped present the draft to the
House of Representatives. Sato also later wrote the report
for the investigation committee on Article 9's origin;
he reported, that in addition to the formal committee,
whose deliberations were open and observed by Occupation
authorities, a subcommittee of thirteen members of various
23sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft
Constitution of Japan," pp. 25-26.
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parties, also headed by Ashida, was formed very secretly
to study the draft more privately. According to Sato, it
was at this subcommittee level where the two amendments
were put forward by Ashida. As legal advisor to the sub-
committee, Sato advised Ashida that he understood GHQ
authorities to be very rigid on wording of this article
and that they might feel that these words would be used to
justify rearmament for self-defense. Ashida made no ex-
planation of his reasoning, but the amendments were taken
24
to the committee as a whole and adopted.
24
Interview with Sato Tatsuo, January 11, 1971.
Sato told me this only after I had pressed him due to the
advice of Captain Oi Atsushi, UN (Ret.) who had told me
that an early article by Sato mentioned General Whitney's
statement that these words would allow Japan to rearm in
self-defense someday, while later, more detailed articles
by Sato did not mention this. Sato said he told me this as
a possible clarification which he feels can appropriately
be told now. The proceedings of the secret subcommittee
were not published in the investigation committee reports
nor were they made available to other members of the House
of Representatives or the whole Constitutional Amendment
Committee itself at the time it was meeting. The proceed-
ings of the subcommittee were stenographically recorded
only and are still kept secret in the House of Representa-
tives' files. As to Captain Oi's point, the investigation
commission reported that Dr. Cyrus Peake, a China expert
in the Government Section, reported Ashida 's amendments
to General Whitney and pointed out that they might allow
Japan to maintain an armed force for self-defense. Whitney,
however, did not veto the amendments. I am indebted to
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During deliberations on the draft Constitution in
the House of Peers, GHQ requested an amendment providing
the inclusion of an additional provision requiring civil-
ian status for Cabinet members; this had been requested
before, when the draft was still in the Lower House, but
had been ignored by the Japanese who felt it unnecessary
because of Article 9. Furthermore, there was no Japanese
word for civilian; one was either military (guntai )
:
Army (rikugun ) or Navy (kaigun) , or he wan't. Regardless,
GHQ stated that the amendment was necessary because of
an urgent request of the Far Eastern Commission. Sato
as legislative vice-chief visited Colonel Charles Kades
of the Government Section in order to talk about the
written form:
. . . While we were talking 1 happened to say that
this request did not seem to go along with Article 9.
He said, "As a result of revisions made to Article 9
in the House of Representatives, the apprehension on
the part of the Allied Nations that there might be
military in Japan in the future might have come forth
and have resulted in the present request. In other
words, in the second part of Article 9 the insertion
of "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
Captain Oi for the original direction, to Mr. Sato for
his confidence, and to Mr. Aso Shigeru of the National
Diet Library for confirming the findings of the investiga-
tion committee report for me.
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paragraph" might have led to the misunderstanding that
Japan might have armament for purposes other than those
of the preceding paragraph, i.e . , for defense."
This might have been Colonel Kades ' spontaneous,
offhand remark; but being the ones concerned with the
matter at the time the amendments were passed, it
seemed strange that the American GHQ authorities did
not raise any objection to the revision of Article 9
despite the fact they had this fear. At that time I
did not know anything about the original draft of
MacArthur, but today when it has been made public and
I know it stated, "An important article will be Japan
renounces armament even for its own security ," there„
s
can be no doubt as to the attitude of the Americans.
If MacArthur was correct that it was his idea from
the start that Japan could defend itself from attack by
armed force, this idea was not well communicated to the
Japanese. The Constitution was passed by Privy Council,
House of Representatives, and House of Peers, granted
sanction by the Emperor, and promulgated on November 3,
1946, with the provision that it would come into effect
six months later. The final English statement of Article 9
25
Sato, "Kempo Daikyujo no Seiritsu Katei," (The
Process through which Article 9 was Formulated) , Commission
on the Constitution, Investigative Legislative Bureau
Document Number 92, 1960. Article provided by Sato.
Italicized portion of quote is the only part which is a
direct quotation of MacArthur. As a result of the GHQ re-
quest a new word for civilian (bunmin ) was coined from two
Chinese characters. For an English description of the
civilian ministers episode see McNelly, "The Renunciation




Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever re-
nounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling inter-
national disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
The official Japanese government interpretation, which had
become communis opino doctorum and which was taught in
university law schools and even in junior and senior high
schools was that, "Japan retained a right of national self-
defense in international law but by virtue of the second
paragraph- -she could neither wage nor mainta in an armed
force--even for purposes of national self-defense."
0£
Takayanagi, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Com-
mission on the Constitution," p. 86. One prominent spokes-
man for this opinion was Yoshida who said that, if attacked,
Japan would have to rely on the help of other nations.
Dr. Takayanagi at the time personally called this communis
error doctorum . Two others who didn't go along were Ashida
who wrote an entirely different interpretation along the
lines of the Kellogg Briand Pact allowing each nation to
provide for its own national self-defense, Shin kempo no
kaishaku (Interpretation of the Constitution) , as early
as October, 1946, and Dr. Taoka Ryoichi of Kyoto University
who criticized the official interpretation as excessively
rigid from the standards of international law and criticized
Japanese intellectuals and journalists for their continuing
tendency to bend with the popular wind of the time, with the
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The effects of Article 9 on rearmament Later in
the Occupation period, on the nature of the Self-Defense
Forces created in 1954, and on the morale of those forces
ever since will be treated in later portions of this mono-
graph.
C. THE CONTINUATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
Despite demobilization and the new Constitution,
only if the ocean were to be abandoned for any purpose
might it have been possible to allow over 100,000 U.S. and
Japanese- planted acoustic, magnetic, and moored mines to
remain scattered about Japan upon completion of the war.
Such an alternative, if discussed at all, was not seriously
considered; the Japanese were directed at Manila to remove
all mines from coastal waters. Sweeping operations took
place until September 1, 1945, at which time they tempo-
rarily ceased until coordinated plans involving U.S. naval
units could be drawn up. Upon arrival off Yokosuka enroute
the rightists in the immediate prewar years and with the
leftists in the immediate postwar times. Interview with
retired Professor Emeritus Taoka , November 13, 1970.

94
to surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, American naval author-
ities reprimanded Japanese officers for not finishing all
27
minesweeping as had been directed.
The highest leaders of the United States Navy's
forces who participated in the Occupation typified the
same leaders of that service as a whole in their misunder-
standing and underestimating of the complexity and time-
consuming nature of mine-warfare operations, particularly
minesweeping. Since overly optimistic estimates of when
operations would be completed were repeated year by year,
no new civilian personnel were trained in the task, leav-
ing Japanese naval forces as the only ones skilled enough
to perform the duty. After Allied force reductions, by
1949 the Japanese minesweeping force was the largest and
most capable in the western Pacific, expert in the ability
to handle complex, modern mines.
Japanese minesweepers were controlled domestically
by the Navy/Second Demobilization Ministry. By May 1,
1946, all U.S. minesweepers were withdrawn, and minesweeping
27Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas, Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Subject: Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan,
dated February 11, 1946, p. 10.
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became an all-Japanese evolution as far as execution was
concerned. The Demobilization Ministry was organized in
some ways similar to the Navy Ministry; the Military Af-
fairs Bureau became the General Affairs Bureau and re-
mained the most important organ. The organization as it
partially existed at its outset on December 1, 1945 was
as indicated in Chart III-2. Initially directed by
Admiral Yamamoto, the man trusted and selected by Yonai,
Captain Tamura Kyuzo began sweeping with an Imperial Navy
force of 350 small ships, 773 officers, and 9227 enlisted
men. Although his numbers became progressively reduced
in all categories, his forces continued operating in uni-
forms stripped of rank insignia but with the same command
organization, each year exempted from purge restrictions,
and always slightly armed due to the necessities and
hazards of mine-clearance operations. Almost reminiscent
of the Tokugawa period, when all outside contacts were
supposedly shut off but limited outside relations were per-
mitted to continue in Nagasaki, so in the Occupation period
prior to the Korean War, when all military activities were
theoretically ended, was a small force allowed to continue







































































































































































The minesweeping effort's scope is indicated by
the map on the following page taken from a U.S. Navy-
theater report prepared at the end of 1945. When the
deadline for completion of operations was not met, another
was set by the on scene naval commander.
:
COMNAVJAP approved the following policy: all
minesweeping must be completed by 31 November 1947.
. . .
Reasons for adopting this policy are: fre-
quent and recurring requests for additional mine-
sweeping are believed to be motivated by ex-naval
officers who wish to prolong the tasks unnecessarily
in order to retain their positions. 28
Tamura was always allowed to continue, however, and
allusion to stalling did not appear in future reports.
During the period 1945-1952, 937 influence mines were swept
29
at a cost of 19 ships sunk and 77 lives lost. In 1952,
Coastal Security Senior Officer First Class ( Itto-Keibi-sei ,
equivalent rank of captain) Tamura, 91 other officers, and
1324 enlisted men would enter the Maritime Safety Force
28COMNAVFE, Command Narrative, Naval Forces Far
East for the period 1 October 1946-31 March 1947, p. 21.
29The operational details of minesweeping can be
found in Commander Naval Forces Far East, Command Narratives,
also in Auer, "The Continuation: A Study of Naval Activi-
ties in Behalf of Japan from 1945-1952, pp. 24-32. De-
tailed technical as well as operational details are con-
tained in Koro Keika Shi (History of Navigational Clearance),









(Keibitai) and later the Maritime Self-Defense Force from
which Tamura would finally retire as a vice admiral. The
minesweeping effort, estimated to be completed in 1946,
continues in 1971, 2000 some-odd influence mines still
remaining to be deactivated in extremely shallow waters.
The activities of the minesweepers played a significant
role in stimulating naval rearmament in 1950, but this
discussion belongs more properly to the next two chapters.

CHAPTER IV
MARITIME SAFETY IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Before and during the war Japan had no one instru-
ment or agency responsible for the numerous facets of mari-
time safety and law enforcement. The duties ordinarily
assigned to a modern maritime law enforcement agency,
namely, the prevention, detection, and suppression of
violations of a sovereign state with regard to the high
seas, harbors, bays, and like bodies of water along the
coasts; the rendering of assistance to mariners in distress;
and the protection of life and property were performed by
various, unrelated agencies. The Japanese Navy provided
assistance on the high seas, in hydrographic requirements,
and other supplementary activities, but only reluctantly,
since it considered the duty strictly collateral. No
Japanese "coast guard" as such existed; and the nearest
approach to any duty usually assigned to a coast guard was




Association) which was founded in 1889 by Kotooka Hirotsune,
the chief priest of Kotchira Shrine, widely known as the
shrine of the guardian god of sailors, who "desired to
establish a public organ looking to the rescue of persons
imperiled by maritime casualties, thinking that it would
never be proper to rely upon the help of God without doing
any effort whatever." The maritime and port regulations
of no two Japanese prefectures were alike, nor were their
pilot regulations. The Japanese shipwreck rate, always
the highest in the world, was an indication of the ineffi-
ciency of this system.
At the time of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima,
Okubo Takeo was the chief of the prefectural maritime
bureau. In December, 1945, Okubo, who only narrowly es-
caped death in the bombing, succeeded Imperial Navy Vice
Admiral Shiraishi Banyru as head of the Sailors Bureau
( Senin Kyoku ) of the then Transportation-Communications
2Ministry (Unyu-Tsushiu-Sho )
.
Information furnished by Captain Frank M. Meals,
USCG (Ret.), January 15, 1971. For Captain Meals' qual-
ifications, see below.
2
Interview with Okubo Takeo, member of the House
of Representatives, December 17, 1970. Okubo, Gekiro
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Faced with increasing captures of Japanese fishing
boats by the Soviet Union, China, and Korea in waters of
the Korean Sea, East China Sea, and off Hokkaido, Okubo
appealed to the Public Safety Division of SCAP to allow
the Japanese to protect threatened vessels or to provide
U.S. protection. Since the Navy was being disbanded, one
suggestion he made was a strengthening of the water
police (suijo keisatsu ) whose duty was to insure harbor
safety but whose personnel were now poorly trained and
equipped to do even that task well. Okubo was told to
wait and discuss the matter with a United States Coast
Guard captain who was coming to Japan to study the situa-
tion relative to maritime safety and to make recommenda-
3
tions concerning the problem.
On March 9, 1946, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard ordered Captain Frank M. Meals to report to SCAP for
the purpose of "making a survey and study of existing
Nijunen (The Twenty Years of Tribulation), Tokyo: Kempo
Kenkyukai, 1968, Chapter 2. I am indebted to Mr. Okubo f s
secretary of over twenty years, Mr. Shiyoma Kunizo, who
kept meticulous records used in the preparation of Okubo 's
book and who provided names and dates of specific persons







Japanese coast guard and harbor police." Upon reporting
the same month Captain Meals was directed:
... to survey such existing coast guard and harbor
police facilities and as a result thereof submit
plans, organization (to include numbers of personnel
and equipment) and recommendations for this force as
follows
:
1. (a) for the main island group of Japan.
(b) any remarks of recommendations concerning




The above is not intended to limit in any way
the scope of activities that may be pursued
in arriving at your decisions or formulating
plans and recommendations on this subject.
Preliminary to undertaking this survey and study, Meals
was also officially informed that "any organization pro-
jected as a result of this survey and study should be
within the scope of the existing Japanese economy and
utilize only such equipment as the Japanese already have or
could themselves make available."
An outbreak of cholera in Korea in the early summer
of 1946 complicated the coastal defense problem. The con-
clusion of the war ended Japanese sovereignty over Korea
and ended the legal classification of Koreans as Japanese
while making them citizens of their own newly independent
4




country. Koreans in Japan thus were not subject to some
of the restrictions placed on natives. Many Koreans in
Japan did not desire to be repatriated, and many in Korea,
particularly after the cholera outbreak, desired to come
to Japan. Over 200,000 Koreans were estimated to have
entered Japan from 1946-1950. Illegal entry of possible
cholera carriers thus became an immediate problem which
could not await the study being conducted by Captain Meals.
Illegal entry led to another problem that was
virtually unknown in Japan prior to the war, smuggling.
Since Koreans illegally entering the country were not en-
titled to rations, they were often forced into the black
market, smuggling, and other illegal activities. Smuggled
goods, while constituting a very small part of total trade,
put a drain on an already shaky economy and were very dif-
ficult to control since very small vessels were employed
and thus were literally needles in a haystack along Japan's
16,470-mile coastline.
U.S. Navy Department declassified document dated





To try to deal with the immediate problem, on June
12, 1946, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to set up
an emergency Illegal Entry Control Center (IECC) ; this was
done on June 20 within Mr. Okubo's bureau. A special center
was set up in Kyushu where the problem was most serious in
order to attempt more stringent control of critical areas.
A plan was worked out whereby illegally entering ships
were turned over to American forces ashore; but the Japanese
forces to implement this concept consisted of only three
ships and thirteen smaller vessels and were rendered almost
completely ineffective by a shortage of money, communications
equipment, and lack of any weapons or ammunition. The
Japanese government asked for permission to use ships held
in custody by the then Second Bureau, Demobilization Board
under SCAJAP control but was refused. Despite continuing
efforts to deal with the problem with the scant forces
available, no further action was to be taken by the American
side until Captain Meals made his recommendations.
Since there was no Japanese "coast guard" as such,
Meals tried to discover "who was doing what and why he was
Agency
Information provided by Japan Maritime Safety
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doing it." He had a great concern for the habits and cus-
toms of the Japanese people whose language he did not know,
and he began to teach Mr. Okubo about the history of United
States maritime development. Through Captain Meals, Okubo
learned of the customs issues and involvement of fishermen
in the American Revolutionary War as encouraged by Alex-
ander Hamilton and of the first act of the first Congress
of the United States in 1789, a protective tariff "to regu-
late the collection of duties imposed by law on the tonnage
of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandise
imported into the United States." One section of the act
called for a customs surveyor at each port and "the employ-
ment of boats which may be provided for the securing the
collection of the revenue." The "boats" were designated
as "Revenue Cutters," and the men in charge of them were
to be known as "Officers of the Customs." This was the
beginning of the United States Coast Guard, the Navy
being established later in 1798 under the central figure
of John Paul Jones. Hearing this, Okubo felt that if Japan
could have a coast guard under the Occupation, it might be
o
able to have a navy when it again became independent.
o
Letter form Captain Meals, January 15, 1971;
interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970; Okubo, Gekiro
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Okubo dates Japanese rearmament from 1947, since
that date marks the start of a new military organization,
while all activities up to that time were carried out only
as part of the liquidation of the old system. Based on
Captain Meals 1 recommendation that a centralized organiza-
tion "for the purpose of protecting life and property and
preventing, detecting, and suppressing violation of law
at sea" be set up, 28 former Japanese Navy auxiliary sub-
chasers were transferred from the Second Bureau, Demobili-
zation Board to the Ministry of Transportation for use as
coastal patrol ships on August 28, 1947; on May 1, 1948,
Diet legislation creating the Maritime Safety Board as an
autonomous organization within the Transportation Ministry
would go into effect to make these 28 ships the nucleus
9
of a Japanese "Coast Goard."
Captain Meals stated that, "At no time did I look
upon the Maritime Safety Agency as the start of another
Japanese navy"; but the organization he designed used the
Nijunen
. Mr. Okubo still likes to think of himself as
Japan's Alexander Hamilton and sought out Hamilton's
memorabilia when he visited the United States for the





U.S. Coast Guard as a model. The latter body was not
initially designated a military force in 1789 but later
became so:
Pursuant to the act of January 28, 1915 (38 statute
800, 14 U.S.C.), as amended, the Coast Guard is
constituted as a military service and at all times
constitutes a branch of the land and naval forces
of the United States , operating under the Treasury
Department in time of peace and as a part of the
Navy in time of war, or whenever the President
shall so direct. 10
Mr. Okubo stated and Captain Meals concurred that the
original organization planned was wider in scope than it
is today and was wider than a coast guard in that it in-
corporated a minesweeping force and planned for large,
heavily-armed vessels. Captain Meals thought these re-
quirements were necessary due to the job that had to be
done; Okubo concurred but additionally felt such a broader
organization could provide the basis for the navy Japan
would need after independence.
Okubo requested and received permission from SCAP
to employ 3000 ex-naval personnel including officers who
Letter to this writer from Captain Meals, Janu-
ary 17, 1971. U.S. Government Organization Manual , 1949,
italics mine.
Letters from Meals January 15 and 17, 1971; in-
terview with Okubo, December 17, 1971.
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were thus exempt from purge restrictions as a basis on which
to build expertise; Captain Meals concurred with the use of
these qualified, trained officers in order to start the
organization. As his chief advisor, Okubo chose ex-Rear
Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio who moved over from his position
as head of the General Affairs Division of the Demobiliza-
tion Bureau. To run minesweeping came Captain Tamura Kyuzo,
and as custodian of patrol ships came Captain Watanabe
12
Yasuji. Referring back to Chart III-2, it can be seen
that the personnel chosen as moderates to demobilize the
Navy were now being called upon to activate its coast guard.
The proposed organization had no limits on number
of personnel, armament of shipping, or number and speed of
ships. The force was to organize around the 28 ships trans-
ferred from the Demobilization Bureau while the necessary
legislation was being cleared through GHQ and Japan's Diet.
Its functions were to include protection of the coasts of
Japan, enforcement of regulations concerning the safety of
ships, establishment of standards of maritime safety,





coastal and adjacent waters, prevention and suppression of
smuggling, clearance of marine obstacles including mines,
etc. The new organization had to be "non-military"
despite the use of the U.S. Coast Guard model, the employ-
ment of ex-naval personnel, and the wide range of tasks,
all of which were felt logical or necessary due to the
serious problems facing an island nation with a long and
dangerous coast line in general but now having no navy
or coast guard organization and beset with hostile,
heavily-armed smugglers and pirates in addition. It was
intended that such be the case by GHQ and by Captain
Meals; and clearly to state the case an article of the
founding law was to declare that, "Nothing contained in
this Law shall be construed to permit the Maritime Safety
Board or its personnel to be trained or organized as a
13
military establishment or to function as such."
13
Ibid., U.S. Navy Department document of April,
1952, p. 162; Article 25, Maritime Safety Board Law (Law
No. 28 of April 27, 1948), Official Gazette , Tokyo:
Office of the Prime Minister, 1948. The same article re-
mained in the law even after 1954 when, again following
the U.S. model, it was legislated that in time of emergency
the Maritime Safety Agency would come under control of the
Defense Agency for operations.
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This assurance did not satisfy some officials of
SCAP, some members of the Allied Council for Japan, or the
Far Eastern Commission.
Early in October, 1947, the Japanese government pre-
sented for the approval of the Supreme Commander a draft
bill for the establishment of a maritime safety authority
of the nature recommended by Captain Meals and approved
by SCAP's Public Safety Division. All interested SCAP
staff departments except the Government Section concurred
with regard to the need of an organization of the type
recommended; the latter was opposed to the particular bill
submitted, principally because it authorized:
a. The establishment of an organized, trained,
uniformed, armed force possibly forming the nucleus
of a navy, without limitation as to size. (U.S.
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan authorized adequate
civilian police forces but prohibited "the restora-
tion even in a disguised form of any anti-democratic
and militaristic activities.")
b. Use of ships up to 1500 tons displacement
without limitation as to speed or armament and with
authority to operate on the high seas.l^
To resolve these objections joint discussions were held
between members of the Public Safety Division and Government
14SCAP document, "Maritime Safety Authorities Law,"
provided by Captain Meals.
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Section in late 1947. Further, Captain Meals advised the
Japanese who had written the law that, "The United States,
Great Britain, France, and Russia - Russia above all - were
not going to blindly approve any Japanese law effecting a
proposed sea force that did not include specifics." Noting
that they would be starting with a very meager force he
added:
We ended up with 28 small patrol type vessels I would
hesitate to go to sea in. ... I did, however, ad-
vise the Japanese to get the MSA established by laws
of Japan, accept the poor 28 boats we had as a starter.
Having the basic law establishing the MSA on the books
they could then, in the coming years after they were
free to act by themselves, take steps under their law
to correct any deficiency in the equipment or opera-
tions of an already legally approved organization.
The main thing was to get started and improve as you
go! 15
Taking these considerations into account the Japanese ac-
cepted changes in original proposals resulting in limita-
tions on:
a. total number of personnel which were not
to exceed 10,000;
b. total number of vessels which was not to
exceed 125 and total tonnage which was not
to exceed 50,000 gross tons;
Letter from Captain Meals, January 15, 1971.

113
c. speed of vessels which was not to exceed
fifteen knots;
d. armament which was limited to small arms for
maritime safety officials;
4. operating area which was limited to the high
seas adjacent to Japan.
The final draft was approved by the Ashida Cabinet
in March, 1948 and was passed with little discussion by
the Diet on April 15, 1948.
On April 28, however, the Maritime Safety Board,
which was to come into being two days later, caused a con-
siderable stir in the Allied Council for Japan. It was
the first item to appear on the agenda for several months,
the most recent preceding meetings having lasted less
than one minute. In the words of a SCAP official:
16
Also, due to American insistence the proposed
English name of the organization was changed to Maritime
Safety "Board" (MSB) vice "Agency," which the Japanese
"
cho " would ordinarily be translated as, since some people
felt a board sounded smaller and thus would be less con-
troversial than an agency. The English title has shifted
back and forth several times between MSB and MSA; the
Japanese version has always remained Kaijowancho . Inter-
view with Mr. Ohno Yasuchika, Foreign Liaison Officer,
Maritime Safety Agency, November 13, 1970. Ohno served




For an hour and ten minutes your [Captain Meals']
law was lambasted by both the British and the Russians,
the United Kingdom representative initiating the in-
quisition by a statement that such an important matter
should have been first discussed with either the
Allied Council or the Far Eastern Commission prior to
headquarters approval. They were very gentlemanly,
however, in their criticism. I won't even attempt to
tell you about all the bad things the Russians had
to say. The Chinese representative supported the
headquarters but cautioned that we should be on the
alert to prevent the Japanese from abusing the author-
ity contained in the law.
The Soviet request that the effectiveness of the
law be suspended until approved by the Far Eastern
Commission will, of course, be ignored as the Supreme
Commander acted within the scope of his authority in
the absence of any policy decision on the matter by
the Far Eastern Commission. The law will be enforced
from May 1st. 17
The U.S. representative on the council, William J. Sebald,
displayed photographs of the vessels to be used in coastal
patrol, claimed that they were very slow, had no armament,
and thus were a threat to no one; Sebald said the entire
law would be submitted to the Far Eastern Commission as a
matter of routine policy.
In the Far Eastern Commission, representatives of
China and the Soviet Union protested the establishment of
a coast guard. The Soviet delegate charged that the
Letter to Captain Meals from SCAP legal officer





Maritime Safety Board was in fact a disguised restoration
of the Japanese Navy and a contradiction of directives of
the Occupation for the disarmament of Japan. He said the
personnel would be armed and would constitute a training
cadre for naval expansion. The U.S. delegate denied the
18
charges and insisted on approval of the bill.
One recent study of Japan's postwar defense sug-
gests that a fundamental policy of Japan providing its own
internal security through the formation of a strengthened
and centralized police force while relying on the U.S. for
external protection was formulated in 1947. The study main-
tains that this policy has persisted relatively unchanged
18
U.S. Department of State, The Far Eastern Commis -
sion: A Study in International Cooperation, 1945-1952
,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953;
U.S. Navy Department document, April, 1952, p. 162.
Others also saw the new force as a restored navy. Jane's
Fighting Ships 1947-1948 editorialized that, "The Japanese
fleet is about to rise like a phoenix from its ashes.
Though its present material is limited to 50,000 tons,
with no single vessel displacing more than 1500 tons, this
may well prove to be the nucleus of a new navy. One has
only to recall the renaissance of the German fleet which
followed the period of comparative quiescence during
which (on paper) the tonnage restrictions of the Treaty
of Versailles were observed." Mr. Ohno, see note 16 above,
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the editors of Jane's to
stop referring to the MSB as a navy nucleus in further
editions for which he sent pictures of MSB ships; interview
with Ohno, November 13, 1970.
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to the present day, the Self-Defense Forces only raising
the threshold of external attack, i.e. , Japan will handle
a small-scale invasion but in an attack of any magnitude
the United States is still expected to defend Japan.
Written statements of this policy were prepared as memo-
randums by Ashida Hitoshi, then Foreign Minister of the
Katayama Cabinet, between June and September, 1947. The
study maintains that although the fundamental purpose was
not achieved at the time the memorandums were written, the
policy continued, found partial success with the first
Security Treaty of 1952, and was essentially fulfilled with
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, when
the U.S. formally guaranteed Japan's external security for
a pledge of Japan to assume a greater role in its self-
defense. The assessment is offered that Japan's postwar
defense policy was formulated early, has not changed sub-
stantially, was not derived from U.S. Far Eastern Security
Policy as is often claimed, but is rather a Japanese-
authored policy--based on a realistic assessment of in-
ternational politics—which has proved successful by means
19
of patient and persistent Japanese diplomacy.
19
Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense
Policy 1947-1968
, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971
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It is interesting to view the origin of the Maritime
Safety Board in view of the above thesis. The MSB was de-
clared non-military in its charter. Former Japanese Navy
personnel eager to build an autonomous maritime force in
1951 also branded it non-military and strictly a police
force. If it was a police force planned in 1947, was it
the first successful expression of the policy expressed by
Ashida and continued by conservative Japanese prime ministers?
First, it should be noted that the request for maritime pro-
tection from U.S. or Japanese resources came in early 1946
and was a request for protection against external irritations.
Second, the solution of solving the problem by strengthening
of the water police, as suggested as one possible alternative
by Mr. Okubo, was rejected. It was decided instead, that a
new Japanese organization would be created with a wide range
of duties from operations on the high seas and minesweeping
to coastal operations coordinated with local police. The
organization was designed to deal with protection against
any internal security violations committed on the sea but
was designed primarily to deal with external security
threats from foreign countries to Japanese fishermen, from
foreign smugglers of foreign contraband, from illegal

1L8
foreign entrants, against the mining of key waterways, etc.
Third, the MSB did not replace the water police. Prior
to the formal inauguration of MSB, a vice minister's con-
ference was held to arrange for "coordination of activities
of the Government agencies concerned, incidental to the
establishment of the Maritime Safety Board (Agency)."
The resolution of that conference stated that the primary
responsibilities to perform policing duties in ports,
harbors, straits and at sea rested with MSB but specifically
precluded the exercise of policing authority over the sea
area considered as "area of influence of the Police." The
resolution went on to call for exchange of information,
mutual assistance, joint operations in time of emergency,
and boarding of police officials on an MSB patrol vessel to
discharge his duties "under the direction and supervision
20
of the Commanding Officer of the patrol vessel or craft."
The water police are still organized in appropriate prefec-
tures at the present time. Fourth, the efforts which
20
From (Extracts of) "Resolution of the Vice
Ministers' Conference held on 18 March 1948 as regards
Coordination of activities of the Government agencies con-
cerned, incidental to the establishment of the Maritime
Safety Board (Agency)." I am indebted to Mr. Ohno Yasuchika,
MSA, for providing a copy of the resolution.
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resulted in the formation of the Maritime Safety Board were
mutual rather than a unilateral program of the United
States or Japan. Mr. Okubo and Captain Meals were repre-
sentatives of an agreement subsequently approved by Japan's
Diet and SCAP, respectively.
In considering the fact that the Maritime Safety
Board was declared to be non-military, it can be noted
that the present-day Self-Defense Forces with nuclear depth-
bomb launchers, supersonic jet aircraft, and guided missiles
are still legally non-military. Examination of the opera-
tions and historical progress of the Maritime Safety Board
will be made in order to judge its character.
The immediate problem of smuggling, illegal entry,
and mines, particularly the influence type activated by the
sound, magnetic signature, or pressure of large ships, were
a large part of the operations. Since smugglers and pirates
were subject to no restrictions on speed or armament of
their vessels as was the Maritime Safety Board, patrol ships
often found themselves too slow or outgunned. If they could
catch a vessel engaged in illegal activity, their most ef-
fective tactic was often to ram it.
Since MSB vessels were authorized to conduct opera-
tions on the high seas "adjacent to Japan," they were
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pretty well restricted from dealing with seizures of fish-
ing vessels by the Koreans or the Chinese; and there were
not enough patrol ships to protect the number of vessels
fishing near the Soviet-held islands to the north. The
Patrol and Rescue Division of the Maritime Safety Agency
did cope with this latter problem by becoming a "nucleus
of intelligence" for the U.S. of Soviet activity in the
area. Tasks such as passing close to and photographing a
Soviet warship fleet operating off Sakhalin and interro-
gating fishermen who had been detained as to the locations
of gunsights on Soviet-controlled islands were assigned
to MSA beginning in late 1948 and were carried out by
21patrol ships operating out of Hokkaido.
The outbreak of the Korean War also lends an in-
sight to the American view of the MSB. On July 8, 1950,
General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida
authorizing the creation of a 75,000-man National Police
Reserve. This act is often heralded as the beginning of
21
Interview with U.S. Naval Intelligence official
and Mr. Mita Kazuya, chief of Patrol and Rescue Division,
MSB, 1949-1950, December 7, 1970. While neither man was
at liberty to discuss the detailed nature of these opera-
tions, the Navy official indicated it was quite common
knowledge among U.S. and Japanese officials that a repre-
sentative of the Central Intelligence Agency worked closely
with MSA on Hokkaido operations.
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postwar rearmament, the first violation of the spirit of
Article 9 of the Constitution, etc. Close examination of
the letter and knowledge of the history of the Maritime
Safety Board do not lead to the same conclusions. The
75, 000- man "Police Reserve" was described by Colonel Frank
Kowalski, U.S. Army (Ret.), Chief of Staff to Major General
Winfield Shepard who was assigned to organize the force,
as a mere disguise for the organization of a new Japanese
army made necessary by the transfer of Occupation forces
22
to the Korean battlefield.
Since the pullout of the U.S. Army units from Japan
resulted in the authorization of a "disguised Japanese army,"
it might be expected that the U.S. Navy units' withdrawal
would have resulted in a similar authorization for a dis-
guised Japanese navy. However, the MacArthur letter stated:
Insofar as maritime safety in the harbors and
coastal waters of Japan is concerned, the Maritime
Safety Board has achieved highly satisfactory results,
but events disclose that safeguard of the long
Japanese coast line against unlawful immigration and
smuggling activity requires the employment of a
larger force under this agency than is presently
provided for by law.
22
Frank Kowalski, Nihon Saigumbi (The Rearmament
of Japan), Tokyo: Simultrans, 1969.
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Accordingly, I authorize your government to
take the necessary measures ... to expand the
existing authorized strength of personnel serving
under the Maritime Safety Board by an additional
8000. 23
Just as Japanese personnel assigned to form the National
Police Reserve did not really know the nature of the force
from the outset, initially thinking it was merely a
strengthening of the police, so Director General Okubo at
first did not understand what the additional 8000 person-
nel meant. He wondered if this was to be the navy he felt
would someday come out of a Japanese coast guard; but to
make sure of the intention of the U.S. authorities, he
24
asked immediately upon receiving the letter. Okubo was
told that no new organization was contemplated. The addi-
tional personnel represented a strengthening of the force
25in order more effectively to carry out its mission. In
23
From the letter from General MacArthur to Prime
Minister Yoshida, July 8, 1950, as contained in U.S. Navy
Department historical files.
24
Mr. Ohno received a copy of the letter from
Mr. G. H. Rettew, chief of the maritime branch of the
Public Safety Division, G-2, GHQ, and hand-carried the
letter to and translated it for Okubo. Ohno then accom-
panied Okubo back to see Rettew to ask him just what the
implications of the letter were. Interview with Ohno,




a formal written statement of July 13, 1950, GHQ's maritime
representative wrote:
Preservation of life and property at sea and
enforcement of Japanese laws in the waters adjacent
to Japan are your functions and which functions the
MSA must at all times endeavor to accomplish to the
maximum extent possible within limitations.
Admittedly the present Agency fleet is deficient
numerically and as to the types of vessels. Numeri-
cal deficiency above can be overcome by chartering of
vessels but it is not thought that proper types are
available from Japanese sources. New construction
can overcome the entire deficiency.
Patrol of Japanese territorial waters for detec-
tion and prevention of an aggressive amphibious move-
ment directed against Japanese shores is most certainly
a matter of grave concern to the Japanese Government
and the MSA. However, such patrol would be of military
nature and vessels required for effectiveness of the
Armed naval type and, since the Japanese Government
has as yet been given no responsibility or authorized
armed naval type vessels it would appear futile to
charter or build vessels for this purpose . . .
Against any contingency there is certainly no
harm in having complete plans reach for if and when
[sic], however, to implement a plan for something which
is not at present a Japanese function could only be
contrary to Japanese and SCAP interests. 26
The MSB, while judged weak in execution, at the time was
felt to be the appropriate organization for providing for
Japanese maritime security. It seems not unreasonable to
26Quoted from letter from Rettew to Okubo, July
13, 1950. I am indebted to Mr. Ohno of MSA who supplied
a copy of the letter.
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say that the MSB was thought to be as adequate a security
organization for the sea as the National Police Reserve
would be on the ground. Can it then be said that rearma-
ment began in 1950? Or is Okubo's statement that it began
in 1947 closer to reality?
One dramatic demonstration in support of his con-
tention occurred with the events of October to December,
1950. After receipt of Rettew's letter clarifying the
meaning of the MacArthur letter, the MSA prepared a written
request for information with an attached annex containing
an outline of a draft Cabinet order regarding strengthen-
ing of the agency. The draft called for amendments to the
basic law to increase the number of personnel from 10,000
to 18,000, to increase the maximum number of ships and
total tonnage from 50,000 to 75,000 tons, and to remove
27
restrictions on speed and armament. But before the
27Annex 2 to MSA letter to Public Safety Division,
GHQ. The letter, which requested advice on the draft
amendment, was never answered; but a Cabinet order was ap-
proved by GHQ and went into effect on October 23, 1950,
allowing the increase of personnel as requested and the
increase in number of ships from 125 to 200 and total
tonnage from 50,000 to 80,000. No mention was made of
speed and armament in the Cabinet order. Mr. Ohno kindly
provided a copy of the MSA request; the final version of




draft could be acted upon and any change to the basic MSA
law could be effected, i.e
.
, when the organization was
still in the original status as planned in 1947, the U.S.
Navy got into serious trouble in Korea.
Following the surprising and successful amphibious
landing at Inchon on the west coast of Korea in September,
General MacArthur scheduled another amphibious landing
at Wonsan on the east coast, the first penetration into
North Korea, which had been authorized by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on September 27, "D-day" being targeted for
October 20. It happened that the waters off the east
coast were ideal for mining because of current patterns
and depth of the water. In 1946, U.S. minesweepers
stationed in Japan had been withdrawn to California; by
1947 the Pacific fleet command responsible for the function,
Commander Mine Force Pacific Fleet (COMINPAC) , was abol-
ished by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval
Operations; and minesweeping was relegated to a collateral
duty of the logistics and destroyer forces. At the time
of the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. Navy's mine-
sweeping force in the western Pacific consisted of ten
ships: four 180-foot steel vessels, three of which were
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laid up in caretaker status, and six wooden auxiliary
minesweepers; the entire navy's minesweeping force
was not any more impressive, consisting of two divi-
sions of steel (and therefore magnetic) destroyer
minesweepers, two divisions of 180-foot steel vessels,
21 wooden auxiliaries, and two smaller wooden mine-
sweeping craft. In August, 1950, Vice Admiral C. Turner
Joy, COMNAVFE, had asked the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, who was visiting the combat
theater at the time, about the possibility of increasing
the minesweeping forces. Admiral Sherman said there
could be no increase because of other priorities. The
U.S. Navy opposed the idea of a landing at Wonsan
because of limited amphibious and support shipping.
Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, formally the Deputy Chief
of Staff under Vice Admiral Joy but actually the per-
sonal troubleshooter of Admiral Sherman, termed the
landing "unnecessary" and favored instead an overland
entrance into Wonsan by the Army. By MacArthur's
28
order the amphibious landing was on.
28
Commanders Malcom W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson,





Admiral Burke knew that the U.S. Navy did not
have the minesweeping forces capable of handling sig-
nificant opposition, particularly if the advance into
North Korea meant the possibility of encountering
sophisticated Soviet influence mines. There was only
one expertly trained and large minesweeping force in
the world qualified to do the job, the forces of the
Maritime Safety Agency, still sweeping the Japanese
coastal approaches and Inland Sea area. After the
landing was definitely decided on, Burke called Okubo
into the operations center of COMNAVFE, explained to
him the necessity of U.N. Forces conducting an amphib-
ious operation off Wonsan, and told him of his fear of
Soviet mines in the area. Okubo understood the impor-
tance of the landing and the fact that the Japanese mine-
sweepers were the most experienced in the art of sweep-
ing influence mines. Burke asked him to assemble all
Institute, 1951, pp. 125-26. This volume was a Navy
Department project and the authors were assigned on
the scene to interview all unit and ship commanders
and to screen all relevant telegraphic communications.
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Japanese minesweepers in the Tsushima Straits area and to
help in sweeping at Wonsan and in residual work at Inchon.
Okubo stated that the decision was too important to be made
by the Director General of MSA but that he would approach
Prime Minister Yoshida for a decision. Yoshida was reluc-
tant since there was no contract to allow minesweeping as
29
there was for the convoying of troops and cargo.
Furthermore minesweeping was a combat operation, and
Article 25 of the MSA law made it very clear that this
was a non-military force; for Japanese former naval per-
sonnel to risk their lives in combat in support of Americans
would be very hard to explain. Still Japan was under Occu-
pation and subject to SCAP authorities. Yoshida told Okubo
30
to send MSA sweepers as desired by the U.S. Navy.
29
SCAJAP Contract #N61736s-l negotiated by Com-
mander J. F. Witherow, U.S. Navy and Mr. Yoshiya Ariyoshi
for the Japanese government called for U.S. appropriated
funds to finance transport services. Operational details
are contained in COMNAVFE Command and Historical Reports,
1950-1951.
30
""^Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S.
Navy (Ret.), February 19, 1971. Interview with Okubo,
December 17, 1970. The Japanese public is still relatively
unaware such operations ever took place. Okubo felt it too
sensitive to mention it in his book on MSA in 1968 but con-
sented to discussion of it now. U.S. Naval Command
Histories and several American historical accounts of Korea
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Captain Tamura, then chief of the Fairway Safety
Office, MSA, organized his forces on October 2, 1950.
There was hesitancy among some personnel, but after being
given a promise of double pay and some strong words of en-
couragement by Tamura, Burke, and Mita, then Deputy
Director General of MSA for operations, there was no
31final refusal to go. On October 6, 1950, Admiral Joy
sent official SCAP authorization to the Ministry of Trans-
portation authorizing the use of twenty ships, ordering
the Japanese government to assemble them for orders as
would be issued by COMNAVFE, instructing the ships to fly
only the "international Easy" ("E") flag while in Korea,
refer to partial activities but have not accurately known
the details as to number of ships involved, circumstances
of employment (most accounts claim the ships were con-
tracted, whereas compensation to the Japanese government
was negotiated later), personnel casualties, and losses of
ships. Because of the secrecy of the incident at the time
and since, it is possible that full details are known only
by the late Prime Minister Yoshida, Burke, Okubo, Tamura,
and Mita. An article describing some details of the opera-
tions appeared in an Asahi Shimbum article on my research
on March 30, 1971. No immediate adverse reaction in Japan
was noted.
31
Interview with Vice Admiral Tamura Kyuzo, JMSDF
(Ret.), December 28, 1970. Interviews with Burke, Febru-





and directing the double pay.
Admiral Burke's fears turned out to be more than
justified. On October 10, Task Group 95.5 under the
command of Captain R. T. Spofford arrived off Wonsan; under
his command were twelve American minesweepers and eight
Japanese ships, the latter also under the command of Captain
Tamura.
33 On October 12, two sweepers, USS PIRATE and
USS PLEDGE , were sunk by mine explosions; but the full ex-
tent of the threat was still unknown. In actuality a net-
work of magnetic and contact mines were spread over a 400-
square-mile-area. The presence of magnetic mines was
32
Letter from Vice Admiral C. T. Joy to Ministry
of Transportation, Japanese government. I am indebted to
Admiral Tamura for providing a copy of the letter. The
National Personnel Authority was mystified as to why and
how to pay "certain members of MSA double pay for special
operations." A special provision enacted by Cabinet order
had to be incorporated into the law to authorize such a
payment; interview with Mr. Yasuda Hiroshi, Secretariat,
Japan Defense Agency, then a member of the NPA, January 15,
1971. A COMNAVFE letter on November 14, 1950, to Pacific
Far East Command Headquarters (also headed by General
MacArthur) asked for funds for the double pay, stores,
material, etc. The request was approved on November 20,
1950. A joint conference between SCAP maintenance and
logistics officials and MSA counterparts in early 1951
worked out details of the payment; COMNAVFE, Command and
Historical Report, December, 1950-March, 1951, p. 40.
33
Interviews with Admirals Burke, February 17,
1971, and Tamura, December 28, 1970.
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confirmed on October 18 and resulted in one of the most
amazing messages being sent to the Pentagon since Pearl
Harbor. Rear Admiral Allan E. "Hoke" Smith, the immediate
senior of Captain Spofford, informed the Chief of Naval
Operations that, "THE U.S. NAVY HAS LOST COMMAND OF THE
..34
SEA IN KOREAN WATERS . . ." The official U.S. Navy
account of the incident reported:
The Navy able to sink an enemy fleet, to defeat
aircraft and submarines, to do precision bombing,
rocket attack, and gunnery, to support troops ashore
and blockade, met a massive 3000 mine field laid off
Wonsan by the Soviet naval experts. . . . the
strongest Navy in the world had to remain in the Sea
of Japan while a few minesweepers struggled to clear
Wonsan.
Vice Admiral Joy and Admiral Sherman concurred with
Admiral Smith. Admiral Sherman stated:
Hoke's right; when you can't go where you want
to, when you want to, you haven't got command of
the sea.
. . . We've been plenty submarine-conscious
and air-conscious. Now we're going to start getting
mine-conscious- -beginning last week. 35
But the immediate problem wouldn't be helped by determina-
tion alone. The landing had to be postponed until
34
The opening of the original message as quoted
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October 25, but Wonsan was finally cleared.
The Japanese minesweepers' experience paid big
dividends. Tamura ' s ships were often called upon to lead
American ships through the mine fields. No area swept by
the Japanese ships ever had to be reswept by other units
although the same could not be said for less experienced
United Nations' ships. Between October 2, and December 12,
1950, 46 Japanese minesweepers, one large "guinea pig"
vessel used for activating pressure mines, and 1200 former
naval personnel were employed in operations at Wonsan,
Kunsan, Inchon, Haiju, and Chinampo. Japanese forces
swept 327 kilometers of channels and anchorages extending
607 square miles. Two ships were sunk, one exploding
after activating a mine off Wonsan and one grounding off
Kunsan; one Japanese sailor was killed and eight were in-
36jured in the sinkings.
36
Interviews with Tamura, December 28, 1970; Okubo,
December 17, 1970; Burke, February 17, 1971; and Mita,
December 7, 1970. In contrast to the early statements by
U.S. naval commands that minesweeping would be completed in
1946, 1947, it is interesting to note the comment of a
government sponsored historical account of the Korean inci-
dent: "Still, there did exist one ray of sunshine from an
outside source. The mining of Japanese home waters, so
successful as to keep the Japanese sweeping ever since,
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Okubo briefed Prime Minister Yoshida in privacy
almost every day while the Japanese ships were in Korea.
Since the Japanese had no law providing for compensation
for people killed or injured in combat, Yoshida and Okubo
, . 37
were worried should there be any Japanese casualties.
Okubo spoke to Admiral Burke, and when the one Japanese
sailor was killed, an official of the Public Safety
Division of SCAP visited the home of the deceased and
38
financially compensated the sailor's father.
With a lessening of the war tempo in December,
1950, the Japanese minesweepers were detached one by one
and the Korean organization was formally disbanded in
Japan on December 15, 1950. Vice Admiral Joy wrote
Mr. Okubo on December 7:
1. I have just received word from my forces
afloat that the check sweeping at Haiju has been
now paid an unexpected dividend as COMNAVFE obtained author-
ity. . . to employ 20 Japanese sweepers for work in Korea.
. .
." James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval
Operations KOREA
,
Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1962, p. 232. All talk of sweeping being
motivated by former naval officers trying merely to retain
their positions seemed forgotten.
37 Interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970.
38
Ibid., interview with Mita, December 7, 1970.
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completed and that all remaining units of the Japanese
minesweeping groups are now enroute to Japan.
2. It is sincerely regretted that MS 4 met with
misfortune at Wonsan and the loss of their shipmate
. . .
must sadden the otherwise joyous homecoming of
your gallant little ships and their faithful crews.
3. The rapidity with which your forces responded
to the request to do minesweeping in Korea, the qual-
ity of their work, and their spirit of cooperative-
ness have given me great pleasure. It is recognized
that they had many difficulties with weather, language
and supplies, but by perseverance, and working under
the efficient supervision of Mr. K. Tamura, Chief of
the Fairway Safety Office, they overcame them all.
4. With pleasure, I ask you to transmit to all
hands concerned, "Well Done." C.T. JOY39
39Letter from Joy to Okubo, December 7, 1950,
COMNAVFE chronological files. Upon reaching the age of 70,
retired VADM Tamura was awarded the Second Order of the
Rising Sun, the highest award given to a Japanese "mili-
tary" man for performance of duty since the war.
Mr. Okubo testified in behalf of Tamura 's award; interview
with Okubo, December 17, 1970. It is interesting to note
VADM Joy's later remark that, "The main lesson of the
Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch
of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever
be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future.
Wonsan also taught us that we can be denied freedom of
movement to any enemy objective through the intelligent
use of mines by an alert force." As in 1946 and 1947,
from 1968-1971, U.S. minesweepers based in Japan were
withdrawn to California, COMINPAC was again abolished,
and the total number of minesweepers in the Pacific has
been greatly reduced. The U.S. Navy's minesweeping
strength has again fallen victim to economy measures. The
biggest and best minesweeping force in the western Pacific,
if not in the world, belongs now to the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force. Whose ships would be used for mine-
sweeping if another conflict broke out in Korea?
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What then of Okubo's claim that the Maritime Safety
Board was the beginning of Japanese rearmament? Was the
MSB/MSA a military force? Some observations on the ques-
tions are offered. First, the original U.S. intention was
that the force not constitute rearmament nor have a mili-
tary nature. In 1946 when the movement began, the U.S.
Occupation authorities were firmly committed to disarmament
and were still to demonstrate their resolve with the writing
of the Constitution. The sincerity of Captain Meals in try-
ing to observe the intentions of the SCAP disarmament pro-
gram are not doubted. Hostile Soviet fleet movements off
Hokkaido and a Soviet -laid minefield off Korea were not
anticipated at the time nor was the fact that Japanese
minesweepers would still be active four years later.
Second, the tasks that needed to be dealt with were almost
impossible to perform without specially- trained personnel;
to be effectively accomplished, these tasks required that
the personnel employed be armed. Third, some officials of
the Japanese and U.S. governments, and particularly the
fishermen who were being harassed and captured were not as
committed to and/or convinced of the certainty that Japan
could live "forever" or even then without a naval force as
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were some wishful thinkers in the Occupation hierarchy.
Fourth, in order to cope with the difficulty of the tasks
involved, SCAP allowed some former naval personnel to be
exempt from purge restrictions and permitted the organi-
zation that was formed to be lightly armed. Since they
were interested primarily in solving problems, the major-
ity of Japanese legislators, to the extent they were free
to object, did not. Fifth, the fundamental objections to
the MSB of the Government Section of SCAP and of the
Soviet delegate to the Far Eastern Commission were never
removed; they were acted upon only by attaching restric-
tions which made the organization weaker and less able to
do what it was assigned to do or by pointing out how weak
it would be due to a lack of good equipment. In fact, as
charged, from the start, the MSB was an organized
,
trained, uniformed, armed force and did provide a training
cadre for later naval expansion ; further, although
uncharged: it was, from the outset, under Japanese
centralized authority ; it was paid for by the Japanese
government ; and it participated in naval operations . But
there is almost no other way it could have done its job--
unless Japan were to abandon the sea or unless the United

137
States would have done the tasks with its Navy. Sixth,
once the organization was founded, it became more and more
tempting not to use its capabilities. Communism was
feared to be expanding globally, particularly in Asia.
Soviet naval units were operating off Hokkaido; Japanese
fishermen were being captured and held in Soviet territory.
Seventh, even though it was intended to remove all former
naval personnel, it was never done. Admiral Yamamoto did
leave in 1950, and there was an effort by the Government
Section of GHQ as late as November, 1950, right in the
middle of the Korean minesweeping, to purge the remaining
officers, including Captain Tamura, who had been continu-
40
ally exempted. Eighth, from October-December, 1950,
Japanese ships were made integral elements of United
Nations/United States Navy task organizations and deployed
overseas in combat operations . Like the Maritime Self-
Defense Force in 1971, the Maritime Safety Agency in 1950
40
In a letter of November 8, 1950, to SCAP, VADM
Joy asked to retain the 92 officers at least through March,
1951. Although he promised to try to train replacements
as soon as possible, he noted that minesweeping was "a
highly developed science that takes many years to develop";
letter quoted from COMNAVFE chronological files.
41
To show the dangers of an absolute generalization,
without implying any Japanese resolve to project military
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had many military characteristics.
Shortly after he initially arrived in Japan in
September, 1950, Admiral Burke discussed with Mr. Okubo
the possibility of MSA's acquiring some American frigates
which had been returned from Soviet-received lend-lease
following the war. Burke had already become intimate
with Admiral Nomura, and after the Korean incident the
two men began talking in earnest about formal naval re-
armament. But planning for that happening had begun
long before.
power, it is interesting to note the opening statement of
a recent U.S. Embassy Tokyo cable to the Department of
State and American embassies around the world on the sub-
ject of "Japanese Defense." "Japanese defense policy and
the defense of Japan are directed at the defense of Japan
against conventional attack. Government policy and public
opinion deny the extension of Japanese military power
overseas, and present capabilities prohibit it, at least
through the 1970 's " (italics mine); U.S. Embassy Tokyo
A-1158 of December 11, 1970; copy provided by U.S. Embassy
Tokyo. When asked later, the drafter of the message
acknowledged he did not realize Japanese units had de-
ployed in 1950. As of the present moment the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force has a larger and more modern
minesweeping force than in 1950; and a similar deployment,
as in 1950, in conjunction with U.S. Forces in a movement
to Korea or Taiwan would not appear beyond capability. A
unilateral move by Japan to conquer a foreign territory
would indeed appear impossible with just SDF units. To
move enough troops and logistic supplies would necessitate
using the Japanese merchant fleet.

CHAPTER V
NAVAL REARMAMENT PLANNING 1945-1952
In the early months of the Occupation although
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa and his Military Affairs
Bureau Chief, Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, were convinced
of and dedicated to the necessity of disarmament, there
was legitimate concern for Japanese security at some future
time. When the Occupation began, no one could say how long
it would last; and at that time the prospect of the United
States providing the naval protection of Japan for the
next 25 years by security treaties and through the station-
ing of the Seventh Fleet in certain Japanese ports was not
in sight.
As a result there was casual morning discussion
within the Demobilization Ministry as to whether planning
for a new navy at some future date should be carried on.
Opinion was divided, some strong voices being heard that




authorities or Japanese government officials, while others
maintained that not to plan anything could result in the
Occupation ending with Japan being irresponsibly defense-
less. Even the latter group admitted that a navy might not
be required for many years, depending on the length of the
Occupation and the willingness of the United States to pro-
vide for Japan. Early in 1946 a conclusion for action was
finally reached since discussions up to that time had been
merely speculative and often almost jocular. The decision
was made:
For the present time, let us not worry about when any
particular plan is to be implemented. But in order
to remain flexible and to deal with any situation
that might come up, let us make the documents division
of the Second Demobilization Ministry a core, for car-
rying out very confidential studies (without admitting
publicly that they are going on) .
1
The head of the Documents Division in the Liquida-
tion Bureau of the ministry was Captain Yoshida Eizo, who,
along with two other members of the division, Captain
Nagaishi Masataka and Commander Terai Yoshimori, worked
secretly on rearmament plans at night or during spare time
Yoshida Eizo, "The Process of Rearmament Plan-
ning by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Func-
tions," April, 1953. I am indebted to VADM Yoshida, JMSDF
(Ret.) for providing me a copy of this article; interview
with Yoshida, December 25, 1970.
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from their primary duties of negotiating with U.S. author-
ities on liquidation and of collecting data on demobilized
naval personnel. Like the officers engaged in minesweeping
operations, these men were also subsequently exempt from
purge restrictions. Although the size of the demobiliza-
tion organization was reduced from time to time, the
2
studies always continued. Table V-l shows the progress
of reduction along with positions of some key personnel.
Consulting with Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, who
himself collaterally headed the Material Liquidation Divi-
sion for about five months in late 1946-1947, with Captain
Nagasawa Ko, who had been an Imperial Navy specialist in
personnel affairs and kept personnel records and lists
during the demobilization period, and with other qualified
officers within the demobilization organization, Yoshida,
Nagaishi, and Terai developed plans for navies of various
sizes.
Outside the demobilization organization many
former officers kept an interest in naval affairs and
2
Interviews with Vice Admirals Yoshida, December

























































































































































































































































































































































acted as advisors. The senior advisor and spiritual father
of the program, however, was Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo.
His closest American friend was Admiral William V.
Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations during the Japanese Train-
ing Squadron visit to the United States in 1932. Rear
Admiral D. W. Beary, assigned as the first naval represen-
4
tative of SCAP, had been Admiral Pratt's aide at that time.
Beary and other active and retired U.S. Navy admirals
who visited occupied Japan often talked with Nomura and
socially entertained him and Admirals Yonai, Yamanashi
Katsunoshin, and Okada Keisuke; Yamamoto sometimes was in-
vited to these gatherings also. Nomura and Yamamoto were in-
vited to naval functions such as the Seventh Fleet change
of command, and many senior officers of the Imperial Navy
3Retired Vice Admirals Fukutome Shigeru and Hoshina
Zenshiro and retired Rear Admirals Tamioka Sadatoshi and
Takada Toshitani are prominent examples of those outside
who helped. Yoshida, "The Process of Rearmament Planning
by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Functions";
interviews with Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and Yamamoto,
December 28, 1970.
4Nomura Kichisaburo, "An Inside Story of the Estab-
lishment of the Defense Forces," Anzen Hosho Kenkyu Kai,
Kaiyokoku Nihon no Shorai (The Future of Japan as a Maritime
Nation), p. 408. Nomura had commanded the Training Squadron
during the visit in question. He wrote this memoir in 1960
and died in 1964, but it was not published until this volume
appeared in October, 1970.

144
who dealt with U.S. naval authorities and were invited to
social activities were treated very respectfully.
Whether this treatment resulted from personal
friendships or from the fame and well-known moderation of
men like Nomura, Yamanashi, and Yonai among U.S. Navy
officers or just generally from the traditional comradery
of internationally minded sea-going naval officers is un-
known, but the U.S. Navy treatment of the Imperial Navy,
which had attacked and beaten the U.S. badly at Pearl
Harbor and which had fought it long and hard thereafter,
even in the immediate postwar period, was generally
friendly. The Navy's attitude was less vindictive than
the Army's which was affected, no doubt, by the fact that
it was on the scene to administer the Occupation and re-
form the "evil" elements of Japan. The Navy seemed to
take the attitude that its ships and personnel were
present as visiting fleet units and that its hosts should
thus be treated well. This attitude and friendship was
to continue and grow as time went on.
Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970;




Nomura explained his ideas about rearmament and
mentioned some tentative plans, which were always discussed
with and given to him by Captain Yoshida, to Rear Admiral
Beary who, for obvious reasons, could not allow them to
be implemented but who was very sympathetic to the ideas
and to the eventual necessity. Other visiting admirals,
such as retired Chief of Naval Operations William H.
Standley, were similarly impressed and sympathetic.
Because of his diplomatic career Nomura also had
wide friendships in the Foreign Ministry, which in Japan
occupied by English speakers, provided the immediate post-
war prime ministers. Nomura knew Ashida Hitoshi well and
through Admiral Yamanashi he had close contact with
Yoshida Shigeru; with both Ashida and Yoshida and with
Hatoyama Ichiro, Nomura found consensus that Japan would
some day need a navy.
Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of
the Defense Forces," pp. 408-409. Interview with Yoshida,
December 25, 1970.
Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of
the Defense Forces, pp. 409-410. Interviews with Yamamoto,
December 28, 1970; Yoshida, December 25, 1970; Nakayama
Sadayoshi, October 28, 1970; and Oi, October 14, 1970.
Regardless of Yoshida Shigeru 's views, he still refused
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The suddenness of the Korean War had caught both
the United States and Japan unaware. Occupation forces
were quickly pulled out, leaving Japan nearly defenseless
In these circumstances MacArthur wrote the letter to
Yoshida concerning the National Police Reserve.
Despite the relations with Yamanashi and Nomura,
Yoshida did not particularly like or trust military per-
sonnel in general. He had been jailed by the military
near the end of the war and knew well about the extremes
to which militarism could lead. He did, however, know
and trust some close acquaintances who had been in the
military. When faced with the situation of the National
Police Reserve, which he suspected was intended to be
more like an army than a police force, in addition to
individuals such as Masuhara Keikichi, whom he selected
to be civilian head of the force and who at first did not
understand the true character of it, Yoshida also called
overtures from U.S. envoy John Foster Dulles who tried
to encourage Japan's ground rearmament prior to the
Korean War. Both Nomura and Yamanashi had served as
President of the Peers College and thus had standing with
the Imperial Household. Yamanashi personally was very




former Imperial Army Lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi
who had been Army attache in London from 1936-1938 while
Yoshida was ambassador. Yoshida sought Tatsumi 's advice
and twice sought to persuade him to become uniformed head
of the National Police Reserve even though no officers
above the grade of colonel were ever allowed to enter.
Tatsumi agreed to help, saw the Prime Minister daily
during the initial period, and served as military advisor
throughout Yoshida 's tenure, but refused personally to head
the force, stating that the senior officers of the old
military organization should take the blame for the last
war, while younger but still experienced men should run
the new organization.
Tatsumi as military advisor discussed the needs of
Japan in light of the American forces' rapid withdrawal.
Q
Interview with Masuhara Keikichi, member of the
House of Councillors, January 29, 1971; Interview with
Lt. General Tatsumi, IJA (Ret.), December 9, 1970.
General Tatsumi had never told anyone before this inter-
view of Yoshida 's offer which was made twice through
Shirasu Jiro, head of the Central Liaison Office (Foreign
Ministry)
. Shirasu could not even persuade Tatsumi to
take the position for a short time until a more stable
military organization, which after negotiations with
Dulles and the Korean situation Yoshida knew would be
necessary, could be set up.
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By convincing Yoshida that the NPR was needed and to be
more like a military organization than a police force,
Tatsumi won his support for using former Army officers,
first those up to the grade of lieutenant colonel and,
after a bitter struggle with Masuhara and the new uni-
formed head, Hayashi Keizo, won permission for full colo-
9
nels to be admitted. He also concurred with Yoshida that
the need for a naval organization was not so urgent because
of the existence of the Maritime Safety Agency which the
American Navy apparently felt adequate. Nonetheless, he
brought another military man whom Yoshida trusted to ad-
vise him concerning naval affairs. This turned out to be
the assistant naval attache during Yoshida 's tour in
London, Yamamoto Yoshio. Yamamoto told Yoshida of the
weakness of the MSA to which he had been advisor for two
years, particularly in ships which needed to be strength-
ened.
9Interview with Masuhara, January 29, 1971,
General Tatsumi, December 9, 1970, and General Hayashi,
JGSDF (Ret.), January 5, 1971. General Hayashi was ap-
pointed uniformed chief after Tatsumi 's refusal.
Interviews with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970, and
Yamamoto, December 28, 1970. Admiral Yamamoto could not
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Nomura had been teaching Admiral Burke about
Japanese, Korean, and Chinese history and character since
October, 1950 and the two were becoming close friends.
Burke thought that any great nation needed a suitable
military force; and through Nomura's knowledge, consider-
ation, and deep regard for people, Burke was becoming con-
vinced Japan was a great nation. Following the Korean
incident, when it looked as if it might be wise for Japan
to start the development of a navy, Burke recommended to
Nomura that, since the most important element of any navy
was its officer corps and since the officer corps would
reflect the attitude of the first officers for generations,
he take ten of the very best officers from the old Imperial
Navy to start a new one. At about the same time, at a
remember how many times he met with Prime Minister Yoshida
in 1950, but General Tatsumi thought Yamamoto attended at
least three times.
I received a letter from Admiral Burke dated
December 1, 1970, and interviewed him later in Washington.
The letter contains a statement which moved me very much
and has appeared to have had the same or a deeper effect
on every Japanese naval officer to whom I have told the
contents. Admiral Burke wrote, "When I went to Japan in
1950, I did not like Japanese. I had fought them too
long and had been in too many battles against them to
have any regard for them. At that time I did not know
many Japanese. ... I felt the need to know more about
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cocktail party given by Prime Minister Yoshida, Joy told
Nomura that there were eighteen frigates which had been
returned to the U.S. by the Soviet Union but which remained
in Yokosuka needing renovation before they could be placed
in service. He indicated these frigates could be made
12
available to Japan.
oriental psychology, and so I asked my friend and classmate,
Captain Eddie Pearce, to suggest a Japanese who could in-
struct me. He suggested Admiral Nomura. About once a week
I had a meeting with Admiral Nomura who tried to teach me
how the Japanese thought and the difference between the
Japanese, the Koreans, and the Chinese and also their
similarities. I came to have greater respect and admira-
tion for Admiral Nomura than almost any other man I have
ever known.
. .
When Admiral Nomura died, I think he was
one of the best friends I ever had." Although he had
only arrived on September 1, 1950 he was scheduled for a
permanent position in command of a cruiser division in
October. When he finally left in mid-1951, his efforts in
sending the minesweepers to Korea and his suggestions to
Admiral Joy and to Washington laid the groundwork for the
new Japanese naval organization. It is interesting to
speculate on what would have happened had his original
orders been carried out.
12
Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of
the Defense Forces," p. 409. These were the same frigates
Admiral Burke had discussed with Mr. Okubo of the MSA in
September. When the Korean operation made these frigates
appear better suited for a new navy, Burke sent Okubo to
Washington to negotiate for new construction of ships for
the MSA and for reform of the law concerning the armament
of vessels. He asked Mrs. Burke to look after Okubo in
the capitol, and her graciousness convinced Okubo that
American women did have merit after all. I am indebted to
Admiral Burke who suggested I see Mr. Okubo in Japan and
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With this encouragement Nomura accelerated his
long-existing program for a Japanese navy. It was not
difficult to gather a group as suggested by Burke.
Nomura was at the apex of an organization that divided
responsibilities but functioned smoothly and efficiently
despite differences of opinion as to the nature and size
13
of the organization to be planned and developed.
Nomura himself attended to relations with Japanese and
American government officials. Vice Admiral Tamioka, a
historian, worked on international relations, studying
the global political and military situation, particularly
the military strength of foreign powers. Vice Admiral
Fukutome, a former operational fleet commander, was assigned
responsibility for studying operations and tactics. Vice
Admiral Hoshina studied the structure for a munitions
industry in Japan and was instrumental in the formation
and to Mr. Okubo, who because of the kindness showed to
him by the Burkes, provided me regal treatment in Tokyo.
13
In contrast to the situation with former Army
officers where factions arose. One faction composed of a
former Japanese colonel favored by an American general in
GHQ took an anti-NPR attitude and made things very diffi-
cult for Tatsumi working with the Prime Minister. Inter-
view with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970; "Rearmament and
Ex-Soldiers," Tokyo Shimbum , April 21, 1952.
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of the "Maritime Air Technical Association," the name being
chosen since rearmament still could not be loudly pro-
claimed; Hoshina worked with Dr. Ishikawa Ichiro, President
of the powerful Federation of Economic Organizations
(Keidanren) and many former naval officers working in
Japanese industry. Rear Admiral Yamamoto was responsible
for studying the organization to create and develop the
new navy; he and Tatsumi worked with Chief Cabinet Secre-
tary Okazaki Katsuo as advisors to Yoshida and two of his
14
young proteges, Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku.
The then- designated Second Demobilization Liquida-
tion Bureau swung into high gear although, because of the
earlier decision to plan for just such a moment, it was
not difficult to update its studies. Captain Nagasawa,
using his detailed records on the numbers of demobilized
personnel, authored projected studies as to how many would
15
still be available. Captains Yoshida and Nagaishi and
14
Interviews with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970;
Hoshina, November 30, 1970; and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970,
15
In addition to the studies commencing in 1946
which were made in strict secrecy, some informal discussion
with American authorities had begun in 1949. In late 1948
the National Security Council had decided to secretly
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Commander Terai, the special planner on aviation, began
working to up-date the studies that had been prepared
earlier and cleared various plans with Admirals Fukutome,
Hoshina, Tomioka, Takada, and Yamamoto. Table V-2 lists
the plans prepared by the bureau. These studies were
often over 50 pages in length with detailed charts, maps,
and organizational annexes. They were translated into
flawless English and typed each night so they could be pre-
16
sented to intended American sources quickly.
On January 21, 1951, Nomura visited Admiral Joy to
discuss the loan of ships and presented him with a plan
for a navy drawn up by Admiral Tamioka and Captain Yoshida
encourage the expansion of Japanese paramilitary capabil-
ity. In 1949 a Japanese-born American civilian reported
to the intelligence division of COMNAVFE and began meeting
regularly twice a week with Captain Nagasawa to discuss
intelligence matters and Japanese naval officers' ideas
about rearmament. All conversations were in Japanese.
Interview with U.S. Naval Intelligence official who parti-
cipated.
I am indebted to Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, Chief
of the Maritime Staff, JMSDF, who gave me access to the
Chief of Staff's personal copy of the Japanese language
versions of the plans and to Commander Fukushima Tsutomo,
UN (Ret.) now of the JMSDF Staff College, Ichigaya, Tokyo,
who was one of the translators of the plans and who pre-
sented me with several English language versions still re-
tained by him. The only other known copies are held at the













2 January 8, 1951
3 January 25, 1951
4 January 25, 1951
5 March 6, 1951
6 March 22, 1951
7 April 10, 1951
8 May 8, 1951
9 August 29, 1951
10 December 3, 1951
11 January 2, 1952
12 February 8, 1952




Additional Opinions on Study
Materials
Personal Opinion on Japanese
Security
Private Plan for Japanese
Rearmament
Study Materials on the Person-
nel Situation of Ex-Navy Men
and their Remobilization
Comparison of the Maritime
Safety Agency and the United
States Coast Guard
Second Special Study Materials
Navy Organization Plan
Maritime and Air Self-Defense
Draft of the New Plan of Air
and Sea Forces
Personal Opinion on Construc-
tion of Air and Sea Forces
National Defense Ministry
Organization Plan
Studies on Reconstruction of
Air Power
Studies on Strengthening Air





Reference Completion rp.^-, £ c*. j
.. , £ . Title of StudyNumber Date ^
16 April, 1953 The Process of Rearmament
Planning by the Organization
Undertaking Residual Navy
Functions
Source: Yoshida Eizo, "The Process of Rearmament Planning
by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy
Functions," April, 1953, number 16 of Table.
(reference 1 of table). Joy recommended that one of
Nomura's representatives meet with Admiral Burke in order
to discuss details of planning. On January 23, Hoshina
and Burke made the first formal contact that led eventually
to the establishment of a naval organization. Burke of-
fered Hoshina his ideas on what a Japanese navy should be
like and commented on a Japanese draft policy (reference 2)
Taking Burke's comments into account, the Japanese naval
officers prepared a new draft (reference 3) which Hoshina
presented to Burke on January 29, and which Burke termed
"excellent." 17
The dates are mentioned by Admiral Nomura, who,
while a member of the House of Councillors in 1960,
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Throughout January and February, Burke kept
Admiral Sherman in Washington informed of Japanese ideas
on a new navy and sent copies of the former naval officers'
plans submitted to him. He and Admiral Joy had been sur-
prised by the size of the original plan submitted by
Nomura but sent it forward anyway as an indication of what
the Japanese felt necessary. After the revised plan that
Burke and Hoshina cooperated on jointly was submitted as a
U.S. Navy proposal, Sherman agreed to support it if the
Japanese government officially adopted the plan. Even
Nomura could not accomplish that; he talked with Yoshida
on February 7, and gave him a copy of the plan. The Prime
Minister told Nomura he had told Joy if American forces
were to fight in defense of Japan in Kyushu or Hokkaido,
Japan would not stand still. But America would have to
18
provide the weapons. Money and who was going to provide
gathered twelve active or retired admirals to record their
recollections of the early days of rearmament. Dates were
often mentioned since at least several of the participants
kept detailed diaries. The text, referred to below as
"Recollections," was never published and I am indebted to
Admiral Yamamoto who lent me his copy.
18
Nomura, "Recollections." Interviews with Hoshina,
November 4, 1970; and Burke, February 19, 1971.
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it were to remain significant factors in rearmament.
U.S. special envoy John Foster Dulles was a guest
at a cocktail party given by William J. Sebald in February,
1951; Admiral Nomura talked with Dulles and gave him his
private plan on Japanese rearmament (reference 4), a
proposal for a complete defense organization with a
200,000-man army and 50,000-man navy-air force with
200,000 tons of shipping and 700 aircraft. Dulles was
very impressed with the plan, and he and Nomura began
19
continuing discussions on rearmament.
Both U.S. and Japanese interest in rearmament came
more into the open by March. SCAP for the first time offi-
cially requested the Second Demobilization Liquidation
Bureau to provide figures on the situation of former
naval personnel and their potential for remobilization
(reference 5) . Although former Prime Minister Ashida
began to speak out for rearmament so that Asahi Shimbun
printed a cartoon of him in military uniform, the first
man publicly to speak out was Dr. Watanabe Tetsuo, an
economist, businessman, and university professor known
19Nomura, "Recollections." Interviews with
Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and others.
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for his strongly anti -communist sentiments. An old friend
of Ashida and Yoshida and a neighbor of Nomura, Watanabe,
in March, asked Nomura to recommend a reliable Navy man to
work with him on a rearmament study. Watanabe formed a
group of 30 military and business leaders including
Admirals Fukutome and Hoshina. Through the Navy members,
the ideas of the organization headed by Nomura strongly
influenced Watanabe 's group, which through a nine-month
program of study developed the so-called 3-3-3 ( San-San-San )
Plan for a 300,000-man army, 300, 000- ton navy, and 3000-
i r * 20plane air force.
Numerous plans for rearmament began coming forward
but will not be mentioned since they follow similar patterns
to those already mentioned; many of these reflected wishful
thinking as to the political and psychological acceptability
of rearmament, the then economic capability of Japan, or the
21generosity of the United States in providing materials.
20
This study greatly impressed Dulles, but Yoshida
was reluctant because of the cost and fear of the power of
so large an army. Watanabe could not calm these fears, but
Yoshida did give him 250,000 yen to continue his study.
Interviews with Dr. Watanabe, now 85 and still a strong
anti -communist, January 25, 1971, and Hoshina, November 4,
1970. Also Fukutome in Nomura, "Recollections."
2lMany of the plans are listed in Doba Hajime,
Nihon no Gunj iroku (Japan's Military Power: Inside the
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What was needed was something that Japan could afford, that
would be politically acceptable domestically, and that
would be acceptable in principle to and bring assistance
from the United States. Admiral Burke had been studying
the Japanese situation intensively since the Korean mine-
sweeping incident and requested a study of a Japanese
naval force to be developed toward the goals of escort of
shipping, coastal patrol, minesweeping, and protection of
fishing boats. In March, during a visit to Washington,
he had written Admiral Joy that he had discussed Japan's
use of the patrol frigates returned from the Soviets with
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then Commander-in-Chief
Atlantic; Burke stressed the need for an eventual Japanese
navy (he was also attempting to get support for the South
Korean Navy) and his belief that it should start with
minesweepers and patrol craft. Radford indicated that
the U.S. would probably need a large number of small
combatants itself and suggested that it might be better
22to build naval craft in Japan.
Self-Defense Forces) Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1963.
22
From Admiral Burke's personal papers, 1951,
U.S. Naval History Division, Washington.
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Nomura's organization, carefully probing U.S. and
Japanese political and military feelings, came up with a
plan (reference 7) that went a long way in determining
the events of the next year and set the way for the de-
velopment of an autonomous naval force. This plan, pre-
sented by Nomura to Joy and by Hoshina to Burke on
April 18, 1951, called for the establishment of a nucleus
for a future air-sea force set up by a temporary loan of
ships, aircraft, weapons, and ammunition from the United
States but supported by personnel, pay, and non-munition
23logistics supplied by Japan. It put forth three possible
ways of forming the desired nucleus: a relatively large
organization having the nature of an armed force (although
not called one) set up autonomously within the government
of Japan; a strengthened and improved organization of the
23
The plan for an air-sea force which persisted
through 1952 was in line with the thinking of Admiral
Inoue Shigemi, mentioned in Chapter I as the progressive
president of the Naval Academy. Inoue, who can possibly
be called Japan's Billy Mitchell, as a rear admiral in
January, 1941, strongly attacked the then popular grand
fleet encounter strategy. He strongly opposed war with
the U.S. and ridiculed the way it was being planned. His
plan for an air- sea force, although not adopted, drew great
respect for its boldness at the time and drew even more
praise as its predictions came true. I am indebted to




Maritime Safety Agency set up initially as an autonomous
organ of that same body; and an organization to perform
the required naval activities having Japanese naval per-
sonnel under the command of the U.S. Navy Far East. Ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each plan were put forth;
and although the first choice was definitely preferred,
the study contended that the second was most likely an
achievable plan, given the political conditions of the
times. The third option was least preferred. Specific
points that were subsequently realized, even though at
times bitterly contested, in later negotiations within
Japanese official circles were as follows:
a. A new organization that has the nature and
structure of an armed force shall be built up
under the Prime Minister. This organization shall
be called the Maritime Safety Guard Reserve.
(1) It should not be in contradiction to the
Constitution of Japan. For this purpose the nomen-
clature of an armed force should not be used, and
the strength possessed by it should be that of a
guarding force.
(2) It should be officially recognized by
the foreign powers--at least by the countries of the
Free World.
(3) It should be approved by the majority of
the Japanese people, that is, by the Diet.
(4) It should be an independent and autonomous
Japanese organization by all means. Specifically,
personnel affairs, control, and operation of this




(5) It should be able to utilize for a while
the able and excellent members of the demoblized
Navy personnel.
(6) After the establishment and development
of this organization the present Maritime Safety
Agency and Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation
Division shall be dissolved; and the Fairway Safety
Office, Patrol and Rescue Division, their affiliated
organs, and other necessary branches of the Maritime
Safety Agency shall be merged into this organization.
[This provision was legislated in 1952 but never
carried out completely, Le
.
, the MSA was not abolished.]
b. In case the build-up of this organization is
difficult or a long period of time is needed for its
realization, an extra-agency bureau to take charge
of the functions of escorting of shipping, patrolling,
minesweeping, protection of fishing vessels, etc.,
shall be established within the Maritime Safety Agency.
(1) The new organization shall be made an en-
tirely extra-agency bureau, and its structure, system,
operation, etc. shall be so constructed as to sever
all matters such as control, operation, supply, ac-
counting, etc. from the agency, thereby making the
bureau completely independent and preventing the in-
filtration of the basic defects of the agency such as
lack of strong guiding spirit, internal bureaucratic
friction, etc.
(2) The new organization shall include excel-
lent former surface and air naval personnel with ex-
perience in command, discipline, and training in as
great a number as possible while, except for specially
excellent ones, employment of the present personnel of
the Maritime Safety Agency devoid of necessary exper-
ience on the sea or in the air shall be avoided.
(3) So far as the system and organization of this
extra-agency bureau, it should be established ir-
respective of the present organization of the Maritime
Safety Agency and should be endowed with the nature of
an armed force.
(4) The system of ranks shall be made clear
among the personnel of the bureau and the chain of
command shall be clearly established.
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(5) Article 25 of the Maritime Safety Agency Law
shall be abolished or revised, so that this extra-
agency bureau alone may be absolved from the provision
of the said article.
c. In order to maintain an especially close liaison
between this organization and the U.S. forces--U.S.
Naval Forces, Far East in particular, Japanese staff
officers should be dispatched to work with the U.S.
Forces or a Joint U.S. -Japanese Research Commission
shall be created.
(1) The Joint U.S. -Japanese Research Commission
shall be created as early as possible prior to the
build-up of this organization and the commission shall
be made to conduct a study and investigation of matters
related to the creation of this organization and sub-
mit its findings and opinions, both to the U.S. and
Japanese authorities concerned.
(2) As many ex-naval officers and men as pos-
sible who will become the key personnel of the
Japanese Air-Sea Force in the future shall be dis-
patched to the U.S. Navy and instructed, guided, and
trained in the usage of vessels, weapons, etc. 4
Admiral Burke was very impressed with this plan and
on April 22, 1951, sent a seven-page letter accompanying
the Japanese draft to Rear Admiral James H. Thach, Jr.,
Director of the International Affairs Division of Admiral
Sherman's office, asking Thach to explain the key provi-
sions of the letter and plan to Sherman. After noting
the difficulties involved due to the Japanese Constitution,
24
"Second Special Study Materials, Study of the
Organization and System to Play, Train, and Operate to Sup-
port the Functions of Escort of Shipping, Patrol, Mine-
sweeping, and the Protection of Fishing Vessels," April 10,
1951; English copy provided by Commander Fukushima.
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the unknown desires of the U.S. government with regard to
a peace treaty, the hesitancy of SCAP to act, the uneasi-
ness of the Japanese government to rearm, the lowly status
of many former Japanese naval officers, the length of time
to build proficiency in any sea force, and the need to re-
inforce the U.S. naval efforts in the defense of Japan,
Burke set forth his ideas because, "I feel that the prob-
lem must be faced directly some day and that the sooner it
is faced the greater the probable benefit to the United
States." Corresponding to the three major points of the
Japanese plan listed above Burke stated:
a. There is a need by the United States for the
assistance of Japan in the defense of her own country
and in defense of the high seas surrounding the
Japanese archipelago. Even at the present, Japanese
unarmed fishing boats are seized by Russians, Chinese
and even our own ROK allies. There is an increasing
need for a sea patrol around HOKKAIDO to discourage
possible agent landings by the Soviets in HOKKAIDO,
to ascertain whether any of the Japanese fishing
ships in that area are trading with the Russians or
are in the pay of the Russians and to detect Soviet
operations against HOKKAIDO. In the event of a gen-
eral emergency situation, the need for sonar equipped
anti-submarine patrol ships of small size around
Japan and for the protection of Japanese harbors
would be acute.
b. I personally believe that the solution to this
quandary lies in the formation of a small group of
United States Naval Officers to study, plan, and
direct the initiation of a small Japanese Navy.
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This Japanese Navy need not be called a Navy. It can
be called a Coast Guard or a sea police force or any-
thing else. I think that four or five really good
officers could handle the job.
c. I should think it might be desirable to augment
this group of United States sailors with about ten
Japanese ex-naval officers. This Japanese contingent
would become the nucleus of the Japanese Navy Depart-
ment. This joint group, at that stage, could then, as
a first step, establish a small seagoing force perhaps
of not over a half dozen patrol craft and a small
officer and enlisted man training school. -*
While Burke was working with Nomura and Hoshina,
Captain Gordon McGowan, the successor of Captain Meals as
U.S. Coast Guard representative with SCAP, was working
with the Maritime Safety Agency. Okubo Takeo had been re-
placed as Director General by Yanagisawa Yonekichi in May,
1951, and he and McGowan continued to strive to improve
the caliber of the MSA. From its beginning, however, the
agency had been plagued by bureaucratic in- fighting. Since
it was put together from many unrelated groups, control was
disputed, the Finance Ministry trying to have maritime
safety under its domain as was the case at the time in the
United States, the Coast Guard being under the Treasury
Department. Even within the Transportation Ministry the
25
Excerpts of letter from Burke to Thach, with
enclosure, of April 22, 1951; Burke papers, 1951.

166
MSA had been kept as an outside agency by Okubo who desired
it to have a pure start. Yanagisawa naturally desired to
see the MSA prosper under him, and Captain McGowan supported
Yanagisawa, feeling that a coast guard organization was
possibly all that Japan at the time could afford and that
the MSA was the organization felt to be adequate for Japan
by the GHQ of SCAP. 26
The former naval officers, on the other hand, had
not been accustomed to a separate coast guard organization
and felt the MSA to be inefficient and devoit of spirit
necessary for a military force. They prepared a study
(reference 6) which purported to show how the MSA was
"totally" different from the United States Coast Guard;
but other than pointing out that the MSA was self-declared
nonmilitary in Article 25 of its founding statute while the
American counterpart was declared to be military in the
United States Code, they did not succeed in putting forth
an impressive case. It appeared they feared that there
would only be one organization, coast guard or navy; and
26
Letter to this writer from Captain Gordon
McGowan, USCG (Ret.), December 29, 1970. Interviews with
Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and Okubo, December 17, 1970
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of course they wanted the latter and tried to legislate
the MSA out of existence.
In August, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida called
Itoh Chubei, 83-year-old board chairman of a steel company
who was soon going to the United States on an electric
utilities survey mission; the following conversation be-
tween the two reportedly took place:
Yoshida: What do you think of armament?
Itoh: There is the problem of the Constitution,
but Japan is like wearing a flannel kimono with only
a small belt around it; she is almost bare. She
must wear more so she can endure the wind and rain.
Yoshida: Come to the point a little bit more.
Itoh: I mean that without a single destroyer
or a cruiser, Japan cannot expect to protect even
one fishing boat.
Yoshida: That's right. In the past, Japan did
some crazy things. That's true. But even so, it
can't be that Japan cannot even have a "pencil
sharpening knife." A country having no guns or
cannons is helpless. When the right time comes,
Japan is ready to have arms to defend the country.
Japan should go hand in hand with the friendly
nations of the Western bloc and while not invading
other countries, it is necessary that steps be
taken so that we will not be invaded. While you're
in America, convey my true intentions when you meet
the military authorities, bank presidents, and other
leaders. Tell them that is the thought of the
highest responsible person in government.
Itoh: You mean "the baby" was born despite the
no, no.
Yoshida: That's just about it.
27Quoted from "Japan's Peace and Security,"
Part III: The Security Treaty, number 6, "Birth of a
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Although Itoh was supposedly too busy with other
matters to convey Yoshida f s message on rearmament, Burke's
letter received attention in Washington. Nomura did much
talking to friends like then CINCPAC, Admiral Radford;
and after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the United
States finally decided in early October to offer Japan
the 18 patrol frigates returned by the Soviet Union, then
still in Yokosuka harbor, and 50 landing craft which were
28
in the United States. The directive of President
Truman did not clearly resolve the issue of the recipient
organization of the vessels, a new navy or a new coast
guard or the already existing Maritime Safety Agency. As
SCAP transmitted the directive to COMNAVFE, the U.S. Navy
was instructed that:
The Senior U.S. Naval Advisor, Maritime Safety
Agency, shall keep SCAP informed of all action
taken and obtain SCAP approval on all matters in-
volving policy. Training the Japanese in American
ways and techniques is the one most important item
Small Navy," The Mainichi Daily News , November 12, 1968.
28
Prior to leaving for the peace conference,
Yoshida called Yamamoto and requested a naval rearmament
plan. Yamamoto gave him a big navy plan which surprised
Yoshida and the outline of an educational training system.
Interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.
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connected with the entire program. The training
given will determine the usefulness and depend-
ability of the Japanese Security Force as a member
of the United Nations team. y
The new SCAP, General Matthew B. Rdigway, however, allowed
COMNAVFE relatively free rein in naval matters; and
Admiral Joy had no doubts as to what was to be done with
the ships for Japan. As he and Nomura had discussed in
January, as the latter f s group had planned in April, as
Burke had suggested to Washington later the same month,
a new naval organization was to be created. It would
grow up within and draw on some resources of the MSA; but
this new force, the Coastal Security Force (Kaijo Keibitai )
would be prepared to separate at any time as an independent
i i 30naval nucleus.
The formal offer of ships was made by Ridgway to
Yoshida on October 19, 1951. The SCAP told the Prime
29
Copy provided by Captain Noble W. Abrahams, USN
(Ret.). Captain Abrahams was the senior naval officer
appointed to head the first MSA Advisory Group. I am
indebted to him for providing me use of his advisory group
files.
30
Kaijo Keibitai literally translates to English
as "maritime guard," the name referred to by the Japanese
plan and Burke's letter in April. The English translations,
however, as in the case of MSB (A) were often picked some-




Minister that a force of 68 vessels--18 patrol frigates
(PF's) and 50 large support landing ships (LSSL's) --could
be made available to Japan if he desired, although legis-
31
lation would be required. Yoshida accepted the offer.
Nomura's actions had also resulted in Japanese
agreement to the idea of a joint U.S. -Japanese research
commission, the Japanese side of which, to ease political
fears and for bureaucratic-financial reasons, would be
organized within the Maritime Safety Agency. The Japanese
contingent would be jointly headed by Director General
Yanagisawa of MSA and one former naval officer. One day
after the Ridgway-Yoshida meeting, Chief Cabinet Secretary
Okazaki called in Yamamoto to tell him the Prime Minister
desired that he head the group.
Okazaki told Yamamoto he would like him to organ-
ize a committee of ten members including Yanagisawa and
one other member of MSA and eight former naval officers
to study the use of vessels the United States had recently
offered Japan. Yamamoto told him he would have to con-
sider the offer; he immediately went to see Nomura who, to
31
Nomura, "Recollections." Radford, Joy, and
Nomura had in fact concluded the agreement; Ridgway and
Yoshida made it official.
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Yamamoto's surprise, knew all about the plan. Yamamoto
thought that a senior officer such as Vice Admiral Hoshina
or Fukutome should head the commission, but Nomura told
Yamamoto to accept and that he and others would help in the
background. Yamamoto accepted the offer with the words,
"If you say build a small navy, I will undertake the job.
But if it's a coast guard I will refuse." Privately,
32
Okazaki agreed that such would be the case.
Yamamoto's choices of the seven other naval offi-
cers, a rear admiral and a captain who were purged and
four captains and a commander from the Second Demobiliza-
tion Liquidation Bureau including Nagasawa, Yoshida, and
Terai were all approved by Okazaki. Yanagisawa picked his
operations chief, Mita and as an outside temporary com-
mitteeman, his deputy director, Yamazaki Kogoro, who,
together with Captain Meals, had formally drafted the MSB
law in 1947. The U.S. side of the organization was tempo-
rarily made up of two naval officers, two coast guard
officers, and two civilians including the intelligence
official who had been working with Captain Nagasawa since





1949. Chief of the American side was Rear Admiral Ralph A.
Oftsie, Chief of Staff for COMNAVFE. In December, 1951,
the U.S. side was formalized as the MSA Advisory Group of
four officers, two captains and two commanders --one of
each group from the Navy and Coast Guard, headed by Navy
Captain Noble W. Abrahams.
Although the new organization did not meet formally
until November 2, on October 26, Admiral Oftsie summoned
the two MSA members, Yamamoto and the other former rear
admiral, Akishige Jitsue, and Captain Nagasawa to COMNAVFE
headquarters. The American was very friendly and offered
maximum cooperation but set the tone of how the U.S. Navy
viewed the organization. All remarks concerning coopera-
tion and assistance were directed to Yamamoto. Captain
Abrahams stated that he was told immediately upon reporting
for duty that a new navy was being born as an autonomous
organization which, for political and financial reasons,




Interviews with Rear Admiral Akishige Jitsue,
UN (Ret.), October 31, 1970; Captain Abrahams, February




The name "Y Committee" for the Japanese group was
taken from the abbreviations used by the military before
the end of the war, the Army as "A," the Navy as "B," and
others (civilians) as "C." By reversing the alphabet
the members came up with the Navy as "Y"; for anyone who might
have objected in official circles was the easy explanation
34
that "Y" stood for Yamamoto and Yanagisawa.
Formal meetings of the committee were held once
each week and were pleasant and non-controversial. Sub-
committees composed of regular members and their assistants
met continuously. Both groups were primarily concerned with
formulating lists of personnel to be admitted to the new
organization to be created and in designing and implementing
35
an educational curriculum for the new trainees. The real
problems were handled primarily behind the scenes by the
four people on no subcommittees, Yamamoto and Nagasawa for
34
Interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970;
Yoshida Eizo, December 25, 1970.
35
The only complete set of "Y Committee" proceed-
ings known to exist is in the safe of the Chief of Maritime
Staff JMSDF; individual members have partial proceedings.
I am indebted to Admiral Uchida for providing access to the
complete holdings and to RADM Yamamoto and Captain Abrahams




the Navy and Yanagisawa and Mita for the MSA. Yamazaki
also was a participant although theoretically not even a
regular committee member.
The MSA had begun construction of new ships in
1949 and had serious doubts about the need of a new organ-
ization to handle the new frigates. The first proposal
from the MSA side even before the "Y Committee" met was an
idea to distribute the frigates and landing craft among
the ten MSA districts. This was not agreeable to COMNAVFE
or the Japanese Navy officers, and such a plan would have
violated the assurance that Okazaki had given Yamamoto.
The position of Yanagisawa then became that of treating
the ships as a separate unit but keeping them organized
much like one separate district under the centralized ad-
37
ministration of MSA. Yamamoto and Nagasawa strongly
opposed this and there was even some sensitivity on the
Japanese Navy side that there was a split between the U.S.
36
Ibid., Interviews with Admiral Yamazaki Kogoro,
JMSDF (Ret.) January 6, 1971; Yanagisawa, January 12,
1971, and Mita, December 7, 1970.
37
Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970,




Navy and Coast Guard over what kind of an organization was
38
going to be established.
The former naval officers had been planning for
this since April, however, and were prepared with their own
design. This was the plan for an extra-agency-bureau with
completely autonomous administration and operation which
could be separated from MSA at any time. Yamamoto's plan
was as indicated in Chart V-3. To gain acceptance of the
38
Yamamoto reported in a memoir written in 1968
that the representatives of the MSA had a document from
Captain McGowan which stated that the MSA would increase
its capabilities with the help of the U.S. Coast Guard
and which Yanagisawa and Mita would not show to the former
Navy members of the committee. Captain McGowan who had
been transferred as he personally requested from SCAP,
officials of which might have felt a coast guard was suffi-
cient, to COMNAVFE, which was very committed to a navy con-
cept, stated he only was in favor of what was best and pos-
sible for the Japanese. Captain Abrahams similarly denied
any U.S. Navy-Coast Guard misunderstanding. An MSA Advis-
ory Group remained after the Keibitai split off in August,
1952, the U.S. Navy group then taking the formal name of
the Naval Advisory Group. It seems that the Japanese as-
sumed a Coast Guard-Navy friction among the U.S. organiza-
tions which has never been characteristic, as was develop-
ing among themselves and which has remained characteristic
to the present day, at least on the bureaucratic level
between the Japan Defense Agency and the MSA. Yamamoto's
memoir is in Kaijo Jieitai Hat ten no Omoide (Remembrances
of the Development of the Maritime Self-Defense Force)
,
Tokyo: Shiraume-kai, 1968. This volume had a limited
circulation and was not sold. I am indebted to RADM
Kikuchi Yoshinaga, Inspector-General of JMSDF and Secretary
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idea he agreed to Yanagisawa f s verdicts on key personnel.
The first organization thus consisted of MSA men in the
position of commandant, namely Yaraazaki, and in the roles
of division chiefs in three of the four headquarters divi-
sions. Only Nagasawa as Chief of Operations was ex-Navy;
and the MSA controlled all administration and, therefore,
personnel; and all supply and accounts, and, therefore,
39livelihood. Yanagisawa accepted this, first hoping to
head the organization himself but then changing to
Yamazaki for even higher personal goals. Yamamoto ac-
cepted this because he got the organization he wanted and
because he felt the Coastal Security Force would break
off from MSA and would eventually be controlled by
former Navy men. This could be done by recruiting most
of the new officers from ex-naval personnel and by
40
eventually getting the high leadership positions.
39
Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970;
Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971; Yamazaki, January 6, 1971;
Mita, November 19, 1970, and Yoshida Eizo, December 25,
1970.
40
Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970;
Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and others. In order to
try to insure the top leadership would not stay among
MSA personnel very long, at a joint meeting of key U.S.
and Japanese officers, it was arranged that U.S. Navy
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The Coastal Security Force, as planned by the "Y
Committee" and the MSA Advisory Group, was designed to
consist of 6038 personnel and to date from April 26, 1952.
Training of 30 prospective officer instructors of future
trainees by U.S. Navy instructors using one of the frigates
to be loaned subsequently began quietly in Yokosuka on
41
January 19, 1952, under most austere conditions. Its
organization, as indicated by Chart V-3, was brought into
officers would express their real fears over the well being
of their substantial investment of loaned vessels because
of selection of key MSA personnel with little naval experi-
ence. The U.S. officers, who were willing to accept
Yamazaki as a temporary political expedient, then asked
who would someday succeed him. To this question came the
reply that it would certainly be ex-Imperial Navy Captain
Nagasawa. The Navy "Y Committee" members had wanted
Yamamoto from the beginning but, like Tatsumi in the NPR,
he refused. Nagasawa did replace Yamazaki. Interviews
with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; and Yoshida, December
25, 1970. Some former Imperial Navy officers, not happy
with the small scale of rearmament to begin with, were
very critical of the outcome of the "Y Committee" pro-
ceedings but continued supporting the rearmament movement
and the small force created. Interviews with Yamamoto,
December 28, 1970, and Akishige, October 31, 1970. Both
Yanagisawa and Yamazaki stated in interviews that they
later realized the wisdom and necessity of the Navy view-
point.
41
Trainees were billeted across the bay in a
barracks on Taura Point to and from which they travelled
by open boat each winter morning and evening. The barracks
itself had many broken windows which were inconvenient dur-
ing periods of snow. One wonders if the conditions were not
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being as scheduled; but before the formal beginning,
achieved by a Diet-passed amendment to the MSA law, a new
problem had arisen, Japan's defense structure post-
independence.
Prime Minister Yoshida was committed to America's
"expectation that Japan will increasingly assume responsi-
bility for its own defense against direct and indirect
aggression" in the preamble to the first Security Treaty
but had actually made a commitment to Dulles as early as
42 i
January, 1951. When Ohashi Takeo took over Okazaki s
role working on rearmament the same month, discussion
soon came up as to what nature a Japanese defense force
would take. Civilian chief Masuhara and uniformed chief
Hayashi of the National Police Reserve honestly felt that
the Imperial Army and Navy were each others' worst enemies,
that any postwar organization should have a unified head-
quarters, and that personnel should perform tasks on the
better in 1855 in Nagasaki when Dutch officers trained
the nucleus crews for the Tokugawa Navy.
42
Testimony of Okazaki Katsuo before the Commis-
sion on the Constitution, in Kempo Chosakai, Kempo
Chosakai, Kempo Chosakai Dai 3 Jinkai Dai 30-kai Sokai
Gijiroku, Tokyo: 1959, p. 8.
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land and sea under the one staff. Several groups of former
Army officers who felt they could control such a unified
organization also supported this idea. Admiral Nomura
and the former naval officers were strongly opposed, and
Admiral Burke spoke to Prime Minister Yoshida about the
matter, telling him of the unification difficulties and
operational difficulties that the United States, Britain,
43
and France were undergoing at the time. Nomura, Hoshina,
Yamamoto, and others lobbied strenuously among politicians
and business leaders for a separate command and administra-
tion structure, stressing the danger of a unified command
controlled by Army elements and pleading the necessity of
44
a system of checks and balances. State Minister Ohashi
was won over to the Navy cause and eventually so was
Yoshida, whom Masuhara and Hayashi had felt was originally
45leaning their way. Yanagisawa yearned for the position
/ q
Nomura, "Recollections"; letter to this writer
from Burke, December 1, 1970.
Nomura, "Recollections"; interviews with
Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.
45
Interviews with Masuhara, January 29, 1971, and
Hayashi, January 5, 1971. It was rumored that both men
would resign, but they indicated in interviews that they
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as chief of the maritime side of a separate organization
and thus agreed to including the MSA under the new secur-
ity organization. The Navy won the battle to the extent
that two separate uniformed offices were created for com-
mand, but a joint civilian administration along the lines
of the idea of the United States Department of Defense
was created rather than the separate uniformed administra-
tions under the civilian Prime Minister as the naval offi-
cers favored. The contest of personalities was so strong
that Prime Minister Yoshida stepped in as first Director
General of the National Safety Force, a job that Ohashi
had hoped for, and Yanagisawa remained in the MSA which
46
was supposed to join the new body later. The new
never seriously considered going that far. Hayashi, who
headed the First Staff Office (ground) of the new National
Safety Agency, was first Joint Staff Council Chairman of
the Self-Defense Forces, and who remained in that position
for ten years, stated that he later became convinced the
Navy was right—with a unified command, the specialized
functions of sea and air would suffer.
46
Interview with Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971.
Yoshida, of course, also took the position to ease the
public's fears, much as Shidehara had done with the De-
mobilization Ministries. Mr. Kimura Tokutaru took over
from Yoshida in October, 1952 and rejected the idea of MSA
joining the National Safety Force. Yamazaki remained as
naval chief. Interview with Mr. Kimura, December 17, 1970.
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organization as of August 1, 1952, was as indicated in
Chart V-4. The new Maritime Safety Force Keibitai (the
English name continued to change more than the Japanese)
had an authorized personnel increase to 7828 which was
taken up primarily by the transfer of Tamura ' s minesweepers
from the MSA at that time, thus giving the new Navy its
first real ships. The minesweepers kept working at the
same tasks occupying them from before the war; however,
the U.S. Navy transferred two frigates and one landing
craft to the Japanese under an official "inactive status
in reserve" title so that operational training of larger
groups of Japanese personnel could continue.
The former Navy officers' plan of April, 1951 had
reached its goal. A nucleus Navy had been set up and
split off from its parent body, the Maritime Safety
Agency. The great majority of new officer personnel com-
ing in were ex-Navy, and their experience was gaining them
positions of responsibility. The only question remaining
was, what was the Maritime Safety Force allowed to do.
The National Safety Agency's mission was spelled out
in only the most general terms, to maintain peace and
47
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Source: Defense Agency, Jieitai Jyunenshi (Ten Year
History of the Self-Defense Forces).
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stability, to defend the citizenry, and to administer and
supervise its forces. There was no mention of any duty
or even authorization to repel external attack; and, of
course, as far as the naval element was concerned, there
were really no forces with which to do anything but mine-
sweep or train. Even patrol was still done only by the
Maritime Safety Agency.
From a standpoint of capability neither the
Coastal Security Force (Kaijo Keibitai ) nor the Maritime
Safety Force (Keibitai ) added anything to Japan's defense.
The former had no operational forces at all, and the latter
temporarily had only the minesweepers which were military
but certainly were nothing new. What final points can
be made then from the events of this period as to Japan's
willingness or potential to defend itself? The following
observations are offered for consideration. First, naval
rearmament, which was supposedly begun with the 1952
forces, was not conceptually or operationally originated
in 1952 nor solely resulted from the Korean War. Planning
began in 1946; and Japanese politicians including Ashida,
Hatoyama, and Yoshida early expressed their belief in the
eventual necessity to have a naval force. Although more of
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a case might be made that the American side was more influ-
enced by the Korean War, it has been noted that the National
Security Council decision on paramilitary activity was
reached in 1948 and the U.S. Navy liaison with the Demobil-
ization Liquidation Bureau began regularly in 1949. Second,
the only reason ever considered by the Japanese or American
civilian and military officials for having a Japanese naval
force was because of threats external to Japan. Both organ-
izations created in 1952 were considered something more than
the Maritime Safety Agency which was already externally
oriented and was performing its own military operations.
Both were further removed from the water police. Both
were designed for the primary tasks of escort of shipping,
patrol, minesweeping, and protection of fishing vessels.
Any internal revolution or uprising on the sea seems never
to have been contemplated. If only internal security had
been the concern, it seems that a Navy would never have
been organized. Third, planning for a naval force was
mutual on both military and civilian levels. The inter-
relationships between Nomura, Burke, Joy, and Hoshina were
pointed out. Nomura conditioned Dulles' view of the size
of forces Japan should have, and Burke conditioned Yoshida's
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feelings about unification of forces. Dulles encouraged
Nomura about U.S. support for Japan's rearmament, and
Yoshida influenced Burke's thinking that Japanese armed
48
forces must start small to be politically acceptable.
Ridgway asked Yoshida orally in 1951 if Japan wanted 68 United
States Ships; Yoshida replied in the affirmative. Yoshida
asked the United States in writing in 1952 if Japan could
have United States ships; the United States replied in the
affirmative. Fourth, despite intentions, planning, willing-
ness, potential, continuing operations, and several naval
organizations, no known defense policy or naval strategy for
Japan existed through 1952 on the part of the United States
or Japan. Although there was in the course of time and these
steps a nucleus Navy recognized as such, it still had no
forces that could realistically defend the country. There
was no explicit authorization for Japanese forces to provide
defense against external attack; there was no obligation on
the part of the United States to provide that defense.
United States Naval Forces remained in Japan throughout and
48
Dulles sent a special note of appreciation to
Nomura when he left Japan for the last time in 1951; inter-
view with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.
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after the Occupation; but there was no promise or commitment,
other than physical presence as hostages, which was subject
to change at any moment as it did early in the Korean War,
although then U.S. ships did not go far away. But the
Japanese nation had not been free to act while the Occupation
was in effect. Thus the wisdom of Japan's policies cannot
be criticized fairly during that period. What Japan did
after regaining sovereignty was more of its own responsibil-
lty
.
49The story told in this chapter is true in every
respect as far as my knowledge allows; however, because of
possible sensitivities of persons still living and a few
small details that remain classified, some opinions and
viewpoints were not specifically identified and several
events were not treated. In no case do I believe that the
essential truth has been obscured by these deletions; I have
prepared a personal memorandum for possible future release
to cover these facts.

PART III
THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPAN
MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
The naval events of the Occupation period were
treated in great detail in Part II because the events of
1953-1971 are direct continuations of the aims, restraints,
and organizational procedures of that period. Since the
Peace Treaty, naval rearmament has proceeded slowly and
continuously while Japan's maritime commerce has acceler-
ated quickly and dynamically. During the period, United
States aid provided the weapons Prime Minister Yoshida said
would be necessary before Japan could ever defend itself.
An explicit authorization and mission to repel external
aggression was given to the defense forces. A nominal na-
tional defense policy was decided upon but has never been
implemented with a definite strategy although the policy
itself has remained in effect. And defense power was




four occurrences are the subjects of Part III. Each will
be studied chronologically from its inception to the end
of the period; for with the reversion of Okinawa in 1972,
it can be said that a new period of independence will be-
gin in Japan. The last large issue remaining from the
Second World War will have been settled; Japan has already
been recognized as having arrived as an economic power.
And the United States has served notice on its allies, in-
cluding Japan, that they must provide the greatest share
of their conventional defense. A study of what will happen




UNITED STATES AID: THE FIRST POINT OF
DEPARTURE, JANUARY 14, 1953
The United States assumed no obligation to defend
Japan under the Security Treaty which went into effect on
April 28, 1952, on the grounds that under the Vandenberg
Resolution of May 19, 1948, the U.S. was prohibited from
entering into collective security agreements with countries
which did not provide for their own "continuous and effec-
tive self-help." Formally Japan had expressed only an
"expectation" to assume responsibility for its own defense
against direct and indirect aggression in the preamble to
the Security Treaty.
Similarly, uncommitted to defending itself from
external aggression, Japan could not qualify for aid under
the Mutual Security Act assistance program which had com-
menced in October, 1951. Thus the loan of ships which had




Yoshida had to be accomplished by some other vehicle. It
was decided that the exchange would be accomplished by an
executive agreement, but each government first gained the
approval of its legislature. Diet approval came in late
April, and the request was submitted to the United States
1just prior to the end of the Occupation. Final U.S.
Congressional action came on July 8, 1952; and the execu-
tive agreement was signed in Tokyo on November 12 of the
The question was raised in Diet interpellations
as to the qualification of the ships as "war potential"
which was forbidden by Article 9 of the Constitution.
The government maintained the ships would not provide the
ability to wage modern war and therefore would not con-
stitute war potential. One opposition member suggested
allowing a troop of boy scouts inspect the vessels and
trusting their evaluation as to the true character. Final
passage was obtained on April 24, 1952. Captain Nagasawa
Ko had prepared a formal note of request for the Prime
Minister; but having SCAP forward it before the treaty
was effective was important, since after that SCAP could
not originate any policy. Yoshida sent the request over
Saturday morning at 10 AM and a U.S. Navy member of the
advisory group wrote the message to Washington requesting
the ships for the Army duty officer. The message was ap-
proved in principle and legislation could thus begin.
Interview with RADM F. E. Fleck, USN (Ret.), February 23,
1971. Then Commander Fleck was a member of the advisory




same year. The so-called Charter Party Agreement went
into effect on December 27, 1952; and on January 14,
1953, the first six frigates and three landing craft were
3formally transferred to Japan. Admiral Nomura wept at
the ceremony; Japan again had a Navy.
From February 16-December 23 the remainder of the
frigates and landing craft were consigned to Japan as
they were renovated and arrived from the United States.
The total cost of the vessels when new was 73 million
2Similar to the Diet attitude, Congressional view-
points looked to domestic U.S. considerations: "Mr.
Speaker, the bill really boils down to just one issue.
Unless we pass this bill and authorize the loan of these
vessels, thus permitting the Japanese naval and coast
guard forces to make security patrols of their own coasts,
then our own naval forces from Korea or elsewhere will
have to be assigned to carry out that security task which
is so vital to our own defense.
. . .
The question is
whether the Members of the House would prefer to have
this coastal security job done by members of the Japanese
Navy or ... by American boys. ..." House of Repre-
sentatives, "Loan of Certain Naval Vessels to Government
of Japan," Report Number 2195, Congressional Record 82D
Congress, p. 8984. There was little further discussion.
3
U.S. Department of State, "Charter for Lease of
U.S. Vessels," United States Treaties and Other Interna -
tional Agreements , TIAS 2714, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1958.
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dollars. Additionally each frigate was given an approxi-
4
mately 250,000-dollar overhaul prior to being transferred.
Under terms of the Charter Party Agreement, the vessels
were loaned on a five year basis subject to renewal for
another five years upon Japan's request. U.S. naval aid
had just begun.
The United States hinted at much greater aid if
Japan would assume military responsibilities. The primary
American interest was the building up of Japan's land
forces, and the primary Japanese desire was for economic
aid. Protracted negotiations took place from July, 1953
to March, 1954, finally resulting in the signing of the
"U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement" on
March 8, 1954, whereby Japan, in return for American aid,
promised to "make, consistent with the political and
economic stability of Japan, the full contribution per-
mitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general
economic condition to the development and maintenance of
its own defensive strength ..." and to "take all
4
Interview with Captain Noble W. Abrahams, USN
(Ret.), first Chief Naval Advisory Group, February 11, 1971
Article 6, Charter Party Agreement.
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reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its
defense capacities. ..."
On March 14, a separate agreement for the loan of
United States naval vessels under the provisions of the
March 8th act was concluded in Tokyo. Under this agree-
ment the United States loaned Japan 159 ships valued at
nearly 80 million dollars. Included were eight destroyer-
types, one submarine, four tank landing ships, numerous
minecraft, and other combatant and support vessels.
Before the expiration of the loans, correspondence has
frequently resulted in the Secretary of the Navy declaring
the ships excess to the needs of the United States and
authorizing their transfer to Japan as "Grant Aid," a
status under which the ships still belong to the United
States but are transferred without stipulation of return
date.
Article 8, "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
Between Japan and the United States of America 8 March 1954,"
in Headquarters United States Forces Japan, United States -
Japan Treaties Agreements and Other Documents , Tokyo:
USFJ, 1961, p. 50.
Data provided by Mutual Defense Assistance Office,
U.S. Government Tokyo; Jieitai (Self-Defense Forces),
Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1968, pp. 271-74, 276.
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In 1960, two new modern destroyers built in Japan
by domestic industry funded as "Grant Aid- -offshore pro-
curement" (OSP) were transferred under the Military
Assistance Program (MAP). As late as 1967 over 40 per
cent of the tonnage of the Japanese Navy was made up of
o
U.S. -owned ships.
In addition to providing vessels, other forms of
aid became authorized by and under the Military Assistance
Program. The advisory group became the Navy Section,
Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Japan (MAAG-J)
.
Personnel expanded from the initial small group of offi-
cers to 20 officers and 27 enlisted men of the U.S. Navy.
Navy Section reviewed the operations and administration of
the newly designated Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) from its annual fleet exercises down to the costs
of its band instruments. Japanese-speaking officers were
assigned as available and insured that the warm relation-
ship of Japanese and American naval officers of the past
Q
Jieitai
, p. 273; interview with Aso Shigeru,
National Diet Library, December 14, 1960. Aso, as a
Defense Agency lawyer, negotiated the arrangements for
the OSP destroyers in 1957. Since 1969 the percentage
of U.S. -owned ships in the MSDF has been reduced consid-




and Occupation periods was brought into the new Navy.
Continued close relationship was aided by the situ-
ation that developed with regard to naval aviation. Using
arguments like Admiral Inoue had in 1941, former naval
officers in 1951 put forth the case that control of the
sea was of little value without control of the air; like
those of Admiral Inoue, their arguments were not well re-
ceived. Partially because of economic reasons which they
themselves had pushed in 1951-1952 in support of ground
and maritime air arms rather than favoring a separate air
force organization, they almost lost any air arm at all
in 1954. The U.S. Navy's prejudice in arguing for a
separate Japanese Navy in 1952 was no different from the
U.S. Air Force's support of a separate Japanese Air Force
in 1954. Reflecting a debate that was going on in the
9
Particularly valuable were Lieutenant Scribner
McCoy, who was born and raised in Japan and who was later
chosen as the only foreign member of a society founded by
the first 30 trainees of Kaijo Keibitai , and Rear Admiral
Redfield Mason, the first Chief of Navy Section, MAAG-J,
whose Japanese- speaking knowledge was commendable for a
foreign-born speaker. McCoy, now of Grumman International,
Tokyo, still remembers Admiral Mason questioning why the
picolo case cost more than the picolo; interview with
McCoy, November 17, 1970.
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United States itself, the American Air Force suggested that
all aircraft be in the separate Air Self-Defense Force.
Certain former Japanese Navy officers who had been re-
cruited to work on the new organization also supported
this concept, including one who had been working with the
group under Admiral Nomura.
The civilian-run Japan Defense Agency did not have
much experience in military planning and thus its officials
were impressed mostly by the economic arguments. Through
the impetus of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy
to Prime Minister Yoshida, however, the JMSDF's chances
improved. Finally the matter came to a head during a
Interview with Vice Admiral Terai Yoshimroi,
JMSDF (Ret.), November 26, 1970. An ex-naval officer,
Commander, later ASDF Lieutenant General, Okumia Masatake,
supported the one service concept and still holds to it
today. Interview with Okumia, December 7, 1970; see also
Okumia, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , December, 1965, pp. 27-35. Two former naval
pilots, who planned and executed the Pearl Harbor attack,
General Genda Minoru, ASDF (Ret.) and Captain Fuchida
Mitsuo, UN (Ret.), who was offered the position as first
Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, both ex-
pressed their views that the MSDF should have a strong,
independent air arm; interviews with Genda and Fuchida
January 11, 1971 and December 5, 1970, respectively.
11The Air Force had only sent a letter to the
Director General of the Defense Agency. Interview with
Kaihara Osamu, December 11, 1970.
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conference between Kaihara Osamu of the Defense Section of
the Defense Bureau, the strategic policy making organ of
the Defense Agency, and Rear Admiral Terai Yoshimori, Chief
of the Operations Division of the Maritime Staff Office
(MSO) . Kaihara asked Terai if the Navy would accept joint
training of pilots if it got authorization to have its own
anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Terai accepted, knowing
that if he consulted with the Chief of Maritime Staff
there would necessarily be numerous lengthy staff meetings
which would result in the justification of a much larger
force which would almost certainly be turned down and
12leave the MSDF with no aircraft at all. The United
States Navy subsequently provided the MSDF with 217 air-
craft costing nearly 100 million dollars. Long-range ASW
patrol aircraft built in Japan were partially funded by
the United States to the extent of over 44 million dollars.
By 1968 figures, the naval air strength was still made up
13
of nearly 40 per cent U.S. -owned aircraft.
12
Interviews with Kaihara December 11, 1970, and
Terai, November 26, 1970.
13
Mutual Defense Assistance Office; Jieitai
, pp.
274, 276. Unlike the case with ships, a significant per-
centage of MSDF aircraft today remains U.S. -owned.
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Friendship was reinforced with the training of
Japanese naval pilots by American officers in the United
States and in Japan itself. With U.S. Navy support, the
JMSDF finally got its own independent training program in
1969 which had been the goal from the outset, Terai only
reluctantly having agreed to joint training, which sub-
sequently proved inefficient, to save the naval air con-
cept. The MSDF's training command became modeled on the
U.S. Navy concept, and the "brown shoes" of the two
14
navies drew very close in spirit and organization.
Officers and enlisted men were sent to the United
States for training in various operations and weapons
systems. Training manuals, which had been supplied for
the first recruits for the Kaijo Keibitai , were made
available in greater quantities and scope along with
14
Even after Terai accepted, the U.S. Navy
balked at giving planes to be used by Air Force instructors
and threatened the Defense Agency by letter with not pro-
viding training aircraft; thus only initial training was
joint and very few U.S. Navy planes were ever used. Inter-
views with Mr. Raymond Y. Aka, Mutual Defense Assistance
Office, August 19, 1970, Vice Admiral Samej ima Hiroshi,
Operations Division Chief MSDF, January 9, 1970, and
Kaihara, December 11, 1970. Admiral Samej ima, as a captain,
was the first postwar naval attache to Washington and pro-




training aids, training ammunition, and other miscellaneous
support items totalling over 115 million dollars. Before
military assistance to Japan was concluded in 1967, over
320 million dollars had been provided to the MSDF. The
total of annual Japanese Navy budgets, including salaries,
from the beginning of Kaijo Keibitai in 1952 through
16
the first six years amounted to less than this.
In 1969 the name of MAAG-Japan was changed to the
Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) by then a much
Interview with McCoy, November 17, 1970;
Jieitai, p. 276.
16
Navy budget figures provided by Japan Defense
Agency. Japan was also given economic aid in some invisible
ways that are not often taken into account. One good ex-
ample of such aid is the introduction of Japanese electronic,
optical, and camera industries throughout the United States
by returning American military men. Tests run by military
electronic technicians and stereo and camera buffs testified
to the improving quality of Japanese equipments; and free
demonstrations soon were given in living rooms, dens, in
photography contests, etc. across the United States. This
kind of aid has continued unabated and, indeed, has grown
despite the cutoff of direct U.S. military aid. For example,
the U.S. Navy Exchange, Yokosuka division alone, did 19.6
million dollars worth of business in 1970; 51 per cent of
that business was in Japanese goods, largely acoustic and
optical equipment. The mail order division of the Army-Air
Force Pacific Exchange System in Tachikawa, whose business
is almost exclusively Japanese merchandise, averaged nine
million dollars per month volume last year. Interview with
Lieutenant Al Guild, U.S. Navy, Retail Sales Officer,
Yokosuka Navy Exchange, April 14, 1971.
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smaller organization of four civilian and six military
personnel to provide liaison in technical research and de-
velopment, an idea put forth in 1965 by an ASDF general.
This office, headed by a U.S. military officer working
under the direction of both the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo
and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, provides assistance
in foreign military sales including equipment and training
and monitors the industrial security of U.S. -designed
Japanese military equipment being co-produced by Japanese
firms under license. The military assistance program is
thus prepared for the new era of Japanese independence.
Interviews with LCDR Charles A. Gertner, Jr. USN,
Navy representative, MDAO, April 23, 1971, and Raymond Y.
Aka, Interpreter Liaison/Security Officer, MDAO, April 30,
1971. Aka was a member of Government Section during the
Occupation and interpreter for the Chief of MAAG-J, through
its entire existence. He was recently honored for twenty
years service to Japan's defense forces, the first American
so decorated by the Japan Defense Agency Director General.

CHAPTER VII
DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION: THE
SECOND POINT OF DEPARTURE, JULY 1, 1954,
[PART L: ] SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE
JMSDF AND A NAVY
When I am asked whether Japan has an Army, a Navy,
and an Air Force, I am obliged to answer that we do
not, but that we have Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-
Defense Forces.
In order to be eligible for large-scale U.S. aid,
it was necessary that Japan commit itself to a detailed
defense plan, but the National Safety Agency's mission did
not even provide for defending the nation from external
aggression. In 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida had insisted,
"We will not rearm . To rearm we must ask the consent of
2
the people and revise the Constitution." Regardless, the
The opening sentence of Okumia Masatake, "Japan's
Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
p. 27.
2Quoted in "Kokkai Rongi no Naka no Jieitai" (The





Prime Minister did not choose that method in 1953 but in-
stead maintained that Article 9 applied to war potential
used as a means of settling international disputes and
did not prohibit military power for self-defense. Rather
than calling for new elections on the issue of revision of
the Constitution, he sought the cooperation of the opposi-
tion for a more limited solution to the problem. On
September 27, 1953, Yoshida and Shigemitsu Mamoru, Presi-
dent of the Progressive Party concluded an agreement stat-
ing that
:
In consideration of the present international
situation and the spirit of national independence
which is arising within our country, we will clarify
the policy of increasing our self-defense strength
and establish a long-range defense plan in response
to the gradual reduction of U.S. armed forces
stationed in our country and in proportion to our
national power. Together with this measure, as a
first step, we will amend the Safety Agency Law in
order to reorganize the Safety Forces into the
Self-Defense Forces and to add the mission of de-
fense of our country against direct aggression to
the former's mission.
3
June, 1967, p. 119.
3The Japan Liberal Party also agreed in principle
to the communique. Text provided by Aso Shigeru, National
Diet Library. Aso was formerly Chief of the Safety
Agency's and Defense Agency's Legislative Bureau, drafted
the founding laws of both organizations, and remains
intimately familiar with the guidelines provided.
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A committee of twelve members of the Safety Agency
headed by Director General Kimura Tokutaro and including
the Vice Ministers, ground and maritime Chiefs of Staff
and their deputies, and several important civilian Bureau
4
Chiefs was formed to amend the law of the Safety Agency.
Based on the Yoshida-Shigemitsu memorandum, the Liberal,
Progressive, and Japan Liberal Parties began negotiations
to decide the essentials of the amendment. The Progres-
sive Party at first maintained that a new basic law for
national defense should be formulated; the party formed
a Defense Special Committee headed by former Prime Minister
Ashida Hitoshi and organized into three subcommittees to
study the legal, constitutional, and economic problems
related to defense; the other parties conducted similar
investigations. On December 5, 1953, the three parties
met together for the first time for negotiations on the
new defense organization; they met eighteen times there-
after before two defense bills were produced by the Safety
Agency committee. These were submitted to the Diet on
March 11, 1954. In accordance with the Yoshida-Shigemitsu
4
Interview with Aso, April 10, 1971.
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memorandum, the laws took the form of amendments to the
Safety Agency Law; but, as was the case with the new
Constitution, the amendments were in effect new laws. The
Progressive Party was satisfied; the key points of the
twin defense bills followed an outline most of which was
proposed by its Defense Special Committee.
On June 9, 1954, the Defense Agency Establishment
Law totally amending the National Safety Agency Law of
1952 was passed; and on the same date, the Self-Defense
Forces Law prescribing the mission, structure, organization,
operation, and status of the armed forces was also passed.
Both laws went into effect July 1, 1954. These laws have
remained in effect to the present day; however, as during
the Occupation, the nature of Japan's sea forces remains
ambiguous. Despite the fact that the Constitution has
never been revised, Japan has continued to maintain sea
forces; and those sea forces have taken on more character-
istics generally associated with a navy. But there remain
"The Progressive Party's Defense Special Com-
mittee Five Year Defense Draft Program" (unpublished)
,




great differences in the nature of the defense organization
and in defense policy and, thus, ambiguity. These similar-
ities and differences will now be explored.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE JAPAN MARITIME
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND A NAVY
A. MISSION
The Progressive Party's Defense Special Committee
had listed the chief objectives of prospective self-defense
forces as follows:
1. To counter blockade of coastal waters by
naval and air forces;
2. To resist the occupation of the coast lines,
especially ports and harbors;
3. To defend the country against air raids or
invasion by airborne troops; ,
4. To maintain domestic security.
The Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 3, stated
only the following:
The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces
shall be to defend the nation against direct and
indirect aggression for the purpose of preserving
peace and the independence of the nation, and main-
taining the national security and, if necessary,







2. It shall be the mission of the Ground Self-
Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly on the
ground, and of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to
conduct operations chiefly at sea, and of the Air
Self-Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly in
the air.
7
More specific missions have been listed in MSDF
public information brochures and have been heard in asso-
ciation with the types of weapons procured in future de-
fense buildup plans; these will be discussed later; the
missions stated in Article 3 remain the only ones ever
legislatively authorized. Although containing no great
detail, the missions listed in the basic law would not
seem inconceivable for the defense organizations of the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, etc.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
According to the Defense Agency Establishment Law
the highest command is invested in the Prime Minister who
gis necessarily a civilian and is responsible to the Diet.
Self Defense Forces Law, Law No. 165, June 9,
1954. Article quoted is from Japan Defense Agency
English translation (unpublished), p. 3.
Q




Although ordinarily he must seek the consent of the Diet
to order the Self-Defense Forces into action, in case of
emergency he can order them directly, seeking Diet approval
after the fact.
The National Defense Council was delayed in estab-
lishment because of political quarreling over the size and
nature of Japan's defense buildup. In the interim the
Cabinet Minister Defense Discussion Group was established
in 1955. On June 3, 1956, The National Defense Council
Establishment Bill was passed by the Diet and the Council
came into existence on July 1, 1956. According to law,
the National Defense Council is the highest advisory group
available to the Prime Minister on defense matters and in-
cludes as statutory members the Prime Minister (as Presi-
dent), the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the
Director General of the Defense Agency, and the Director
General of the Economic Planning Agency.
The Defense Agency (JDA) itself is the Prime
Minister's executive organ for defense matters. It is an
outside office of the Prime Minister but is headed by a
Minister of State who is a member of the Cabinet and there-
fore necessarily a civilian. The Director General's two
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deputies, the Parliamentary Vice Minister, responsible for
political matters, and the Administrative Vice Minister,
responsible for administering the agency, are both likewise
required to be civilians. The Defense Agency organization
also includes: nine civilian counsellors who assist the
Director General in the formulation of basic policy con-
cerning the specific functions of the agency; six internal
subdivisions, all headed by civilians and known in toto
as the Internal Bureau; the four member; all-uniformed
Joint Staff Council, which advises the Director General on
coordinated defense matters; the Ground, Maritime, and
Air Staff Offices whose Chiefs of Staff are the Director
General's highest professional advisors on matters per-
taining to their respective forces and who carry out the
Director General's orders as to operation and administra-
tion of their forces; and four affiliated organs all
headed by civilians: the National Defense College, a
high level research college providing education to senior
uniformed and civilian officials and conducting research
and study of war history; the Technical Research and
Development Institute which conducts basic and applied
research, development, test, and evaluation of weapons
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and weapons systems; the Central Procurement Office which
provides economical centralized procurement for the three
forces; and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency
which handles the real estate, maintenance, and construc-
tion needs of Japanese and U.S. forces and attempts to
minimize the annoyances that the forces cause to people
living near airports, to fishermen whose operating areas
are restricted, etc. An organizational outline of the
9Defense Agency is shown in Chart VII- 1.
9The organization facts and data for charts used
in this chapter are drawn from public information and
documentary material prepared by units of the Japan De-
fense Agency, interviews, and personal knowledge. By
virtue of Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, all
or part of the Maritime Safety Agency can be placed under
the command of the Director General of the Defense Agency
if directed by the Prime Minister in times when the de-
fense forces are ordered into operation. Placing the MSA
under the Director General instead of under the MSDF re-
sulted from the earlier resentment between MSA officials
and former naval officers. Reportedly the MSA did not want
to be subject to the organ it felt it mothered and the
compromise wording of Article 80 resulted; interview with
Yamaoka Ryohei, U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office,
Tokyo, January 12, 1971; Yamaoka has worked with MSDF and
MSA personnel for the U.S. Navy for 17 years. Of course
the Defense Agency Director General could conceivably
place MSA units under MSDF commanders if he had control
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The Maritime Self-Defense Force within the Defense
Agency is made up of the Maritime Staff Office and units
and installations supervised by the Chief of Maritime
Staff. Orders to operating units are transmitted by the
Prime Minister through the Director General to individual
units through the Chief of Maritime Staff. Upon commence-
ment in 1954, the organization of the MSDF was as indicated
in Chart VII-2.
The Maritime Staff Office (MSO) consists of six
divisions, which serve as the Chief of Staff's organs for
command and supervision of the MSDF. The basic organiza-
tion and subdivisions of the MSO are as indicated in Chart
VII-3.
The MSDF's major units are made up of the Self-
Defense Fleet, Regional Districts, the Training Squadron,
units directly under the Director General, and miscellane-
ous units such as schools, hospitals, etc. The Self-
Defense Fleet contains the primary mobile operating forces
of the MSDF which are engaged in training. It includes
the Fleet Escort (destroyer) Force, Fleet Air Force,





Organization of Maritime Self-Defense Force As of July 1, 1954
Director General
Defense Agency



















































































































































































































































Source: Japan Defense Agency, Jieitai Junenshi (Ten Year History of the





Organization of Maritime Staff Office As of April 1, 1971
Chief of the Maritime Staff




























































































































Source: Japan Defense Agency
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Training Command. The sea around Japan is divided into
five Regional Districts, each containing: a headquarters;
coastal defense units such as destroyers, torpedo boats,
subchasers, minesweepers and landing craft; and support
units such as local bases, air stations, recruit training
centers, etc. The Training Squadron, continuing directly
the practice of the Imperial Navy, makes an overseas
cruise each year, culminating a year of Officer Candidate
11School for prospective MSDF ensigns. The units under
the Director General are those called out for operations
The designation of force, flotilla, division
,
etc. has been evolutionary with the expansion of the MSDF,
i.e
.
, when enough units of a particular type of ship are
obtained the next higher command unit is created, e.g
.
,
more than two destroyers form an "escort division" while
more than four can result in two divisions then organized
into an "escort flotilla." In addition to new names
additional command staffs are thus created. Compare, for
example, Charts VII-2 and VII-4. The Fleet Training Com-
mand includes shore based training units assigned to fleet
headquarters units to conduct training ashore and provides
ship-riders for training and evaluation of underway units.
11
For the history of the Training Squadron from its
beginning in 1875 through the 1970 cruise see Commander Seno
Sadao, JMSDF, Enyo Kokai Yowa (Episodes of the Training
Squadron), Tokyo: Daiwa Associates, 1971. The first cruise
of the Imperial Navy was to Hawaii (then the Sandwich Islands),
as was the first of the MSDF in 1957.
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other than training, such as those engaged in disaster re-
lief; until 1969 included in this category was a squadron
still sweeping the mines laid in the seas surrounding
12
Japan in World War II. The organization as it existed
in 1971 is as indicated in Chart VII-4.
Judging by the organizations prescribed by the basic
laws and as pictured in the usual organizational block
diagrams, it would again seem not unusual to expect this
was a navy within a defense organization in a progressive
country where the civilian government runs the military.
Some of the names sound a little unusual but are more
politically and publicly acceptable equivalents of U.S.
organizations and units on which their designs are based.
Table VII-5 lists some of the commonly used terms.
12Although all mines were still not completely
swept upon the transfer of the minesweepers to the Self-
Defense Fleet in 1969, those remaining were in very shallow
water where conventional minesweepers were not able to
sweep. This transfer signaled an end to the special mission
for regular minesweepers begun in 1945 and administered and
carried out thereafter by the Navy Ministry, Second Demobil-
ization Ministry, Second Demobiliation Bureau of Demobiliza-
tion Board, Second Bureau of Prime Minister's Office,
Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division of
Demobilization Bureau of Welfare Ministry, Maritime Safety
Agency of Transportation Ministry, Maritime Safety Force




CHART VI I -4
ORGANIZATION OF THE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE
AS OF APRIL 1, 1971
JDA Director General








— Self Defense Fleet Headquarters (Yokosuka)
- Fleet Escort Force Headquarters
(Yokosuka)
- 1st Escort Flotilla
--Escort Divisions
Fleet - 2nd Escort Flotilla
-Escort --Escort Divisions
Force - 3rd Escort Flotilla
--Escort Divisions
- 4th Escort Flotilla
--Escort Divisions
- Other Units under Direct Command
- Fleet Air Force Headquarters
(Shonan Town, Higashi-Katsushika-
Gun, Chiba Prefecture)
- 1st Air Wing (Kanoya City)
- 2nd Air Wing (Hachinohe City)
- 3rd Air Wing (Tokushima City)
- 4th Air Wing (Shonan Town, Higashi-
Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture)
- 21st Air Wing (Tateyama City)









—1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)
—Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka)
--Fleet Training Groups




















Base Oper. and Activ.
Base Activ. Unit
Base Oper. Unit
-Headquarters, Air Training Command (Utsunomiya)
-Kanoya Air Training Group
Air
-Training-|—Utsunomiya Air Training Group
Command
—Ozuki Air Training Group (Shimonoseki)
—Other Units under Direct Command
MSDF Staff College (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)




MSDF 1st Service School (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima
Prefecture)
MSDF 2nd Service School (Yokosuka)
MSDF 3rd Service School (Shonan Town, Higashi-Katsushika-
Gun, Chiba Prefecture)
MSDF Youth Basic Service School (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun,
Hiroshima Prefecture)
MSDF Yokosuka Hospital (Yokosuka)
MSDF Etajima Hospital (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima
Prefecture)
MSDF Maizuru Hospital (Maizuru)
MSDF Ominato Hospital (Mutsu)





MSDF Intelligence Service Unit
Operational Development Group
MSDF Shore Police Command
Supply Demand Control Point
MSDF Tokyo Band
MSDF Tokyo Service Activity
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The equipment of the MSDF is not atypical of what a
modern navy would be expected to have. Starting out with a
few old minesweeping craft and the patrol frigates and land-
ing craft loaned by the United States, the MSDF grew with
further loans from the United States and the domestic pro-
duction of both ships and aircraft. Destroyers, escort
destroyers, and a guided-missile destroyer are now included
in the anti-submarine forces of the Self-Defense Fleet; con-
struction has already begun on a manned helicopter-carrying
frigate; drone helicopters are already in service on some
ships. The present minesweeping force has already been
mentioned as among the best in the world; the designs of
the most recent models are regarded as the most advanced
known to any navy. Patrol craft include standard types as
well as new torpedo boats and hydrofoils. Landing craft
of large and small variety, although now generally old, are
still available as is the world's largest and most modern
merchant fleet replete with tankers and large fast ferries
suitable for transporting tanks, troops, and heavy equip-
ment, if converted, which could possibly be made available
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with emergency legislation in time of crisis. Present
support vessels also include an oiler (tanker) , ice-
breaker, and hydrographic research vessels. Aircraft are
almost exclusively oriented towards anti-submarine warfare
with long and short-range ASW search and attack fixed wing
craft, anti-submarine helicopters, and, recently, a new
ASW and rescue flying boat (PS 1), regarded as the most
capable craft of its type ever built.
In these general ways, the MSDF seems very much
like a navy. There are some unusual aspects, however,
that make it unlike the sea forces of other nations.

CHAPTER VIII
[PART 2:] DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MARITIME
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND A NAVY
A. NO SYSTEM OF MILITARY LAW
In addition to Article 9, other provisions of
the Japan's postwar Constitution have, at least by inter-
pretation, hindered the establishment of essential ele-
ments of most national military systems. Military justice,
characteristic to most national forces, is one element
absent in the Self-Defense Forces.
Article 76 of the Constitution states:
The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as are established
by law.
No extraordinary tribunal shall be established,
nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be
given final judicial power.
All judges shall be independent in the exercise
of their conscience and shall be bound only by this
Constitution and the laws.l
From "The Constitution of Japan" as contained in
The National Diet Japan , official English edition published




This article is interpreted as preventing any system of
court martial, and thus no provisions for a system of
justice were inserted in the Self-Defense Forces Law.
Any defendant who is accused of a crime is brought before
a civil court and is represented by personal counsel.
This lawyer must be given access to classified information
and material necessary for the defense of his client,
complicating the security problem for the uniformed
forces.
Articles 118 through 122 of the Self-Defense
Forces Law do call for prison sentences up to seven years
or fines up to 50,000 yen (138 dollars) for violating
security requirements, engaging in private enterprise
illegally, using weapons illegally, forming a union,
destroying weapons, or failing to follow orders in defense
or police operations; however, these provisions have only
rarely been exercised as it is feared such practice will
provide an opportunity for challenge of the legality of
the law.
2
Self-Defense Forces Law, Defense Agency trans-
lation, pp. 39-41. Such a challenge took place in 1967
when the law was used to indict two Hokkaido brothers
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There is room for administrative punishment in the
MSDF based on Article 46 of the Self-Defense Forces Law:
Dismissal, demotion, suspension, forfeiture of
pay, or reprimand shall be enacted against Self-
Defense Force personnel coming under the following
categories
:
1. In the event of violation or negligence of
duty;
2. In the event of conduct unbecoming a member
of the Self-Defense Forces;
3. In the event of violating this law or any
order based on this law.
Thus to take care of violations of procedures such as re-
porting late, fighting, drunkeness on duty, etc., com-
manding officers of ships and unit commanders ashore are
authorized to take administrative measures such as oral
and written warnings, suspension from duty, reduction
in salary, and dismissal from the MSDF. A guidebook for
standards to be applied and appropriate measures to be
taken is put out by the Maritime Staff Office; fines are
recommended only for the most serious cases of negligence
in a command status and then do not reach three months
charged with violation of Article 121 of the SDF Law for
cutting communication wires near a firing range after
being irritated by the noise of a training exercise.








salary. Dismissal is the most severe measure authorized,
and its exercise is allowed only by a Regional District
Commandant in the case of an enlisted man and by the Chief
of Maritime Staff in the case of an officer.
B. NO NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
Although no attempt has ever been made to enact
a national security law, there is no political party
known to be willing or interested in passing one because
of anticipated accusations of violating Chapter III of
the Constitution which covers rights and duties of the
people. Article 21 of that chapter states:
Freedom of assembly and association as well as
speech, press, and all other forms of expression
are guaranteed.
No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall
the secrecy of any means of communication be
violated.
5
This has led to problems with the United States because
of Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
4Chokai Shobun To no Kijun ni Kansuru Tatsu
(Order Concerning the Standard of Punishment), Tokyo
Maritime Self-Defense Force, Defense Agency, 1961.
"The Constitution of Japan," p. 30.
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which states in part that:
Each Government will take such security measures
as agreed upon between the two Governments in order
to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified
articles, services, or information furnished by the
other Government pursuant to the present agreement.
6
Loans of classified U.S. equipment made such assurances
desired; a MSA secrets protection law does theoretically
bind all Japanese citizens, but the law has never been
used in a conviction, and; because of doubts that it will
be enforced, the American Navy has been limited in the
amount of information it has been willing to give and in
the types of cooperation it might otherwise seek with
Japan. Although, as of October 1968, 4700 items were
designated as classified under the provisions of Article 3,
only one person has ever been charged with violating the MSA
secrets protection law which allows for confinement at hard
labor for up to five years or fines of up to 50,000 yen;
the individual case charged did not result in an indict-
ment. For the future, sharing of information with regard
"Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between
Japan and the United States of America 8 March 1954,"
p. 54.
"Protection of Secrets" in the series "Japan's
Peace and Security," Mainichi Daily News , November 30, 1968
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to nuclear propulsion looms as a big problem for the United
States and the JMSDF if Japan is to continue the present
security practices and any sharing or cooperation is de-
sired.
The Self-Defense Forces Law does provide for the
protection of information among its own forces in Article
59:
Self-Defense Force personnel shall not divulge
any secret which may have come to their knowledge in
the performance of their duties. This shall also
apply even after personnel have been separated from
the service.
2. In the event Self-Defense Force personnel
are required to make a statement concerning any
secret in line with their duties as witnesses as
prescribed by law, they shall be required to obtain
the permission of the Director General. This shall
also apply even after personnel have been separated
from service. °
This law has been exercised once, by the Tokyo District
Court in the case of an Air Self-Defense Force colonel
convicted of providing plans for an electronic air raid
alert system to an employee of an American aircraft company
The officer was sentenced to six months at hard labor,
9
suspended for two years. But the great mass of the
Self Defense Forces Law, translation, p. 19.
9The Japan Times , January 24, 1971. The January,
1971 conviction which will be appealed was for an offense
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populace is free from obligations with regard to all but
U.S. -MSA-classified information; thus, newspapers feel an
incentive to learn information classified by the Self-
Defense Forces in order to publish "scoops" which the
Japanese press thrive on. One recent example involving
the MSDF was the joint training exercise held by MSDF
destroyers and an American nuclear submarine; the story
appeared as a headline in the morning edition of Asahi -
Shimbun and necessitated a statement later in the day by
the Defense Agency Director General that such training had
in fact taken place. Opposition parties also have no
hesitation about revealing classified information for
their own benefit; a so-called "Three Arrows" plan was ex-
posed by Socialist Diet members in 1968 and exaggerated
beyond its actual content to indicate that firm plans for
Japanese deployment to Korea with the United States in
case of aggression were in effect. By finally admitting
that occurred over five years previous and took over two
years in court alone.
Interview with Taoka Shunji, Asahi Shimbun
,
March 18, 1971, the night before the "scoop" appeared.
The scoop belonged to Taoka.
"In Case of Emergency," Mainichi Daily News
"Peace and Security" series, December 3, 1968.
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that a "Three Arrows" study did exist, the government gave
credibility to the exaggerated story.
C. CONSCRIPTION DOES NOT EXIST
Conscription is not specifically forbidden by the
Constitution although Article 18 does prohibit involun-
tary servitude. At the time the Self-Defense Forces Law
was written, no thought was given to a draft system. The
forces were to be small; there were no immediate problems in
obtaining the necessary volunteers; and there was a
12
natural and strong sentiment against conscription.
Recently, however, SDF recruits have been becoming increas-
ingly more scarce; a smaller youthful population, an ex-
panding economy, and the Japanese tendency of "my homeism"
are starting to plague the MSDF (and the other military
services) whose ships are increasingly achieving ability
to serve sustained periods at sea. Volunteers who once
averaged almost twenty for each vacancy over an annual
period have fallen to almost a one to one ratio with
12




requirements recently. There are no provisions for a
draft, even in time of emergency; and under normal cir-
cumstances any member is free to resign at any time.
Article 40 of the Self-Defense Forces Law does provide
the Director General an option of freezing the present
strength in a crisis situation:
When the Director General, or an individual
designated by him, deems that the accomplishment
of the missions of the Self-Defense Forces is
greatly impeded by the approval of a resignation
tendered by any Self-Defense Force member, except
in cases where there are specific reasons for
resignation as prescribed by Cabinet Order, he may
disapprove the resignation for a period as stated
within the previously fixed term of enlistment in
case of Leading Privates and below, Leading Seamen
and below, and Airmen First Class and below, and
for the minimum period required to accomplish the
mission of the Self-Defense Forces in the case of
other personnel. l^
This provision has never been exercised.
Recently, talk about conscription has been heard
associated with the first white paper on defense issued in
late 1970. Since the Self-Defense Forces are already lack-
ing personnel and a large increase in defense spending is
13Official Defense Agency figures show a ratio of
19.7:1 for the MSDF in 1958. The one to one figures
first appeared in 1969. For more detailed figures, see
Chapter XI.
14Self-Defense Forces Law, translation, p. 15.
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programed for fiscal years 1972-1976, some fears about a
movement for a draft system have been heard. Reportedly,
handsome and personable Defense Agency Director General
Nakasone Yasuhiro, known to have ambitions of becoming
Prime Minister in the 1970' s, wanted a brief statement
inserted in the white paper in the section entitled
"Fundamentals of National Defense" that "A conscription
system will not be adopted." This statement was sup-
posedly removed at the last moment because of objections
by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau since "it was not
necessary to mention this" and since there exists a minor-
ity opinion that "conscription is not unconstitutional."
The same statement on conscription then appeared in a
message issued on the occasion of the publishing of the
white paper by Minister Nakasone; this message was
printed in the same volume, immediately prior to the basic
text, which was translated, published, and distributed by
the Defense Agency. Some adverse foreign reaction based
Murata Kyoaki, "The Spector of Conscription,"
The Japan Times , November 6, 1970.
16
The Defense of Japan , Tokyo: Japan Defense
Agency, 1970, p. ii.
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on fears of resurgent Japanese militarism was heard, how-
ever, because of the fact that conscription was not spe-
cifically banned in the basic text itself. Such reaction
only serves to increase the political unacceptability of
any type of conscription system in the future.
D. INCOMPLETE EMERGENCY MEASURES
From the above description it is obvious that one
problem in an emergency could be personnel. The MSDF
presently has a reserve force of 300 and hoped to expand
it to 3000 in 1971; GSDF and ASDF reserves are also pro-
portionately small; there are no adequate reserve training
programs and equipments; and there is nothing that would
prevent a reservist from quitting if he thought a danger-
ous situation was approaching. In order to augment the
regular forces adequately to meet an emergency, former
Defense Agency Director General and presently Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Funada Naka, in 1969 pro-
posed the formation of a one-million-man "local defense
corps" to be composed of volunteers who would receive
training and be subject to call in times of emergency,
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somewhat in the way in which Switzerland and Sweden pro-
vide for their security. Cartoons appeared of Funada in
military uniform just as Ashida Hitoshi had been pictured
in the early 1950 ! s. Although he feels the time was not
right when he originally proposed it, Funada feels such
a system might be more acceptable than conscription at
some future date.
In addition to personnel inadequacies, there are
no measures to provide for special controls over and ad-
ministration of public utilities and services in time of
crisis. With the meager amount of support craft possessed
by the MSDF some kind of additional augmentation would
certainly be necessary if it were required to ferry troops,
ammunition and fuel even around the Japanese islands.
Whereas, in the time of the Imperial Navy, shipbuilding
companies were augmented in the construction of ships spe-
cifically so that they might become utilized by the Navy
in time of war, there is presently no such system.
Although it is hard to imagine that MSDF leaders would
be so irresponsible as to not have done some thinking
Interview with Speaker Funada, January 23, 1971.
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about which types of Japanese merchant ships might be use-
ful, any authorization to utilize such shipping would most
likely have to be the result of emergency legislation in
time of crisis. In the present situation, there can be
no effective planning for a Naval Control of Shipping organ-
ization, and there has never been even a coordinated
emergency exercise of cooperation between the MSDF and
the MSA which are authorized possible emergency joint
operations. Rail and air transportation, communications,
oil stockpiles and other logistic items similarly lack
any emergency administrative authorization.
E. UNIQUE CIVILIAN CONTROL
Although civilian control is not unusual among
the military forces of many nations, the situation in
Japan is unusual and generally poorly understood; there-
fore the status and history of civilian control will be
described in some detail.
The "safety officials" for the Maritime Safety
Agency's key Patrol and Rescue and Fairway Safety Divi-
sions were, of necessity, drawn from former Imperial
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Navy personnel, while the key positions within the central
administration were drawn generally persons from the
Transportation Ministry and other agencies that had been
involved in maritime safety functions. Because of small
numbers involved and the personalities of Okubo Takeo and
Yamamoto Yoshio there were no serious problems.
Civilian control and supremacy were the foundation
stones of the Japanese ground armed forces organized in
1950; the American Occupation authorities insisted upon
the concept and the Japanese government eagerly agreed in
the belief that lack of control over the Imperial Army and
Navy had led to the adventures in China in the 1930' s,
World War II, and finally occupation by a foreign army.
Some officers for the National Police Reserve were, as
those for the naval forces started earlier, picked from
former Army personnel; but key permanent positions within
what was to become the National Safety Agency in 1952 and
the Defense Agency in 1954 were generally filled by civil
officials from the National Police Agency and the old
Home Ministry, which in prewar times had authority over
the police, elections, and local government; a very few
Transportation Ministry officials were also admitted.
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In contrast to cases such as the United States
and Britain, the problems of national defense and of
military affairs were almost completely absent from the
concerns of civil leaders in prewar Japan; even broad
national strategy considerations were monopolized by the
military. Public discussions of military affairs and
defense strategy were discouraged, if not suppressed; in
the Diet little explanation was given to military-
originated legislation and military appropriations bills.
Military topics covered in civilian universities and in
the press were superficial; public officials were either
exempted from military service or given insignificant
positions. With this lack of experience in mind, the
first hasty solution to the problem of exercising civilian
control of the post-Korean War forces was to bring over
the police officials and bureaucrats from the old Home
Ministry. Their strength was their administrative abil-
ity and experience, buttressed by the fact that many of
the brightest graduates of the nation's best schools,
then as now, were attracted to police careers. Their
weakness was their ignorance of military matters.
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Another feature of the solution, again hasty, was
to bring in selected officials from other government
ministries such as the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry,
and the Health and Welfare Ministry to take charge of
those positions requiring specific expertise in fields
such as procurement, budget, liaison with foreign countries,
and military medicine. These "other-ministry" people took
over many areas in the Internal Bureau which holds much of
the real power in the Defense Agency today. Because of
government hesitancy in defense matters, the Finance
Ministry, particularly, has almost a power monopoly.
Thus many key men, bureau directors and their section
chiefs, are not of the Defense Agency itself; their bureau-
cratic loyalties lie elsewhere; and their interests are
temporary, inasmuch as they stay at the Defense Agency
only two to three years and then return to their own
ministries or retire.
To avoid having to rely so heavily on outsiders,
in 1955 the Defense Agency began recruiting high-caliber
university graduates from the Law Faculties of Tokyo and
Kyoto Universities, the traditional training grounds for
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Japan's bureaucratic elite. An average of slightly more
than three persons have been hired each year since the
program began; so far all are moving up into responsible
positions in accordance with their abilities, but only
one, in April, 1971, has reached the section chief level
and several more are near. Some opposition from the
"other ministries" is expected as new section heads are
appointed as the bureaucratic battle will determine how
the political power structure exercises civilian control
over the military in the future.
Presently the Internal Bureau constitutes the
center of power within the Defense Agency and is the main
instrument whereby civilian control is exercised. The
bureau directors, who also hold the title of Defense
Agency Counsellors, meet once or twice each week with
four other counsellors, the Administrative Vice Minister,
and the Director General as the Counsellors' Council.
Uniformed officers from the Joint Staff Council attend
some meetings but only in the role of technical experts
to be called upon for answers to specific questions. The
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Takase Tadao Home Ministry
Tsurusaki Satoshi Private Industry
Suzuki Tateo Foreign Ministry*
Source: Japan Defense Agency
Indicates incumbent's assignment is short term.
The predominance of former police officials and
bureaucrats from the old Home Ministry has often extended
to three of the four major auxiliary organs of the Defense
Agency: the Defense Academy, the National Defense College,
and the Central Procurement Office. In 1971 the National
Defense College and the Central Procurement Office were
headed by former police; revealingly, Yamada Masao, the
President of the former was also a retired Chief of Staff,
Ground Self-Defense Force, a position that is usually
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rotated between a former Imperial Army officer and an ex-
police official.
On the controlled or military side, the highest
organ is the Joint Staff Council (JSC) composed of the
Chairman and Chiefs of Staff from each of the uniformed
services. The first Chairman, General Hayashi Keizo of
the GSDF, held the position for ten years; not surprisingly,
General Hayashi was a former Home Ministry official.
Since 1964, former military officers have held the posi-
tion, usually for two years. As of April, 1971, the
chairman was Admiral Itaya Takaichi of the MSDF.
Although the concept of civilian control is wel-
comed by an overwhelming majority of MSDF officers, many
of them today have a rather low opinion of the present
system and of some of their civilian superiors. This
has partially resulted from the arrogant attitude and
open contempt of some of the civilian officials toward
the military and the use of senior military men in menial
messenger jobs as collectors of statistics and data.
Another reason the present system is disliked is the
small degree of voice uniformed officers have even in
matters directly affecting them and their equipment.
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Only one uniformed member, General Genda Minoru of the ASDF
who was asked to explain about the F-104 jet aircraft, has
ever appeared before the Diet. If the Director General,
who has usually been a short-term political appointee
with no military expertise, disagrees with the unanimous
position of the Joint Staff Council, there is no institu-
tionalized channel whereby any of the chiefs can gain
access to the Diet or the Prime Minister. The Prime
Ministers have scarcely known uniformed leaders and have
18
met with them very infrequently.
Director General Nakasone has often said that
civilian control should be "improved" and "perfected."
When asked if that meant increasing the power of the
civilians over the military or giving the military more
19
control over their own affairs, he replied, "both."
18
A revealing but amusing example of the extremely
low profile of the uniformed Chiefs of Staff is provided
by the invitation of Joint Staff Council Chairman Itaya,
then Chief of Maritime Staff, to a garden party given by
Prime Minister Sato in 1968. Admiral Itaya, in dress
uniform, was approached by the Prime Minister's protocol
officer and asked in English what country he came from.
The good natured Itaya, a fluent English speaker who
studied at the U.S. Naval War College, reportedly replied
in English, "I come from a small island country by the
name of Japan." Interview with General Okumia, December 7,
1970.
19Interview with Minister Nakasone, January 18, 1971
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Personal relations among Japanese are at best well-defined,
with great emphasis on who is junior and who is senior.
It is very clear that the civilians today are senior in
most aspects and that civilian-military relations within
the Defense Agency are today very rigid.
The former policemen and outside-ministry people
naturally have an interest in continuing civilian control
in its present form, and it seems probable that the shape
of the system is bound up with the bureaucratic fortunes
of the new professional Defense Agency civilians. The
views of uniformed personnel will seemingly have little
immediate influence on any evolution in the system.
The Finance Ministry can help the Defense Agency civilians
by cooperating with them on budgetary matters as those
with Finance Ministry support can influence key decisions
in Japan; however, the Finance Ministry is part of the
outside power group within the Defense Agency and may
resist any move which might endanger its own predominant
position there. One possible outcome is an arrangement
whereby the new civilians and outside ministry people
unite to squeeze out the police, all groups continuing
to restrain the uniformed services. If the Defense Agency
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can finally make its long-desired jump to full Ministry
status, there would be bureaucratic and financial expansion
and experts feel that the new Defense Agency civilians would
then probably triumph over all other groups.
F. WAR POTENTIAL IS PROHIBITED
One of the greatest contributors to attacks on the
legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces has been the incon-
sistent Japanese government effort to maintain that "war
potential," which the government states is forbidden by
Article 9, can be differentiated from "defense potential."
Initially Prime Minister Yoshida maintained that the fore-
runners of the Self-Defense Forces were not unconstitu-
tional because they had no capability to wage modern
warfare and were thus no threat to anyone. In 1952
Director General Kimura of the Safety Agency maintained
in the Diet that "defense potential" allowed a weapon
such as a howitzer which he was defending against criti-
cism at the time; when asked to give an example of war po-
tential which was not allowed, he said a jet airplane
20
would be such an example. Of course today jet airplanes




are a front-line item in Japan's defense arsenal, but the
war potential ban is still given considerable attention
in political arguments.
The Supreme Court has not clarified the situation
with regard to war potential. In the so-called "Sunakawa
Case" the court's decision of December 16, 1959, stated
that self-defense was not denied to Japan as an inherent
sovereign right but scrupulously avoided the issue of
the possibility of maintaining war potential for self-
defense. It is interesting to note that despite the
fact that "war potential" is still denied legitimacy
and in doubt constitutionally, the primary orientation
of the MSDF in equipment and training is toward anti-
submarine warfare; this is not merely an argument in
semantics- -to fight a modern nuclear submarine defensively
from a stationary position is questionably effective.
The question of an "offensive defense" will be addressed
in the next chapter.
G. THE RIGHT OF BELLIGERENCY IS DENIED
Denial of "the right of belligerency" was written
into Article 9 of the Constitution, and Dr. Kanamori
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Tokujiro who explained the document before the Diet inter-
preted this to mean that Japan was denied the rights
given to a belligerent in time of war by international
law. Apparently neither the U.S. Occupation authorities
instrumental in writing the Constitution nor Dr. Kanamori
realized at the time that the term "right of belligerency"
21
was meaningless in international law. In his explana-
tion Dr. Kanamori used three examples of the kind of
actions prohibited to Japan by the denial of the right of
belligerency. Of primary interest to the MSDF are the
first two examples; Japan could not, according to Kanamori,
check neutral ships for contraband goods during wartime nor
21
For example, Dr. Kanamori to the Special Commit-
tee, House of Peers, September 13, 1946. Shimizu Shin,
Kempo to Jieitai (The Constitution and the Self-Defense
Forces), compiled from minutes of the Diet, Tokyo:
Asagumo Shimbun, 1969, p. 344. The respected Japan
Society of International Law adopted a report by Professor
Miehara Mitsuo of Keio University at its annual conference
in 1951. Professor Miehara ' s report concluded that after
an exhaustive search of international law treatises, a
search which it noted was not made in 1946, there was no
precedent for the term "right of belligerency" and recom-
mended that the term be regarded as meaningless. Miehara,
"Renunciation of Belligerency," Kokusai Ho Gaiko Zasshi
(The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), Volume
51, Number 2, January, 1951, pp. 4ff. Regardless, the





could it blockade enemy territory. Actually, according
to a reliable source:
As international law recognizes the status of
war and its effects as regards rights and duties
between the belligerents on the one hand, and
between belligerents and neutral states on the
other, the question arises what kind of States
are legally qualified to make war, and thereby
to become belligerents. According to the Law of
Nations, full sovereign states alone possess the
legal qualification to become belligerents; half
and partially sovereign States are not legally
qualified to become belligerents. Since neutral
States, such as Switzerland, are full sovereign
States, they are legally qualified to become
belligerents, although their neutrality binds
them not to make use of that capacity, except for
defense. If they become belligerents because they
are attacked, they do not lose their character as
neutral States; but if they become belligerents
for offensive purposes, they ipso facto lose the
character. ^3
It would thus appear that Japan has domestically renounced,
even in defensive warfare, the rights it is allowed as a
belligerent under international law; it would also appear,
however, that such a renunciation has no effect in
22Nakamura Kikuo, "The Interpretation of Article 9,"
in Nakamura and Hayashi Shuzo, editor, Jieitai to Kempo no
Kaishaku (The Self-Defense Forces and the Interpretation of
the Constitution), Tokyo: Yushindo, 1967, p. 259.
23
L. Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise
,
Volume II: Disputes War and Neutrality, London: Longmans,
Green and Co. Ltd., 1963, p. 248.
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international law. If Japan were attacked and the govern-
ment were to change its official position to that of its
legal scholars who maintain that denial of the right of
belligerency is a meaningless term, Japan would have no
domestic or international legal obstacles to exercising
the rights given a belligerent in time of warfare. If the
Kanamori position were rigidly maintained, the MSDF, again
particularly in the field of anti-nuclear-submarine war-
fare, would be presented with some severely limiting
obstacles to complicate an already most difficult game
which can be easily won or lost depending on small ad-
vantages or disadvantages.
H. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED
Despite the official sanctions that have been given
to the right of self-defense by Japanese government leaders,
even they have consistently maintained that overseas de-
ployment of the armed forces is unconstitutional; such a
declaration was passed as a resolution by the House of
Councillors at the time of the passage of the Self-Defense
Forces Law in 1954. The only relaxation as to interpreta-
tion of the prohibition has been to allow overseas
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deployment for training, although even this was attacked
at the time of the first MSDF training cruise to Hawaii
in 1957. The Training Squadron now deploys annually and
has visited North and South America, Europe, and Australia;
the MSDF icebreaker FUJI since 1965 has replaced a Maritime
Safety Agency vessel in the role of transporting Japan's
annual survey mission to the Antarctic; and MSDF sub-
marines and aircraft regularly exercise in Hawaii with
American units. Combat deployment is rigidly denied,
however; and many feel that this prohibition affects
Japan's ability to fulfill the obligations of collective
security assumed with the signing of the Peace Treaty and
the United Nations Charter. Since one of the explicit
principles of Japan's "National Defense Policy" is to
support the United Nations, this question has caused a
great deal of debate and will be discussed more thoroughly
in Chapter IX. Here it is interesting to note that very
few Japanese realize even today that their forces have
deployed overseas in combat since the war and that that





I. CONSTITUTIONALITY IS DENIED OR QUESTIONED BY A
SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE POPULACE
In no other country in the world, regardless of
ideology, have the armed forces been questioned and/or
attacked by as large and vocal a segment of the popula-
tion as in postwar Japan. The Supreme Court has evaded
the issue of constitutionality. The Communist and Social-
ist Parties have maintained from the beginning that the
Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional. Public opinion
as to the necessity of the forces has risen to nearly 80
per cent in recent years but a direct question of con-
stitutionality has rarely been able to achieve 60 per
cent in the affirmative.
Opposition party credibility and public doubt
have seemingly been aided by the inconsistency of the suc-
cessive stands of ruling conservative governments. To
exemplify:
(
a. June 28, 1946 (Yoshida Cabinet at the time of
discussion of the Constitution)
:
Most wars have been fought in the cause of self-
defense so that it is better to wage no war at all
in any cases. To acknowledge and justify a war in
self-defense would only serve to invite another war
and would be harmful and unprofitable.
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b. November 21, 1949 (Yoshida Cabinet prior to
hostilities in Korea)
:
There remains the rights of self-defense without
arms, the right to defend one's country through dip-
lomatic measures and other such means.
c. March 10, 1952 (Prime Minister Yoshida, to
Budget Committee, House of Councillors):
To maintain war potential, even for the purpose
of self-defense, would mean rearmament. This would
necessitate revision of the Constitution.
d. November 25, 1952 (The government's official
interpretation of war potential in reply to Socialist ac-
cusations that the National Safety Force is unconstitu-
tional) :
Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Constitution pro-
hibits the maintaining of a war potential whether for
aggression or for self-defense.
"War potential" means a force with the equipment
and strength capable of conducting modern warfare.
The Security Force and the Maritime Safety Force are
not "war potential." Objectively speaking, the
equipment and strength of these forces are not cap-
able of effectively conducting modern warfare and
hence are not to be considered "war potential" men-
tioned in the Constitution.





The Constitution, while denouncing war, has not
denounced war for self-defense. . . .
To check armed attack in event of such an attack
from an outside nation is self-defense itself, and
is entirely different from settling international dis-
putes. Hence, the use of military power as a means of
defending the nation when the nation has been attacked
by military power is not counter to the Constitution.
f. March 12, 1959 (Prime Minister Kishi to
Cabinet Committee, House of Councillors)
:
The Government intends to maintain no nuclear
weapons, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation
of the Constitution, there is nothing to prevent the
maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons
for the purposes of self-defense.
g. March 19, 1959 (Kishi Cabinet official inter-
pretation) :
In the event that an attack is waged with guided
missiles and there are no other means of defense,
counter attacks on enemy bases are within the scope
of self-defense. With the right of self-defense re-
tained as an independent nation, the Constitution
does not mean for the nation to sit and do nothing
and await its death.
h. June 25, 1963 (Prime Minister Ikeda to the
Cabinet Committee, House of Councillors):
The Self-Defense Forces are not to be determined
conceptually or numerically, but the strength should
be determined according to the national situation,





i. November, 1965 (Prime Minister Sato answering
the question, "Where is the Constitutional limit to the
expansion of self-defense power?"):
The defense power needed for self-defense, of
course. We would have equipment appropriate to our
national power and circumstances. Thus new condi-
tions will always be added. Therefore, it would be
difficult to show where the limit is in concrete
terms. *
As it did with respect to war potential, the
Supreme Court in the landmark Sunakawa case refused to
pass on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces
in 1959. Over 300 lawyers were mobilized to support a
case in 1969 in which two farmers sought to absolve their
guilt from destroying government property as charged
under the Self-Defense Forces Law by maintaining that the
law was unconstitutional. The district court found them
guilty of crime but failed to fit the crime to the
24Statements "a" through "g" quoted from Masuhara
Keikichi, Chairman, Nihon no Boei (Japan's Defense) Tokyo:
Nihon no Boei Kanko (Japan's Defense Publishing Company),
1961, pp. 57-59. Prime Minister Ikeda's statement con-
tained in Asahi Shimin Kyoshitsu Volume 8, Nihon no
Jieiryoku (Self-Defense Strength of Japan), Tokyo: Asahi
Shimbunsha, 1967, p. 182. Prime Minister Sato's statement
quoted in "Under the Peace Constitution," Mainichi Daily
News "Peace and Security" series, January 24, 1969.
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definition of the Law and thus avoided the issue of con-
25
stitutionality of the forces. In 1970 an ASDF corporal
accused of violating the SDF law by instigating sabotage
through antiwar activities mounted another test question-
ing the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces;
this case was still pending in July, 1971 and the firm
26
legal status remains unaddressed by the courts.
The Socialists have held that both the preamble
and Article 9 of the Constitution make it clear that
"military forces" are illegal; they have claimed that if
this were not true there would be provisions for declara-
tions of war and peace, military law, etc. While they
have not denied that there is an inherent right of self-
defense, they have maintained that Article 9 clearly
denies any military force or war potential even for self-
defense. The pre-Korean War statements of Prime Minister
Yoshida supported this view. The Socialists have been the
only political party in Japan to advocate "unarmed
25
The court decision is contained in Jurisuto
(Jurist) Number 370, May 15, 1967, pp. 53-55.
26
"Constitutionality of Defense Forces Attacked
In Trial," The Daily Yomiuri , January 31, 1971.
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neutrality" although they have sometimes spoken of the
need for a "National Construction Corps," ironically
reminiscent of Vice Admiral Hoshina's idea of 1945 or a
"People's Police Corps," which sounds like Funada '
s
recent proposal. In the 1969 national election they took
a strong position that the Self-Defense Forces should be
gradually abolished.
The Japan Communist Party has claimed that the
Self-Defense Forces were created as servants to the
United States Far Eastern strategy and has maintained
that they are in violation of the Constitution. The
Communists' arguments have been no more consistent than
those of the conservatives, however, in that they main-
tain that once a "democratic, neutralist, independent"
state as defined by them is formed, armed force might be
necessary. Their official position as of June 11, 1968,
was that:
As a future problem, we have to consider that
developments both within and without the country
may produce a situation in which, in order to
defend the independence and sovereignty of the
country, some defense measures of a military nature
may be required. Over the future, to declare the
rigid principle of "unarmed neutrality" is not the
right way to defend successfully Japan's sovereignty
and independence in every situation. However, this
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is a problem which the Japanese people themselves,
facing a new domestic and international situation
in the future, and considering the application of
the Constitution, must decide on the basis of the
will of the people. '
The early Yoshida statements would not agree with this
position, but the later conservative governments do not
seem in fundamental opposition to it.
The two late comers to present opposition ranks
have two different positions of their own. The Demo-
cratic Socialists who split off from the right wing of
the JSP claim the Self-Defense Forces are constitutional
but call for a reversal of the present primary U.S. and
secondary Japanese roles in the nation's security; their
ideas sound much like some of the views expressed in the
defense white paper of October, 1970. The rapidly growing
Clean Government Party (Komeito) , like many of the people,
listening to what is regarded as inconsistent government
and Communist positions and the unrealistic Socialist
position, seem in doubt. A Komeito leader listed some of
these doubts: the stated purpose of the Self-Defense
27Quoted from Akahata (Reg Flag) in Kyosan-To -
Seiken-Ka no Anzen Hosho (Security under a Communist Party
Government), Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1969, p. 242.

259
Forces as given in establishment law, the modern equipment
such as jet aircraft and guided missiles, and the lack of
independence of the Self-Defense Forces from the United
28
States. Komeito does not believe that the Self-Defense
Forces should immediately be abolished but favors a
National Guard that can eventually join in a United Na-
tions Police Force, a proposal that also sounds reminiscent
of Speaker Funada ' s
.
The general public has increasingly supported the
Self-Defense Forces but the legal status is still unsure.
A Liberal Democratic Party-sponsored poll of September,
1969 sampling 3000 people of twenty years of age and
older living throughout Japan found that while 75 per cent
of the sample felt that the Self-Defense Forces "had bet-
ter exist" and only 15 per cent answered "Don't know,"
only 60 per cent of the same sample would say "the exer-
cise of armed force may be permitted if it is for the
self-defense of Japan" while 23 per cent said they didn't
29know whether it was legal.
28
Komeito- Seiken-Ka no Anzen Hosho (Security under
a Clean Government Party Government), Tokyo: Mainichi
Shimbun, 1969, p. 168.
29 Mpublic Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," in
Seisaku Geppo (Organ magazine of the Liberal-Democratic
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Despite the fact that it is doubtful that any op-
position party, if it gained power, would actually
abolish the Self-Defense Forces, it would be reasonable
to expect that lack of consistent support from the govern-
ment, opposition from major political parties, and doubt
caused by the opinions of the Supreme Court and expressed
by a large segment of the public would, first, greatly
affect the morale of the forces, and would, second, cause
an unsettled situation in a case of an attack, particu-
larly an indirect one such as on a Japanese merchant ship
30
on the high seas. The MSDF, operating almost exclu-
sively in international waters to defend Japan, probably
faces even more questions than the other two forces which
are operating on or over the same terra firma they are de-
fending.
Party), April, 1970, U.S. Embassy translation, pp. 25, 29.
30Privately, even Socialist leaders have advised
SDF senior officers that they shouldn't worry, i.e
.
, the
gradual abolition Socialists have publicly advocated could
be explained away and any change as far as decreasing size
is unlikely. Socialist Party officials who are graduates
of the former Naval Academy avoid daytime activities of
class reunions but quietly come to evening festivities.




J. THE HEAD OF STATE HAS NO DIRECT RELATION TO THE FORCES
One of the most impressive pictures in Japanese
naval history is that of the Emperor Meiji in an admiral's
uniform reviewing the Imperial Navy Fleet with Admiral
Togo. The present Emperor has not donned a uniform since
the war and is not the supreme commander of the Self-
Defense Forces in theory or in fact. To avoid controversy,
the Emperor has never even visited a ship or unit of the
MSDF or any other of the other forces. On August 26, 1954,
the Emperor and Empress did present wooden cups and
cigarettes to some MSDF unit commanders and crew members
in appreciation for security measures provided during the
31
royal couple's tour of Hokkaido. Also, annually, the
highest level admirals of MSDF are presented to the
Emperor by the Chief of Maritime Staff, but these are the
only types of contacts that take place. Despite the re-
spect of the majority of Cabinet members for the Emperor,
they would not dare risk giving him the honorary title of
commander or desire to have him appear at a Naval Review
31 .Jieitai Nenpyo Kaijo Jieitai (Chronological
Table of the Maritime Self-Defense Force) Tokyo: Japan
Defense Agency, 1962, p. 150.
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in or out of uniform. Bitter attacks by Mainland Chinese
press on the person of the Emperor in 1971 made any change
in such past policy unlikely in the near future.
K. MEMBERS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE THEORETICALLY
"CIVILIANS"
Despite destroyers equipped with nuclear depth
bomb launchers, anti-submarine warfare patrol planes, and
a guided missile frigate in their arsenal, members of the
Maritime Self-Defense Force are civilians according to
Japanese law; and the government has refused to change
this status even though it is recognized as a positive
detriment to morale.
According to the "Law Governing National Servants"
of 1947 there are two kinds of government employees,
normal and special. Normal civil servants include classifi-
cations such as policemen, bureaucrats, etc. Special civil
servants include categories such as the Prime Minister,
Cabinet Ministers, government advisors, judges, Members
of the Diet, etc. Presently category sixteen of a total




Agency." Because of fear of opposition and public reac-
tion, there is no move to change this status. Prime
Minister Sato told a harsh critic in the House of Council-
lors in 1967 that, "Now and in the future we will not call
the Self-Defense Forces military (guntai ) . " A year later,
pressed in the House of Representatives, he mentioned his
rejection of any change in status again, this time dash-
ing the hopes of the Self-Defense Forces for change through
revision of the Constitution, an idea endorsed by his
brother, former Prime Minister Kishi; Sato stated, "I
have no intention of revising the Constitution . . .
especially the pacificism of Article 9. . . . This is the
flesh and blood of the Japanese people now. I will carry
33through this pacificism." As a fitting close to the
list of differences between the Maritime Self-Defense Force
and a typical navy, this domestic legal status gives the
final touch of accuracy to the statement of General Okumia
32
Law No. 120 of 1947, as amended, quoted in Kokka
Komuin Ho, Kaijo Jieitai Kaikei Hokiruishu (2) (MSDF Dis-
bursing Laws (2)), Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1962, p. 6
33
"Detailed Reports on 'Nuclear-Security' Diet
Debates, House of Representatives," Yomiuri Shimbun
,
January 31, 1968, U.S. Embassy translation.
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given at the opening of Chapter VII. As a young MSDF
officer told this writer on their first of many meetings,
"You will have difficulty understanding us because you are





Interview with Lieutenant Nagasawa Kazunami,
JMSDF, August 30, 1970.

CHAPTER IX
A NATIONAL DEFENSE "POLICY": THE THIRD POINT
OF DEPARTURE, MAY 20, 1957
The first Japanese postwar sea forces, the former
Imperial Navy minesweepers did not suffer from the lack of
firm policy as to how their mission should be carried out.
The forces of the Maritime Safety Agency had a vague mis-
sion, but their duties were relatively clear. After Japan's
recovery of sovereignty, however, the role of the Coastal
Security Force, two days old when independence was regained,
was not settled. No precise duties were specified in the
founding law nor spelled out in government policy. The
mission of the Safety Agency was very vague; and policy
for the initial sea forces was easy: the minesweepers
kept sweeping the World War II mines. In anticipation of
the new defense organization in 1954, no new mission was
immediately assigned because of the new ships received




pitifully small so there was really no problem: the first
frigates and landing craft were used for training; the
minesweepers kept sweeping.
The mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Force
within the new Defense Agency was very vague and open to
interpretation. For almost three years no explicit duties
were spelled out in a public policy; thus, the JMSDF forces
of U.S. and Japanese-made ships and aircraft kept training
for various roles and the minesweepers kept sweeping, the
latter being the only group within the organization which
really knew definitely what it was supposed to do.
With the organization of the National Defense
Council finally established in mid-1956, the definition of
a national defense policy was undertaken. Under the new
civilian control system incorporated in the Defense Agency
organization, the highest level input to the Council from
the defense organization for such a policy came not from
the Joint Staff Council, as one might expect in another
country, but from the Defense Bureau of the Defense Agency,
which was made up of bureaucrats from the prewar and post-
war police organizations. On May 20, 1957, a Cabinet
3-As has been noted, at this same time the Chairman
of the Joint Staff Council was General Hayashi Keizo, a
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meeting approved the "Basic National Defense Policy" as
recommended by the National Defense Council; the statement
has ever since remained in effect. Basic Policy was de-
fined as follows:
The purpose of national defense is to prevent
direct and indirect aggression, and, once invaded,
to repel it in order to preserve the independence
and peace of Japan for the blessings of democracy.
To achieve this purpose, the government of Japan
adopted the following principles:
1. To support the activities of the United
Nations and its promotion of international coopera-
tion, thereby contributing to the cause of world
peace.
2. To promote the national welfare and enhance
the spirit of patriotism, thereby laying a sound
basis for national security.
3. To develop gradually an effective defensive
power within the bounds of national capabilities to
the extent necessary for self-defense.
4. To cope with aggression by recourse to the
joint security system with the United States of
America, pending effective functioning of the United
Nations in preventing and removing aggression.
2
This statement did not include the specific mis-
sions listed by the former naval officers and recommended
former Home Ministry official; the Chief of Maritime
Staff was Admiral Nagasawa Ko of Imperial Navy and
Second Demobilization Ministry, the only postwar chief
of staff at the time to come from former military ranks
2
Defense of Japan 1970 , Tokyo: Japan Defense
Agency, 1970, p. 2.
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by Admiral Burke but also did not necessarily exclude them
from being undertaken. Since the policy has never been
changed and has been strongly defended by many, including
Prime Minister Sato, as having no need of being changed,
its provisions will be examined individually.
A. TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
ITS PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THEREBY
CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE
The United Nations has always been popular in post-
war Japan, but how much it has contributed to the cause of
world peace is largely speculative. Although the number
of wars it has prevented cannot be accurately estimated,
it has not seemed able to resolve the largest armed en-
counters that the postwar international scene has exper-
ienced; Vietnam is only the most recent example.
Since the Japanese were formally admitted in 1956,
they have been in favor of ideas such as the proposal for
a United Nations' University which many would like to see
constructed in Japan; but they have been unwilling so far
to participate in any type of military peacekeeping or
observer force in which they were almost forced to
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participate in 1950. Many claim that such participation
would be unconstitutional. Professor Kotani Hidejiro of
Kyoto Industrial College strongly maintains that partici-
pation of the Self-Defense Forces in a peacekeeping
mission of the United Nations would not necessitate revi-
sion of the Constitution but merely a minor change to
the Self-Defense Forces Law such as that which took place
in 1964 to allow participation in the activities associ-
3
ated with the Olympic Games. Unfortunately for the cause
he espouses, Kotani, who is probably the greatest author-
ity on this particular subject, was involved in an incident
resulting in the publication of his picture in a U.S. Air
Force fighter plane in which he had just ridden as a pas-
senger on a Vietnam combat mission; the matter attracted
enough controversy in the "progressive" Japanese press
that Kotani had to resign from his position at the National
Defense College. More recently Japanese observers have
speculated that if at some future date Japanese armed
forces are authorized to deploy abroad as part of a United
Nations' Force, their use for anything more than something
3
Interview with Professor Kotani, July 23, 1970.
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like multinational border monitoring, and that most likely
only in a non-Asian area in a conflict not involving a
great power, would not be domestically acceptable. One
official further suggested that in such a role the Japanese
participants probably would be given concurrent diplomatic
status, as is the case with Japanese military attaches
abroad today, so that they would be directly responsible
4
to diplomatic rather than military authority. For the
present, the government of Japan seems content to support
the first principle of the National Defense Policy by
attending U.N. meetings and hoping for more effectiveness
of the organization and of Japanese participation in the
future.
B. TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL WELFARE AND ENHANCE THE
SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM, THEREBY LAYING A SOUND BASIS
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
To compare the situation of occupied Japan with
the present day with regard to national welfare and
patriotism would lead to the conclusion that this principle
4
William Beecher, "Japan, 25 Years After Surrender,




has been achieved to a very great degree. Having experi-
enced the great physical and emotional sufferings of
defeat, having received a shock that only the Japanese
can rightfully claim as having experienced as a nation
in the instantaneous death and destruction from two
atomic bombs, and having experienced physical and psycho-
logical disarmament by a foreign Occupation, Japan was in
physical, emotional, and economic ruins.
Japan's economic recovery is beyond dispute; and
while government leaders and opposition spokesmen alike
deny that such resurgence should in any way be related to
military growth, the economic miracle seems to have neces-
sarily effected the national security question also. The
first reason for this contention has already been explored
in Chapter II: Japan's economic activities including the
import of critically-needed natural resources and the
export of finished products has made its relations with
other countries interdependent to an unprecedented degree.
Japan and the other East Asian countries seems inseparable
economically.
Secondly, although Japan has consistently spent
approximately one per cent or less of its gross national
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product for defense, this GNP figure has become so large
that security expenditures continue to rise annually in
total amount. Although some maximum figure could be set
rather than continuing aggregate increases while maintain-
ing a fairly stable percentage of GNP, even only such a
continuance in the future would probably not impede
economic development and, depending on the rate of economic
expansion, could result in very large future defense ex-
penditures
.
Thirdly, economic success is helping Japanese
nationalism to re-emerge. Starting with Yoshida Shigeru,
Japanese postwar prime ministers have chosen economic de-
velopment as the national priority, and success in this
field has restored confidence to politicians and to the
people, confidence which has spilled over into psychological
For one prediction of conditions under such a
continuation see Chapter XIII concerning the economic
predictions of Herman Kahn. Although the Japanese govern-
ment has reportedly been disturbed with Kahn's predictions,
Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo, a leading candidate to suc-
ceed Prime Minister Sato, has actually predicted greater
gains for the Japanese economy than Kahn percentage-wise.
Unlike Kahn, few other people seem to realize what their
predictions mean when arithmetical calculations are per-
formed based on their percentage growth rate figures;
interview with Kahn, July 2, 1971.
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and social realms as well. Pride in the nation as an
equal in the world community after years as an inferior
member has returned, and the hosted Olympics of 1964 and
the Osaka Exposition in 1970 are spectacular examples.
This does not mean that Japan has returned to
militarization; on the contrary, some uniformed leaders
even doubt that a "sound basis for national security" has
been built in spite of progress to date. Evidences that
the return of nationalism is healthy yet responsible
which should please both government and military leaders
are beginning to appear. Two recent annual public opinion
surveys by a national newspaper concerning public reaction
to the nuclear armament of Mainland China produced the
Shortly before his death in 1967, Yoshida wrote
his former military advisor, General Tatsumi Eiichi, that,
had he any idea of how dramatically the Japanese economy
would recover, he would have certainly applied more efforts
to defense. Even more than fiscal efforts, one wonders if
he would have had the political courage to call for new
elections on the issue of revision of the Constitution as
seems to have been the proper measure at the time of the
creation of the Self-Defense Forces. Admiral Yamamoto
Yoshio, Yoshida 's naval advisor, thinks he should have.
General Tatsumi only said it is hard to criticize Yoshida'
s
sincerity in wanting what he thought best for Japan.
Interviews with Tatsumi, December 8, 1970, and Yamamoto,
December 28, 1970. Tatsumi told me he had never revealed




























Concerning the Self-Defense Forces themselves, a govern-
ment poll of 1967 found that 24 per cent of the sample
surveyed stated that the reason for the need of the present
forces was for "ensuring the security of our country" while
33 per cent thought "dispatch in the case of disasters"
was the more proper role; in 1969, a similar sample found
50 per cent registering for "ensuring the security of our
Q
country" and only 13 per cent for the disaster role.
Geppo
.
Mainichi Shimbun , May 12, 29, 1969; April 30, 1970
Q
"Public Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," Seisaku
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Some civilian leaders who have talked about defense among
the people of varied political and economic groups claim
that a healthy consciousness of the necessity to defend
Japan from outside aggression is growing as reflected in
polls such as these.
The unusual legal situation of the nation's armed
forces and how it effects national security may come
under more serious examination if national self-confidence
and economic growth continue in the 1970' s. As 1972 ap-
proaches, sentiments that Okinawans do not want the Self-
Defense Forces stationed there have been heard from some
opposition politicians and in the press. Plans to station
SDF units throughout the islands and a reduced U.S. military
presence have been formulated. No one doubts the patriotism
of the Japanese people, but the insistence of the mainland
public to provide for the defense of Okinawa and the will-
ingness of the Ryukuan Japanese to accept the Self-Defense
Forces there may provide another barometer for the soundness
of the national security base.
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C. TO DEVELOP GRADUALLY AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE POWER
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES TO THE
EXTENT NECESSARY FOR SELF-DEFENSE
Of all the principles of the Basic National Defense
Policy, this is the most loaded and most significant one,
particularly for the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Since
the gradual buildup of defense power is the subject of
the next chapter, this discussion will deal with the most
controversial issue in this principle, "within the bounds
of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-
defense. "
Four key questions can be raised: Is there a dif-
ference between offensive and defensive warfare and can
certain strategies and certain armaments exclusively for
one type be selected? Can a sea strategy for an ocean-
going navy be "purely defensive"? What is the role of a
navy with a mission of defending its country from direct
and indirect aggression on the sea? Should Japan, taking
into account its geographical position, natural resource
allocations, political, economic, and psychological con-
ditions, and pledging itself only to self-defense, have
an ocean-going navy or a limited, anti-invasion,
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anti-infiltration coastal guard force?
These questions have been argued for the entire
history of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to date and as
yet, regardless of the theoretical existence of a "defense
policy," have not been finally answered. Because they and
other important policy questions have not been decided, it
is difficult to say that such a policy or a maritime de-
fense strategy exists. Generally speaking it can be said
that the civilian defense planners of the Defense Agency
have argued that there is a difference between offensive
and defensive warfare and defensive armaments can be dis-
tinguished; they have held that defensive naval strategy
can be distinguished; they have argued that to defend its
country the MSDF should be oriented against invading
enemy ships and planes as well as against infiltration,
sabotage, mining, and other indirect attacks harmful to
the territory and coastal security; and they have indicated
that this force should essentially be a limited coastal
guard force. On the other hand, the leaders of the MSDF
have questioned whether there is a difference, other
than one of intention, between offensive and defensive
warfare, particularly in the tactical sense at sea, and
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have felt that naval weapons cannot be readily distinguished
as being offensive or defensive; they have argued that a
maritime strategy for an ocean-going navy cannot be "ex-
clusively defensive," particularly in the sense that a
navy can fix its position on the sea and wait to be at-
tacked; they have felt that to defend its country the
MSDF should guard against direct and indirect attacks on
its territories from the sea and should insure Japan's
vital necessity to use the sea and coasts freely; and they
have held that because of Japan's nature as a maritime na-
tion and extensive and necessary involvement on the sea,
an ocean-going navy is required.
Since failure to resolve this controversy is indica-
tive of the lack of a defense policy, it is important to
understand how completely lacking any effort to resolve
it has been. In order to describe the objectives of the
planners of the Defense Bureau as compared to those of
the leadership of the MSDF, this writer will elaborate
two positions called for purposes of identification "The
Kaihara Vision" and "The Sekino Vision." The first is
named after Kaihara Osamu, former head and long a member
of the Defense Bureau who has on occasion been called
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"Emperor Kaihara," in recognition of his strong will and
powerful approaches to controversial issues, or "Rikuhara"
(Army-hara) , in view of his supposedly anti-Navy attitudes.
Kaihara presently heads the Secretariat of the National
Defense Council, and a former subordinate and close con-
fidant now heads the Defense Bureau. "The Sekino Vision"
is named after Sekino Hideo, retired commander in the
Imperial Navy, a close associate of many former naval
officers, an advisor to the Foreign Ministry on security
matters, and a prominent writer on national security
affairs. Both men have written extensively on their
views as to the authorized and practical roles of the MSDF.
Both have elaborated their ideas in interviews with this
writer; however, they have not named their views as is be-
9ing done here. While not all members of the Defense Bureau
9Both Mr. Kaihara and Commander Sekino have read
and acceded to English copies of the respective vision as
representative of their views. Kaihara 's views were ob-
tained from three personal interviews, an unpublished
speech in English entitled, "The Defense of Japan and U.S.
Military Bases," and especially from his recent article,
"Kare o Shiri Onore o Shiru " (We Should Know Ourselves as
well as Knowing Them) , Kokubo (The National Defense)
,
April, 1971. Sekino's ideas were obtained from three per-
sonal interviews, an English article, "Japan and Her
Maritime Defense," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
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necessarily support Kaihara and the leading officers of
the MSDF may well have ideas more up-to-date tactically
and technologically than Sekino's, the ideas of these
authorities are believed fairly typical of leading
Defense-Bureau-civilian and MSDF points of view, respec-
tively.
"The Kaihara Vision" purports to learn from the
mistakes of Japanese failure in World War II. Pointing
out that on the Navy side the great defeat suffered was
resultant from an unrealistic strategy of one decisive
fleet encounter and speed-and-surprise attack, from
flamboyant spirit which was more concerned with spectacular
successes and style than with final outcome, and from
optimistic thinking that some kind of "Divine Wind" would




a strategy that did not take into account the harsh reali-
ties of what a Pacific War against the United States would
May, 1971, and especially from his article, "A Diagnosis of
Our Maritime Self-Defense Force," Sekai no Kansen (Ships
of the World), November, 1970.
Kaihara has written one book specifically on
this subject, Senshi ni Manabu (Lessons from World War II),
Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha , 1970.
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entail and as a result never having any real chance of
victory. Kaihara praises the plan of Admiral Inoue Shigemi
submitted in early 1941 as the one brilliant piece of
realistic thinking that came forth from the prewar Navy.
The plan was, of course, rejected; and Kaihara fears
that today Japan may again be rejecting a realistic Inoue-
type plan for unachievable and dangerous dreams.
"The Kaihara Vision" posits that the small island
country of Japan can never wage a major war with a super-
power because of the twin damaging characteristics of its
geography and natural resource allocation; i.e
.
, the nar-
row islands dictate that Japan cannot retreat and regroup
but must always fight from one front line, and with scant
resources Japan must always import basic raw materials
and export finished goods in order to sustain a vibrant
economy. Particularly in the nuclear age, despite how
much destruction Japan might be able to inflict on another
country, geography dictates that there will be no second-
strike capability and that Japan will be among the sure
losers in any nuclear exchange with a big power. Kaihara
feels that those individuals such as Sekino who advocate
a Japanese nuclear deterrent force are "beautiful dreamers"
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such as existed in Japan before the war. Ticking off
statistics of Soviet missile strength in the manner reminis
cent of an American like former Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara or National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy,
Kaihara argues: "If we started from nothing in nuclear
armament (whatever amount of weapons were built by Japan)
would be tiny fireworks compared with the Soviet stock
-
11piles." Rather than deterring any attack upon Japan or
effectively providing for national security, possession of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or nuclear
submarines carrying multiple independently targeted re-
entry vehicles (MIRVs) would serve an opposite purpose by
causing fears from other parts of the world which have ob-
served Japan's erratic behavior in the past. Strategic
nuclear deterrence can be and is willingly provided for
Japan by the United States which is capable of credibly
deterring the Soviet Union at the present and China in
the future, something Japan could never do now or then.
Kaihara, "Nonnuclear is not a Myth," Shokun
,
December, 1970. See also Kaihara, "The Nonnuclear Myth
Has Vanished," Shokun , October, 1970.
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Another "unrealistic dream" of today, attacked by
Kaihara, this one caused by a guilty conscience of failure
in World War II, is the desire of Japanese naval officers
represented by Sekino to secure Japan's commercial sea
lanes against "invisible enemies," i.e ., against unidenti-
fied submarines which are usually assumed to be Soviet or
Chinese. According to Kaihara, such a role for the MSDF
is unauthorized, unrealistic, and impossible.
The role is unauthorized because Japan's sea lanes
minimally extend throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
and attacks on Japanese merchantmen in these far distant
areas are not the narrowly- defined types of direct and
indirect aggressions against "the nation" spelled out in
the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.
The role is unrealistic because these sea lanes
do not extend over narrow fixed paths which can be somehow
"secured" but instead are of infinite number depending on
the destinations to be sought, types of shipping employed,
weather conditions encountered, etc. Further, it is
unrealistic because the equipment with which to perform
such a task is, first, unavailable and, second, if it
were available, it would be unattainable in sufficient
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quantity ever to be effective. To illustrate, Kaihara
treats the problem of ship sonars and torpedoes. Despite
the best sound and navigational ranging (SONAR) system avail-
able, detection of a submarine is by no means assured; he
recounts some of the difficulties experienced by the U.S.
Navy in this field. Torpedoes, he adds, have trouble catch-
ing fast nuclear submarines even if they are equipped with
homing devices and can be delivered near to their target;
again he talks about the great problems experienced by the
United States Navy and the great expenditures it has put
forth in this regard. He often asks the MSDF pointed
questions as to the capabilities of its present stock of
torpedoes to operate in areas like the shallow Malacca
Straits or the straits near Japan. If reliable equipment
were available, Kaihara asks, how could the MSDF be in
enough positions to help attacked ships which might be
located anywhere in the Pacific or Indian Oceans? He
questions whether "the invisible enemy" could be dis-
tinguished as "the" enemy; and, positing himself as that
enemy, he picks only the weakly defended areas or gaps to
make his attacks. Quoting figures given in studies by
groups favoring ideas like Sekino's as to the number of
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escort ships that would be necessary to sustain a supply of
twenty vessels per day into Japan, Kaihara questions the
ability to sustain this amount, even with the large number
of escort ships required; as a critic, again citing his
opposition's sources and admissions of weakness on this
point, he, as a potential enemy, attacks on the seventh
day, the tenth day, or whenever the limited Japanese forces
are at their weakest. He even questions the ability of
Japan to provide sufficient manpower greatly to expand the
MSDF, noting the recent recruiting difficulties and project-
ing meager fruits from even a highly unlikely two-year
conscription system.
Finally the mission is impossible because it is
oriented against the Soviet Union which Japan has no cap-
ability to fight. He believes even the present oft-mentioned
strategy of trying to block Soviet submarines from passing
through the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin
enroute to the Pacific from their base in Vladivostok is
offensively oriented. Citing the fact that just the Soviet
Pacific Fleet of 120 submarines, twenty of which are nuclear,
is three times larger than the entire U.S. Navy submarine
fleet at the beginning of World War II, a fleet that
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subsequently destroyed Japanese maritime commerce, Kaihara
points out that, despite a claim that the 1967-1971 defense
buildup program was supposed to provide the MSDF with moni-
toring capability in the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and
Hokkaido, where Soviet submarines can pass unbothered in
peacetime, the buildup program, which has been declared
97.5 per cent completed by the Defense Agency, has not
provided effective monitoring capability in this area. By
concentrating solely on anti-submarine warfare, Kaihara
feels the MSDF is trying again to fight the Second World
War. Despite the fact that its priorities are now differ-
ent, he feels the results in any such conflict would
inevitably be the same.
"The Kaihara Vision" is persuaded, however, that
there is a proper authorized, and necessary role for the
MSDF. The role comes directly from the stated mission, to
defend Japan against direct and indirect invasion. Since
Japan is surrounded by water on four sides, an invading
enemy must come over or through the water. He feels that
instead of using undefinable terms like "securing sea
lanes" and "securing command of the sea" the MSDF should
discuss the neglected but legal role of "repelling enemy
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invasion." The latter, he feels, naval officers do not want
to do because they feel the threat of direct invasion is
very small; and they would rather concentrate on larger
goals on the open sea. Kaihara also feels that the danger
is very small; but that even if it is only one or two per
cent, it must be protected against because one invasion
is enough to take from Japan her independence. Also and
very important, this danger of direct or indirect terri-
torial invasion is the only kind of threat authorized for
Japan's Self-Defense Forces to resist. Realistically
Kaihara believes that the Soviet Union might well be the
enemy, and he thinks that resistance must be offered. He
states that the most favorable outcome is not spectacular
victory but is to delay conquest until diplomacy can solve
the crisis or outside help from the United States or the
United Nations can be enlisted.
Although ideal or maximum figures for aggregate
tonnage and number of ships are left unspecified and are
determined by the relative threat, specifically "The
Kaihara Vision" would do several things immediately.
First, it would dissolve the Self-Defense Fleet which is
headquartered in Yokosuka and put its front-line ships in

288
the Ominato and Maizuru Regional Districts (see map follow-
ing page) which are oriented towards the most likely direc-
tion of invasion. Secondly, it would unite the Maritime
Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Safety Agency into
one anti-invasion, anti-infiltration, and rescue force
oriented toward the authorized and only reasonable mis-
sions a Japanese sea force can support. It would employ
destroyers (seemingly the English name of escort ships
should change), minesweepers, coastal patrol and rescue
ships and aircraft in a role of coping with an invading
amphibious force, a covertly- laid minefield, an infiltra-
tion of saboteurs or insurgents, and of aiding ships in
distress; it would employ submarines mainly as targets
to train destroyers against attacks they might receive
while resisting an enemy invasion force. Third, it would
reallocate budgetary resources to stop merely buying ship
platforms and fancy weapons which support "beautiful
dreams" rather than providing a balance of ships, aircraft,
ammunition, and fuel which provide an effective, limited
capability against invasion. Fourth, it would frankly
state the capabilities of Japan and its dependence on





and completely control the Pacific-oriented bases of
Yokosuka and Sasebo, realizing that to compensate the
United States for its support of Japan, the latter must
allow the United States to use these bases in its own
interests
.
"The Sekino Vision" would agree that Japan made a
drastic mistake in attempting to fight a Pacific War with
the United States but would maintain that Japan's geography
and natural resource allocation require that the nation be
a Pacific power, politically, economically, and also in a
military sense. Hopefully, from the Pacific War and the
subsequent friendly treatment by the United States, particu-
larly from the United States Navy to the Japanese Navy,
Japan has learned that it has nothing to fear from and has
common interests with the United States in the Pacific and
that the relationship between the two navies will always
remain friendly as it has for the past 25 years.
Sekino feels that there exists a stable balance of
strategic nuclear deterrence between the United States and
the Soviet Union, neither being willing to strike first
because of fears of the loss of 100 million lives and the
destruction of the greater part of its industry. Since
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neither is willing to strike, their pledges of nuclear pro-
tection for their allies do not have as large a deterrent
effect for those individual countries. He does not believe
either the United States or the Soviet Union will wage a
nuclear war resulting in its own destruction to protect
an ally against foreign attack. For this reason, he be-
lieves, America's European allies in NATO have armed them-
selves with tactical nuclear weapons. These can hopefully
succeed in deterring or checking a large-scale enemy in-
vasion with credibility short of forcing the United States
to engage in strategic nuclear warfare with the Soviet
Union; the tactical nuclears are reinforced with the pledge
of U.S. strategic support behind them. Sekino believes that
such kind of tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in
Okinawa and effectively shelter Taiwan, South Korea and
Japan and seriously, doubts, as do many U.S. military au-
thorities, how credible Japan's security will be if these
weapons are removed with the reversion of Okinawa to
12
Japan. Since Mainland China has already developed and
12
For example see views of Lt. General Paul W.
Caraway, USA (Ret.), former High Commissioner of the
Ryukyu Islands and Commanding General of the U.S. Army
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is continuing a buildup of intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) and progressing toward the possession of
an ICBM system, unless tactical nuclear weapons are
definitely pledged in support by the United States, pos-
sessed by Japan under some kind of bilateral sharing ar-
rangement, or possessed outright by Japan, a blackmail
situation could develop. In the future Sekino believes
that Japanese nationalism will not tolerate such a situa-
tion and that a cooperative arrangement with the United
States is therefore best from the standpoint of dealing
with the threat and of easing the fears of U.S. and
friendly Pacific countries as to Japan's intentions. To
objections that such weapons are not credible because of
the lack of a second-strike capability by Japan stemming
from geography, he would maintain that ballistic missile
submarines possessed by Japan would be able to threaten
minimum unacceptable damage to China and, when backed by
the United States, to the Soviet Union. Since these mis-
siles could be delivered even though Japan's territory
Ryukyu Islands from 1961-1965 in United States-Japanese
Relations , Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1968, p. 25.
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might be destroyed, they would hopefully deter an attack
in the first place. This scenario he believes to be more
realistic than the present potential blackmail situation.
As to the protection of maritime traffic, Sekino
acknowledges its difficulty but not its impossibility.
Citing the figure of Japan having to import 99 per cent
of its oil to survive, he feels it is a "beautiful dream"
not to be worried about the situation. Although he also
worries about direct invasion, he argues that direct in-
vasion is the one instance where the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security provides for assistance for
Japan from the United States, while on the sea lanes the
United States has no commitment in writing to help Japan.
"Therefore, Japan cannot expect the cooperation of the
powerful Seventh Fleet in protecting maritime traffic,
although it can expect the Seventh Fleet's cooperation in
13
case of direct invasion of Japan."
Sekino cites figures similar to Kaihara's on the
size of the Soviet submarine force and concedes the
13





great expanse of Japan's trade routes. He also agrees
that the enemy would certainly attempt to attack the weak
points in Japan's security posture. Thus he feels it is
ridiculous that Japan, whose gross national product is
second in the non- communist world and whose merchant
fleet is the largest in the world, expects to get by in
1976 with an MSDF of 250,000 tons of ships and 250 air-
craft. His summary of the strengths of Pacific navies
and his estimate of required and officially projected
Japanese sea force strength are listed in Table IX- 1.
In wartime, "The Sekino Vision" posits Japan
reducing its shipping to about half the normal peacetime
level and limiting its operating areas to the seas north
of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the
United States and Japan, in order to maintain approxi-
mately 50 per cent of its present economic activity,
enough to secure national life. Since the majority of
crude oil now comes from the Persian Gulf, since Japan
cannot control the Indian Ocean, and since, even if it
could, oil could be shut off at the source in the politi-
cally sensitive Middle East, Japan would have to secure
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and Australia, hopefully cooperating with the U.S. and
Australian navies and keeping friendly relations with
Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries.
Even without the cooperation of the U.S. and Australia,
which might be too busy to help, Japan, according to
this plan, if it could secure the seas north of Indonesia,
could load oil brought to Palau Island, a U.S. trust ter-
ritory east of the Philippines, and other large ports from
more distant sources by foreign ships and thus maintain
the minimum necessary supply.
To answer charges that his plan is just a "beauti-
ful dream" or impossible, Commander Sekino has posited
what he calls a "Maritime Safety Zone" which he would
establish during wartime between two chains of islands,
an eastern one running from the Izu Islands south of
Tokyo Bay to the Bonin Islands to Iwoj ima and then to the
Marianas, and a western chain from Kyushu to Okinawa to
the Philippines to Borneo. On appropriate islands of
both chains sonar listening stations monitoring fixed sonar
arrays and anti-submarine fixed-wing and helicopter patrol
plane bases would be established. Hunter-killer groups of
destroyers, aircraft and submarines would operate in the
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zone and augment the direct escort forces which would
convoy shipping through some portions of the zone where
natural geographical features do not allow sufficient
protection from other means. Such features include the
sea bottom to the east of the eastern chain of islands
which would allow arrays of hydrophones to be set at ap-
propriate depths around the islands. Several high-power,
very- low- frequency (VLF) active ( i.e . , positively-trans-
mitting rather than passive-listening) sonar stations
would be established on several appropriate islands; and
by combining the use of active, passive, and semi-active
sonars together with the hydrophones and VLF sonar stations,
targets would be detected with a considerably high prob-
ability to ranges of 100 to 200 miles from the barrage line,
allowing patrol planes and helicopters stationed on nearby
islands to reach detection points within one hour in order
to classify, localize, attack, and destroy enemy sub-
marines or at the least discourage them from entering the
safety zone where they would be subject to detection and
attack. This theoretical model extends air defense over
the "Maritime Safety Zone" with anti-air radars and
vertical take-off and landing fighters (VTOL) stationed
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on islands of the chains or by equipping jet ASW patrol
planes with air-to-air missiles in order to provide ef-
fective interception against enemy land-based, large-size
planes. Since the "Maritime Safety Zone" is south of
Japan, Soviet submarines would become more inefficient
as they operate further away from their bases. The
conventionally-powered models are posited as being limited
to the sea area north of Indonesia. Nuclear submarines
would, if passing undetected through the partially-
monitored Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits, encounter
various Japanese ASW measures including barriers, patrol
groups, and nuclear attack submarine wolf packs so that
even their operating freedom would be much restricted.
"The Sekino Vision" does not predict a victory over the
Soviet Union or any other country but is an attempt to
keep open Japan's sea lanes until enemy submarine warfare
becomes too costly and is discontinued.
Direct invasion is also seen as a threat, particu-
larly from the Soviet Union. In such a case Sekino sees
the ASDF as being occupied maintaining control of the air
over the battle zone and nearby areas while the MSDF is
attempting to destroy invading sea forces enroute to Japan
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before they can land much as "The Kaihara Vision" would
envision. He also concedes that with limited SDF and
the strategic geographical narrow island structure, the
destruction of such forces at their bases is necessary
but is difficult without Japanese attack aircraft car-
riers. Sekino, like Kaihara, would thus delay the enemy
until the arrival of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
Although aims such as cooperating with the United
States, repelling direct invasion, having an effective
capability in fields such as minewarfare and anti-
infiltration patrol are similar, there are widely divergent
goals for the MSDF under the two plans just described.
Kaihara 's ideas posit a limited and cautious Japan realiz-
ing its past mistakes, keeping a small, balanced, anti-
invasion naval guard force; Sekino 's see a resurgent Japan
learning from the past but intent on maintaining its
economic role in the Pacific with a larger, ocean-going
naval force. Given the political and popular sentiment
in Japan against large military establishments and the
situation of civilian control already described, why then
has not the position of Mr. Kaihara, described even by his




Some observations based on interviews with military
and civilian junior and senior personnel are offered.
First, it is a fact that this view has been re-
sisted continuously by the leadership of the MSDF for
many of the same reasons its seniors resisted a union with
the Maritime Safety Agency at the time of the MY Committee"
in 1951; the naval leaders do not feel that a coastal
guard force is adequate for an engaged, maritime nation.
As military men it is difficult for them to be convinced
that there are such things as offensive and defensive
equipments. Although they feel that the Soviet Union or
China might have offensive intentions toward Japan or
other countries, it is the intention rather than the
weaponry that determines such a classification. All MSDF
leaders to date have been Imperial Navy officers who have
been trained by the United States Navy. Civilian leaders
claim Japan will not have "offensive weapons" but change
the definitions to suit convenience and willingly accept
protection from such weapons they call offensive which are
owned by the United States. In fact the most defensive
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